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Joseph Myers
Kansas City,
1930.

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PACIFISM IN THE MODERN WORLD

We fear to experiment, when to leave things as they are is worse than any possible results of experimentation. We are like the navigators of the Middle Ages who hugged the eastern shores of the Atlantic fearing unknown monsters in those western seas in which later explorers found only fertile islands and a rich new world.

—Professor Edward P. Cheyney,
Law in History.

PACIFISM IN THE MODERN WORLD

EDITED BY
DEVERE ALLEN
EDITOR, "THE WORLD TOMORROW"

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INTRODUCTION: PACIFISM OLD AND NEW

THE power of good-will in human relations has been the theme of prophets in all ages.

Primitive man is being revealed by modern studies as a far less violent creature than commonly assumed by those who thoughtlessly associate the term "savage" with unrestrained ferocity.

Centuries before the so-called Christian Era lone voices crying out against war must have inspired the crude attempts at arbitration in Greece and the Near East. Isaiah's counsel of trust in providential intervention against Sennacherib, the Assyrian invader in 701 B. C., contains strong suggestions of nonviolent resistance.

Lao-Tse, the protagonist of Taoism, taught about 500 B. C. a philosophy of "nonaction" which held definite anti-war implications. Confucius, his contemporary, also emphasized nonviolence. Mo Ti, in the Third Century B. C., stressed the need of "equal love to all" as a solvent for war and injustice.

Likewise Gautama laid down for the religion of Buddhism principles which were the antithesis of warfare.

Historically, it remained for loyal Mohammedanism and apostate Christianity among the great re-

ligions to write down the bloodiest records and in varying degrees to elevate the heroism of the warrior into a virtue.

The young prophet of Nazareth who is exalted by the Christian Church did not issue learned books on international relations; but in a social order which was torn by war and subjugation and which seethed with revolutionary plots he clearly enunciated a pacifist principle of love which only takes on increased validity because of his vigorous, forceful character. For two hundred and fifty years his followers maintained in remarkable fidelity their unwillingness to compromise with military methods and régimes.

But from the time when Constantine made Christianity his imperial handmaid in 312 A. D. only a "remnant" in every generation carried on the original nonviolent way of life. Down through the Dark and Middle Ages little bands of peace-loving individuals, small and troublesome sects, allowed no wars or rumors of wars to weaken their trust in the way of Jesus, at times paying heavily for their belief and enduring persecution or martyrdom. The names of these sects in some cases have been reduced by time to unfathomable silence just as time has turned to dust the bodies of their devotees. To "injure no one and practice love to the brethren"—such was the ideal of one "remnant" now submerged in impenetrable obscurity.

The Albigenses and the Waldensians, or "Poor Men of Lyons," at least closely approximated a nonviolent mode of conduct. The Bohemian Brethren; the Anabaptists; the followers of Menno Simons, or Mennonites; the Schwenkfelders, founded by Caspar

Schwenkfeld; the Dunkards; the Doukhobors; the Shakers; the Quakers—all these, though often vastly differing from each other and sometimes changing their emphases in different periods, kept alive the ideal of a warless, hateless life. In some cases the principle of nonviolence was central; in others it was secondary to the assertion of a sectarian tenet or, rarely, a concrete program of social redemption and reform.

When Napoleon scourged the European peoples until ultimate defeat at Waterloo set him down on St. Helena, the infinite cruelties of that period brought about a natural reaction. Peace societies were suggested in England, though actual organization there was delayed until the formation of three small societies in the young United States.

The first peace society in the world was organized in the summer of 1815, at the home of David Low Dodge in New York City. Dodge was radically a pacifist, holding views essentially like those put forward by Tolstoy at the end of the century. Here and there progressive Friends assisted the new societies which sprang up, and under Quaker leadership the second peace group was formed in far Ohio. The third society was established late in 1815 by the Rev. Noah Worcester, aided by William Ellery Channing. This, the Massachusetts Peace Society, was less radical than the others, sanctioning "defensive" war; it also paid more attention to current happenings and, unlike the earlier two, did not entirely neglect war's economic causes. Thus it was at once more alert and more conservative. It was less elaborately pietistic; but it also interposed no serious principle to member-

ship by almost anybody. Naturally, it outgrew the more radical movements.

Pacifism, however, was definitely respected by the entire peace movement in those days and occupied a considerable share in the articles, addresses, tracts, and books of the period. From 1815 until 1846 it steadily grew in influence.

The American Peace Society, when organized in 1828 to federate the local societies scattered from Maine and Ohio to South Carolina, was a mixture of radical and conservative. After its founder and chief benefactor, William Ladd, became a radical pacifist in 1834, its trend toward a more thoroughgoing position was accelerated. In 1837 it rejected the toleration of "defensive" war entirely. But when William Ladd died, in 1841, the leadership passed into conservative hands, occasioning a revolt in 1846 which led to the resignation of Samuel E. Coues, the Society's president; Elihu Burritt, its most significant figure; and a good many other radicals. From that time on, save for a period under the guidance of Benjamin F. Trueblood, a Quaker, from 1892 to 1913, this oldest of our peace societies has embraced a steadily more conservative viewpoint.

The immediate occasion for the schism of 1846 was principally the Mexican War. The American Peace Society was divided on the righteousness of that conflict. Everywhere in the North the war was unpopular with thoughtful citizens; the Massachusetts legislature passed a resolution condemning it with incredibly strong language. The pacifist wing of the peace movement saw many political conservatives speaking more

strongly against the conflict than the peace societies themselves. As the war went on some of the cumulative resentment of the people against the war led to a stiffening of attitude, and the record of the later years was by no means one of supine acquiescence. Yet the early opportunity for prompt, effective protest had been lost.

While Elihu Burritt labored in England and the United States to build up his League of Universal Brotherhood, securing over thirty thousand members who repudiated all war and all peace-time voluntary military service, the country drifted on toward internecine conflict. When it came Burritt and other pacifists were unheeded; William Lloyd Garrison, formerly the chief spokesman for nonresistance, counselled silence on the peace cause for the sake of slavery's abolition through war. Whittier, Emerson, a great many Friends, and almost the entire leadership of the organized peace movement put the cause of war abolition in cold storage and aided military morale to the best of their ingenious abilities. Pacifism was ruthlessly suppressed, though the government was very lenient toward many noncombatant Quakers. Unlike England, France, Spain, Denmark, Mexico (and later Brazil), the United States ushered in Negro freedom by hate and bloodshed, thereby engendering a bitterness against which the "free" Negro could make headway only slowly and through hard travail.

The peace movement was bankrupt. In 1866 some of those who had opposed the war and the quick surrender of the American Peace Society established the

Universal Peace Union under the guidance of Alfred H. Love, a young Quaker merchant of Philadelphia, and with the aid of such distinguished pacifists as Lucretia Mott, Joshua P. Blanchard—an active peace worker for half a century, the Massachusetts legislator Amasa Walker—father of the secret ballot law, and Adin Ballou of the Hopedale Community. Now a new spirit was manifest, and the Universal Peace Union urged the pacifist view of nonparticipation in war along with removal of war's causes, arbitration, and international peace congresses—finally coming to coöperate with the American Peace Society where possible.

The latter organization, led by Trueblood, voiced strong opposition to the Spanish-American War, joining with the Anti-Imperialist League in condemning the atrocious Philippine campaign, and genuinely establishing a record of at least one war, even though minor, courageously withstood.

The World War, as everyone knows, drew into its whirlpool substantially the whole old-line peace movement. More by far than in any previous conflict was free speech abridged and all war opposition driven underground. Many erstwhile leaders in the peace societies took posts of prominence in the great "crusade" for a warless world.

Out of that last betrayal pacifism again emerged to assert itself with new determination. The word "pacifist," formerly accepted by the great bulk of the peace movement, was now anathema, and few public speakers who touched even remotely on the question of world peace failed to establish their trustworthi-

ness by reminding their listeners, "I am not a pacifist. . . .

Those who are familiar with the pacifist movement know that it has been experiencing a definite growth. In proportionate numbers there are hardly as many pacifists in the United States as there were from 1835 to 1848. But to be a pacifist now requires a far deeper sense of conviction than in those days, when conscription was still abhorred and our war machinery was in a primitive state. Notwithstanding all the difficulties, pacifism definitely seems to be gaining. In England it is strong, and in many parts of the Continent, where it made slow headway through the Nineteenth Century, it has exhibited a striking increase, especially in the new Germany, in Holland, and in the Scandinavian countries. In India the Gandhi movement has been built up on a basis of nonviolence, though how fully impregnated with that method the movement is as a whole remains still to be tested. The historic nonviolence of China, always actually less than is usually taken for granted, has for a time at least been thrown aside. Pacifism is still young in Japan, though exemplified by some remarkable personalities. In Latin America very little of it has been manifested outside of a few youth groups. Yet all in all, the present international status of pacifism, while that of a small and frequently persecuted movement in a hostile world, is an evidence of its imperishable vitality.

But most people still respond to pacifism as Mirabeau replied to a new group of French Quakers in 1791: "Thou desirest peace. Well! It is feebleness

which makes its appeal to war. A general resistance would result in universal Peace!"

To many people even in the present-day peace movement pacifism is a point of view not clearly understood. For this the pacifists themselves are in part to blame. They can hardly be expected to penetrate the minds of those who intolerantly rant against them with inflamed emotions; but there are many far more open-minded who find it genuinely hard to comprehend what the pacifist is driving at.

Pacifists have done too little to meet these honest perplexities. Frequently they adopt toward their own deepest convictions a deprecatory attitude, almost of apology; always there are those who believe "no good can come from pressing viewpoints which cause antagonism"; occasionally the pacifist, more than he realizes, tends to leave the fresh vitality of his unique position in a safe-deposit box for a future emergency and devotes his energy entirely to seconding the motions made by his more orthodox comrades in the peace movement.

To aid somewhat in a deeper understanding of pacifism is the chief purpose of this book. Many of those who contribute to it are performing work of acknowledged value and are occupying places of such public responsibility that their ideas can hardly be dismissed as the vague dreams of temperamental extremists; nor may they themselves be lightly dismissed as dogmatic fundamentalists of passivism. While the book makes no pretense of being a complete or even a thoroughly coördinated expression of pacifist thought,

its writers are fairly representative and in their differences of opinion and emphasis typify the divergences of many pacifist groups. Each author, it should be understood, speaks for himself and for none of the others; nor does the editor speak for any. Yet despite the effect of variety, through the thought of all flows an essential unity of purpose, the distinctive view of life which makes pacifism what it is. And if what it is finds in these pages no concise or conclusive definition, that too is natural; for pacifism is defined by the lives of pacifists rather than the neat sentence or the academic phrase.

These essays may also help to indicate the substantial differences between the pacifism of to-day and the pacifism of tradition. Modern pacifism has its own distinctive emphases. Pacifists, like other people, live in this complex world; they are a part of our times and would not escape if they could into a quiet retreat for perpetual monastic contemplation. No less than their prototypes they listen for commandments coming down from Sinai; but more than the old-time pacifists they seek also to keep in tune with the finite.

A sadly distorted conception of modern pacifism may easily be conveyed by a too facile comparison of it with the nonviolent philosophies of antiquity and even the expressions of comparatively recent times. Some of the older traits of the pacifist sects manifest themselves to-day as anachronisms and eccentricities, a fact which complicated immensely the officers who had the job of classifying conscientious objectors in the World War. But in more than superficial matters changes have come about.

Lao-Tse, it is highly probable, believed in "defensive" war; and Taoism was based on an ascetic ideal which put a low value on culture. Buddha's "harmlessness" and renunciation commonly induced a withdrawal from social problems rather than a grappling with them. The Albigenses maintained a form of religious activity which was not free from numerous gross excesses. Few of the other nonviolent groups present a mode of thought wholly likely to win thinking people to pacifism in our day, unless it is carefully extricated from its traditionalistic impediments.

The pacifism of to-day is strongly positive. The pacifist's concern is not merely the salvation of his soul by refusal to sin through the employment of violence; he is out to abolish war and conceives of his pacifism as a means directly to that end. The old individualistic type of pacifism, offering the world a "testimony" by example, is of course alive to-day, though the vocabulary is somewhat changed. However, the pacifist who uses his influence as he may in nonconscript countries, and the war resister in more militaristic lands who goes to jail refusing military service, are alike in visualizing a world order ultimately freed from the clutch of the war monster. Regardless of how often pacifists may appear to the public eye as obstructionists, recalcitrants, or slackers, they are undertaking positive accomplishment in social progress.

Though they are profoundly religious, using the word to include the mystic and the rationalist humanitarian alike, they are more and more inclined to interpret their faith in the divine possibilities of the human race under the light of social science—subject-

ing their ideas to continual and rigorous tests in their own experience, the relations of groups, and in concrete international situations. And not merely are they theorizing: whether they roam the seven seas or stay at home, theirs are often lives of adventurous devotion to an ideal the core of which is action.

Present-day pacifism differs vastly in its estimate of human nature from the pacifism of the years gone by. It does not regard man as wholly angelic or sublime; but it has laid away its belief in infant damnation. One could compile from the writings of the earlier peace movement literally thousands of citations of the Apostle James: "From whence come wars and fightings among you? Come they not hence, even of your lusts that war in your members?" Without giving *homo sapiens* a clean bill of health, the pacifist of to-day is aware of the fact that infanticide, human sacrifice, marriage by capture, slavery, the duel, and a multitude of other evil institutions have been done away with, and all without revolutionizing human nature.

To-day we are neither optimists nor pessimists. We know that even the probable does not always work out; but we also know that the impossible is being done again and again. The pacifist is not so visionary as to trust war for the accomplishment of any good end; it is he, rather than the one who capitulates to apparent military necessities, who is after all the realist.

On the whole, pacifists in this day are increasingly reluctant to proffer panaceas. Disillusioned though they rightfully are, they often coöperate actively in

the promotion of other work for peace, while insisting that without pacifism as a basic conviction and program the peace movement will be unable to achieve the final abolition of war. They are conspicuously different from many of the old-type abstainers from violence in their realization that pacifism touches all of life with a new beauty and lets loose in society a leavening ideal profoundly in contrast with our contemporary economic and social structure. Pacifism in our day directly challenges imperialism, industrial autocracy, punishment as a basis for penology, race prejudice, indeed every phase of the existing social order which thwarts fellowship and love. Nonviolence, which Gandhi once called "the greatest force," they hold a scientific principle; if applied with the artistry of good-will, it is capable of its own distinctive revolutions.

One of the contributors to this volume, writing in another place, has said that "Those who devote themselves to the art of life have no place left for the art of death." That is the genius of pacifism in the modern world.

THE EDITOR.

THE MEANING OF PACIFISM

PAUL JONES

Paul Jones is a Bishop of the Protestant Episcopal Church, formerly of the Diocese of Utah, from which he resigned rather than support the War. Since, he has been secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. He has published numerous articles and has addressed a large number of audiences, varying from Rotary and city congregations to free-speech meetings and radical labor groups. He is chairman of Reconciliation Trips, a member of the board of directors of the League for Industrial Democracy, and a member of the board of directors of the National Consumers' League.

THE MEANING OF PACIFISM

PAUL JONES

When an admiral or even an ordinary citizen remarks: "The only thing some of these nations understand is the big stick"; when a person says of some offender: "He ought to be punished"; when it is suggested in regard to people of another race, "You've got to keep them in their place"; or when an industrialist insists upon the necessity for his autocratic control of the industrial process: the pacifist enters his emphatic dissent from such proposals, not only because they imply the use of methods which involve a disregard of personality and frequent injustices, but because they proceed from a view of life which he regards as fundamentally unsound and self-defeating.

Of course, the term "pacifism" has been applied to all sorts of people who would not accept any such description of it. Under its shade have been grouped social radicals who oppose international or capitalistic war, but who are quite ready to fight the class war; those who refuse to take part in killing but who have little conception of, or interest in, brotherhood; those who are willing to work for peace but who will engage in war when it comes; and even those who believe that the best way to make peace is by the war method. Most of them probably would be glad to be relieved

of the label; but in any case the aim here is not to develop an exclusive definition of pacifism, but to present the background of the idea in its aspect of a coherent, well-rounded approach to life rooted in recognized principles.

Pacifism, then, I would call an attitude to life arising from a belief in human capacity for social action, which stresses the importance of the reaction of person upon person and group upon group, and which consequently uses only methods calculated to evoke coöperative action in seeking to achieve a progressive integration of life in every field of human relations.

Essentially, the thing is not negative, although many people who do not understand it suppose that it is. They think of pacifism as a dogmatic and fanatical opposition to war or to methods of violence. They see pacifists opposing big navies and small navies, military training and conscription, economic imperialism and exploitation of labor, aspects of our penal system and racial segregation; and without realizing that those activities are the outcome of a view of human relations completely different from the one commonly accepted, they come to the conclusion that the pacifist is just a soft-headed, well-meaning kicker. They do not inquire as to why the pacifist has taken the stand he has, and perhaps he is at fault for not making clearer the springs of his action; but the fact remains that the issue is between two fundamentally conflicting views of life. The pacifist has back of him a well-grounded theory of human relations, and although the present dominance of a different theory forces him into the attitude of a critic of current poli-

cies, he is in reality much more of an advocate of a constructive program than the usual defender of things as they are.

The recognition of the value of personality is one of the points at which the pacifist begins. Does anyone know just what personality is? It is one of those elusive things that defy definition just as life does; but exactly as we continue to live and know something of life's manifestations without being able to define it, so we know that we are persons and we are beginning to know more about the way persons behave although still awaiting an adequate definition. Personality is what gives life its meaning and dignity. Life itself may be sacred so that it should not be taken or even given lightly, but I have to admit that the importance of the mere matter of physical existence does not stir me greatly. And I am less impressed where I see it being emphasized at the expense of those qualities of self-respect, moral responsibility, and the creative urge which give life a real significance and redeem it from being merely physical. Those are the things which society should value and foster, yet when our current methods treat men as cannon fodder, as tools in the industrial machine, or as impersonal units grouped under some racial label, we do violence to the significance of personality and slander our richest social asset.

There is another side to this matter of personality also. An automobile will not snap back at you if you do not handle it properly, but a man will. Human reactions are of tremendous importance, for irrespective of race, culture, nationality, education, or

religion, men react to the way they are approached, either antagonistically or coöperatively, reluctantly or enthusiastically. Salesmanship has recognized this and has patiently studied the methods of evoking the kind of response that is desired. In industry, personnel management is beginning to recognize its importance so far as individuals are concerned but has not yet applied the principle to labor organization. When, however, we turn to the more important matter of dealing with other races and other nations, the almost universal custom is to ignore utterly the fact that they are made up of persons who will react to the way they are approached. In those fields people blindly hope, against all experience, that the factor of human reactions can be ignored. The pacifist believes that there, too, the methods we use will determine the results that we get.

It is more, too, than merely taking people as they are and trying to get the best results with them. Just as the biologist in experimenting with plants or animals to produce more useful types works to encourage and develop the favorable strains and let the unfavorable ones become recessive, the pacifist would do the same. Where now, in our organization of society, we so generally put a premium on selfishness, greed, and the antagonistic spirit, rewarding the man who develops those antisocial tendencies and thus establishing more firmly the divisive and combative elements in human nature, the pacifist would seek to reorganize our social machinery so as to draw upon the coöperative and friendly capacity of human beings, thus giving such qualities a greater chance to

find expression in our common life and acquire a more dominant place in the society of the future.

In spite of all the conflicting theories of human origins and social development it seems to be perfectly clear that the human race is one. Dr. Arthur Keith, President of the Royal Anthropological Institute, in his book *The Antiquity of Man,* says: "We all agree that modern human races, however different they may appear, are so alike in the essentials of structure that we must regard them as well-marked varieties of a common species." That is a sufficient fact to rest the case upon. The differences in race and culture, in nationality and economic organization, which separate human groups may and do present real difficulties in working out a harmonious world life, but they can only obscure and not invalidate the view that it is only when we base our thinking and planning upon the essential unity of the race that we are upon sound ground.

The history of the world has been so much the story of the continuous impact of one racial group upon another, their intermixture and development, and the rise of modern nations has been so recent and fluctuating a thing, that one who has any concern for the probable developments of the future cannot be satisfied to think and plan simply in terms of his own particular country. Thus the pacifist, instead of being indifferent to the call of his nation, recognizes that he will serve it best when he strives to bring it into a closer unity with those other groups which make up the human family. That is its ultimate goal, which he feels the call to serve, rather than those influences

which mistakenly, though perhaps honestly, are striving to perpetuate the antisocial ideals of nationalism.

One of these days someone will attempt an examination of the tremendous setback to the social development of the world that has been given by the form in which the evolutionary idea has been popularly accepted. It will be an interesting study, for there is little doubt that an overemphasis on the struggle for existence and on the survival of the fittest has given a decided impetus to the competitive idea in industry, the laissez faire doctrine in commerce and imperialism among the nations. Modern evolutionists, however, are giving more and more emphasis to that aspect of the doctrine which stresses the fact that the survival of certain species has been due to their ability to adapt themselves to the requirements of a changing environment. Those that were too firmly habituated to ways which may once have been suitable but which ceased to meet the demands put upon them simply pass out of the picture. Those that were able to develop characteristics and habits better adapted to changed climatic conditions and altered food supply survived. In a word, ability to coöperate with environment was the determining factor in the situation.

Such a view does not alter the facts of the matter but merely appraises them from a new angle. It is, however, an angle which is of vital importance where men—as they invariably will—begin to reason from that evolutionary process to their own best line of development. If, as seems to be suggested by this view of the process, the coöperative element is a pri-

mary one, standing ground for the idea that human life must be organized around a principle of strife will be completely removed, and it will be seen that the pacifist is upon a solid foundation in insisting that life must be organized around the coöperative principle if it is to survive. Those who are telling us that unless we destroy war war will destroy us are, although they may not always realize it, really emphasizing the impossibility of a social order based on strife, for war is simply the logical outcome of that combative way of life.

Less tangible and less easily appraised but of even greater significance are the roots of pacifism in the spiritual view of life. At the heart of Jesus' description of God as father lies the essential element of a relationship with Him. In that relationship, however it may be interpreted, is the foundation of morality and the basis of human society. A few brief and fragmentary sentences will have to take the place of the adequate treatment the subject deserves, but since the purpose of this article is not to convince but simply to suggest the basis for a point of view, perhaps that is all that is necessary.

The implications of the spiritual unity of the human race are more far-reaching, from the pacifist point of view, than those of its physical unity. War, exploitation, and other antisocial manifestations are a direct denial of that unity and a negation of the common fatherhood of God. On the other hand, the conception of that fatherhood as a creative power striving to bring men into deeper relationships means that when one throws his energies into activities and purposes

which aim to give expression to that essential unity he has working with him all the spiritual resources of the universe. It is not to be wondered at that the conscientious objector, or anyone else, who has taken a stand against activities or practices which are a denial of that spiritual unity, has a power and influence out of all proportion to his individual importance.

God's method of dealing with the human race, so far as one can judge from Jesus and from the experience of those who have entered most deeply into an understanding of his ways, is not to drive, compel, or force men into conformity with His will or to punish them where they refuse, but to seek with a loving patience to win them to a recognition of their true relationship to Him. With the example of Jesus giving himself without stint or limit to express his sense of his solidarity with both men and God, the pacifist feels that in endeavoring to use the same methods he is on sure ground here as well. Love and sacrifice as redemptive forces in the world are too deeply embedded in both the nature of God and the constitution of humanity to be ignored in those phases of human relations which are most in need of reclamation.

Suppose we try to sum the matter up in briefer form. The pacifist is essentially interested in bringing into being a better ordered, more harmonious world where men may have the best chance to come to their full development and have their needs both physical and spiritual met. Others, including many religious folk, social reformers, and adherents of certain radical social philosophies, however, share that aim. But it separates him from those who are pri-

marily interested in their own welfare or that of their group and also those who are committed to the maintenance of things as they are in the church, industry, social order, or state.

When it comes to the methods to be used in achieving that goal a further separation takes place. The pacifist believes that the means and the end are so intimately related that it is impossible to get a coördinated and coöperative world by destructive methods that violate personality and increase antagonism and distrust. He, therefore, cannot go with those who so emphasize the goal that they are ready to use any method in trying to reach it. He takes his stand on a conception of personality and the reactions of human nature which are ignored by those who would fight war with the war method or would try to rid the world of an exploiting system by using its own methods against it.

More important, however, than the fact that he is seeking a different goal from some and feels compelled to use different methods from others is his commitment to a way of life that in itself is creative of brotherhood and unity. To him, it is not just a casual choice between various interesting objectives in life or a matter of expediency in the methods to be followed. Behind all that is the urge to achieve a unity with the universe in which he lives and to build his life into a deepening harmony with all that is deepest and truest in this evolving world. In repudiating the machinery and methods of war and exploitation he is merely clearing the way for the far larger task

of laying, stone by stone, the foundations of a friendly, coördinating society in which men will be united by common projects instead of being separated by competing fears. Only in so doing does he feel that he can be true to the spiritual forces of the universe.

THE USE OF FORCE

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

Reinhold Niebuhr is associate professor of Christian ethics in Union Theological Seminary, and editor, *The World Tomorrow*. Until recently he was for thirteen years pastor of the Bethel Evangelical Church, Detroit. He is a contributing editor of *The Christian Century* and has spoken in colleges throughout the United States and at student conferences. In Detroit he was chairman of the mayor's Interracial Commission. He is a member of the administrative committee of the Federal Council of Churches, as well as of the Council's commissions on Race Relations, Research and Education, and Good-will between Jews and Christians. He has contributed many articles to *The Atlantic Monthly* and other periodicals and is the author of *Does Civilization Need Religion?* and *Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic.*

THE USE OF FORCE

REINHOLD NIEBUHR

When defining pacifism and discussing its relation to the social problems of modern society it is important to begin by disclaiming the right to express anyone's opinion except one's own. Pacifists are no more divided than other groups who try to apply general principles and ideals to the specific facts of the common life; but it is inevitable that they should hold with varying degrees of consistency to the common principles which bind them into a group.

In a general way pacifists may be defined as social idealists who are profoundly critical and skeptical of the use of physical force in the solution of social problems. At the extreme left in the pacifist group are the apostles of thoroughgoing nonresistance, who refuse to avail themselves of the use of physical force in any and every situation. At the right are the more circumspect social analysts who disavow the use of force in at least one important social situation, as, for instance, armed international conflict. What really unites this group in spite of its varying shades of conviction is the common belief that the use of force is an evil. The consistent exponents of nonresistance would regard it as an unnecessary evil in all situations.

Those who are less consistent regard it as an evil in all situations but as a necessary evil in some situations.

The writer abhors consistency as a matter of general principle because history seems to prove that absolute consistency usually betrays into some kind of absurdity. He must begin, therefore, by stating two positions which represent the two poles of his thought. One is that the use of physical violence in international life has impressed itself upon his mind as an unmitigated and unjustified evil. The other is that some form of social compulsion seems necessary and justified on occasion in all but the most ideal human societies.

Between these two positions a line must be drawn somewhere, to distinguish between the use of force as a necessary and as an unnecessary evil. Different men of equal intelligence and sincerity will draw that line in different places. Perhaps some, while claiming to be critical of the use of force, will find it practically necessary in so many situations that they may hardly be counted among the pacifists. It is necessary, therefore, to draw an arbitrary line and count only those among the pacifists who express their critical attitude toward the use of force by disavowing it completely in at least one important situation. Perhaps it ought to be added that a true pacifist will prove the sincerity of his conviction by seeking the diminution of force and by experimenting with other methods of social coöperation in every social situation.

The reason armed international conflict stands in a category of its own is because history has so vividly proven its worthlessness as a method of solving social

problems that it can hardly be justified on any moral grounds. It is morally so impotent and so perilous chiefly for two reasons. One is that force in an international dispute is used by the parties to a dispute and it therefore aggravates rather than solves the evils and misunderstandings which led to the dispute. If there is any possibility of force being redemptive it is an absolute prerequisite that it be exerted by an agency which is impartial and unbiased with reference to the controversy. The other reason is that the use of force in international conflict inevitably issues in the destruction of life, and, what is more, in the destruction of the lives of many who have had no share in the dispute and who are innocent of the evils which a war may be designed to eliminate.

If international conflict is outlawed on these two grounds it would follow that the use of force by some society of nations would fall in a different category. If force is under the control of an impartial tribunal it has a better chance of being redemptive, or, at least, of not being totally destructive of morals, than if it is merely the means of conflict. However, it must be observed that it is so much more difficult to create an impartial society and an impartial tribunal with reference to disputes between large groups, national and economic, than with reference to controversies between individuals, that it is much more necessary to seek the total abolition of force in overcoming group conflict than in settling the difficulties of individuals within a group.

A "league to enforce peace" between nations has much less chance of succeeding than has a

government to enforce peace between individuals, simply because the total number of groups which make up the league is relatively so small in comparison with the number which may be engaged in a controversy that it is practically impossible to guarantee the impartiality of the groups which enforce the decision of a tribunal. Added to this is the fact that a league of nations is no more able to punish a recalcitrant nation without destroying the lives of innocent people than is a single nation. Economic pressure rather than military force may reduce this moral hazard to a certain extent and it may therefore have a higher moral justification than the latter; but it does not entirely remove the difficulty and must therefore be regarded as a dangerous expedient. Though it is a dangerous expedient it does not follow that it is an expedient that may never be justified on moral grounds.

Pacifists assume too easily, it seems to me, that all controversies are due to misunderstanding which might be solved by a greater degree of imagination. When the strong exploit the weak they produce a conflict which is not the result of ignorance but of the brutality of human nature. It may be that the strong can be convinced in time that it is not to their ultimate interest to destroy the weak. But they can hardly gain this conviction if the weak do not offer resistance to oppression in some form. It may be that this resistance need not express itself physically at all. It may express itself in the use of the "soul force" advocated by Gandhi. But even as thoroughgoing a spiritual idealist as Gandhi has realized that the for-

giving love of the oppressed lacks redemptive force if the strong are not made to realize that alternatives to a policy of love are within reach of the oppressed. Oppressed classes, races, and nations, like the industrial workers, the Negroes, India, and China, are therefore under the necessity of doing more than appeal to the imagination and the sense of justice of their oppressors.

Where there is a great inequality of physical advantage and physical power it is difficult to establish moral relations. Weakness invites aggression. Even the most intelligent and moral individuals are more inclined to unethical conduct with those who are unable to offer resistance to injustice than with those who can. It must be admitted that an inert China did not succeed in inviting the attention of the world to its maladies, while a rebellious China did. Even the social idealists in the Western world who were not totally oblivious of the evils of Western imperialism in the Orient before the nationalist movement assumed large proportions had their conscience quickened by it.

It is obviously possible to resist injustice without using physical force and certainly without using violence. In a world in which conscience and imagination have been highly sensitized the oppressed may seek relief against their oppressors and punish them for their misdeeds by indicting them before the bar of public opinion. But it seems that the world in which we live is not so spiritual that it is always possible to prompt the wrongdoer to contrition merely by appealing to his conscience and to that of the society in

which he lives. It may be necessary to deprive him of some concrete advantage or inflict some obvious hurt upon him to bring him to his senses. In other words, Gandhi's boycott in India and the Chinese boycott against the English in Hongkong and the strike of the industrial worker would seem to be necessary strategies in the kind of world in which we live. It is possible to justify the use of such force without condoning violence of any kind.

The distinction between violence and such other uses of force as economic boycotts is not only in degree of destruction which results from them but in the degree of redemptive force which they possess. Parents frequently find it necessary to aid the defective imagination of a child by creating painful consequences by artificial means for acts which would result in painful consequences of their own accord in the long run. But the character of the child might be ruined before it had the opportunity to test the actual consequences. On the other hand, if such punishment is administered violently it will confuse rather than clarify the moral judgments of the child. When oppressed groups resort to violence they also confuse the moral judgment of the society from which they seek justice. They give society the pretext for identifying social maladjustments with social peace and for maintaining the former in the effort to preserve the latter. In the same way the effort of society to maintain a social equilibrium by the undue use of force, particularly by the violent use of force, inevitably confuses rather than clarifies the moral judgments of

its minorities and easily prompts them to violence and destruction.

If force is used, therefore, for the sake of gaining moral and social ends, it is necessary to guard its use very carefully. Every society, every individual as well, is easily tempted to overestimate the importance of force in the creation of social solidarities. Many people live under the illusion that a nation is integrated by force and that order is maintained in its life by police power. The fact is that societies are created by attitudes of mutual respect and trust; and standards of conduct within a society are created by mutual consent. Every society seems under the necessity of maintaining its integrity against and forcing its standards upon a certain antisocial minority by the use of force. It is this antisocial minority which justifies, or at least seems to justify, the use of a certain minimum amount of force. It is because every society tends to overemphasize the place of force in its social strategy that absolutists have considerable justification for the thesis that force ought to be completely abolished; for the social efficacy of force is very definitely limited and most societies have been too uncritical to discover these limitations.

The first obvious limitation is that force can be used only upon a very insignificant minority. If the great majority of a people do not choose to observe a law it is not possible to enforce it by even the most ruthless police action. If a government does not rest upon the consent of the governed every effort to maintain it by ruthlessness must ultimately result in complete dis-

integration, as, for instance, in the Russian revolution. If a political policy does not achieve the uncoerced acceptance of a vast majority of the population, every effort to enforce it finally proves abortive. Even when the minority which opposes a government or a governmental policy is numerically small and insignificant, its coercion is fraught with moral and social peril.

A so-called antisocial minority is, for one thing, never as completely antisocial as the society which tries to coerce it imagines. A part of the minority is usually made up of social idealists who resist the moral compromises upon which the life of every society is inevitably based, not because they are too high for its attainment but because they are too low for its ideals.

It has been the tragic mistake of almost every society to number its prophets among its transgressors. Thus the same coercion by which it sought to avoid social disintegration has operated to produce social stagnation. The same force which preserved its standards also destroyed the social forces by which those standards might have been gradually perfected. A high degree of imagination, which few societies have achieved, is required to distinguish between the creative and the disintegrating forces in its life. It may be observed in passing that while it is in the interest of social progress to dissuade societies from undue reliance upon coercion it will probably always be necessary for creative minorities to pay a certain price in martyrdom for their achievements. All social organisms are conservative and are bound to resist

not only those who try to draw them backward but those who try to pull them forward.

Even after the distinction between creative and disintegrating forces in the social minority has been made there is no clear case for the use of force upon the remaining, really "criminal" minority. Some force may be necessary in dealing with the criminal, but every undue reliance upon force obscures the defects in the life of society itself which have helped to create the criminal. A wayward child is just as much the product of a faulty pedagogy as of innate human defects. It is dangerous to follow Clarence Darrow's moral nihilism and insist that every individual is merely the product of his environment and therefore without blame; but it is obvious enough that much antisocial conduct is definitely due to maladjustments in society. That is what Jesus meant by suggesting that he who is without guilt should throw the first stone. Of the cases of criminality which remain after those for which society is responsible have been subtracted a certain proportion must be attributed to purely pathological causes. A wise society will deal with these without passion and will use force only to put their unfortunate authors in social quarantine.

What is left after all these subtractions have been made represents the real criminal minority. While physical restraint and coercion are probably necessary in dealing with this group, it is obvious that even here force has its limitations. Imagination and understanding may restore a goodly portion of this group to useful membership in society, while the uncritical use of force will merely aggravate its defects. We

must arrive, then, at the conclusion that the use of force is dangerous in all social situations, harmful in most of them, and redemptive only in a very few.

The validity of the pacifist position rests in a general way upon the assumption that men are intelligent and moral and that a generous attitude toward them will ultimately, if not always immediately, discover, develop, and challenge what is best in them. This is a large assumption which every specific instance will not justify. The strategy of love therefore involves some risks. These risks are not as great as they are sometimes made to appear, for the simple reason that love does not only discover but it creates moral purpose. The cynic who discounts the moral potentialities of human nature seems always to verify his critical appraisal of human nature for the reason that his very skepticism lowers the moral potentialities of the individuals and groups with which he deals. On the other hand, the faith which assumes generosity in the fellow man is also verified because it tends to create what it assumes.

If a nation assumes that there is no protection against the potential peril of a neighbor but the force of arms, its assumption is all too easily justified, for suspicion creates suspicion, fear creates fear, and hatred creates hatred. It is interesting to note in this connection how in the relations of France and Germany since the war every victory or seeming victory of the nationalists in Germany has given strength to the chauvinists of France, and vice versa; while every advantage for the forces of one nation which believe

in trust has resulted in an almost immediate advantage for the trustworthy elements in the other.

Hence the contest between the apostles of force and the apostles of love can never be decided purely on the basis of scientific evidence. The character of the evidence is determined to a great degree by the assumptions upon which social relations are initiated. This is the fact which gives the champions of the strategy of love the right to venture far beyond the policy which a cool and calculating sanity would dictate. It may not be true that love never fails; but it is true that love creates its own victories, and they are always greater than would seem possible from the standpoint of a merely critical observer.

THE BACKGROUND OF GOOD-WILL

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

Charles A. Ellwood is professor of sociology in the University of Missouri. He has been visiting professor or lecturer at Columbia University, the University of Chicago, the University of Colorado, the University of Southern California, the Yale Divinity School, etc. He is a member of many sociological, economic, and scientific societies. He is the author of numerous books, several of which have been translated into foreign languages. His most recent works are *The Reconstruction of Religion, a Sociological View; The Psychology of Human Society;* and *Cultural Evolution, a Study of Social Origins and Development.*

THE BACKGROUND OF GOOD-WILL

CHARLES A. ELLWOOD

HUMAN society and human civilization have been built up to their present level by means of coöperation; in other words, by means of active good-will among men. Just as the whole universe is held together by the coöperation of its forces, while conflict and disharmony are relatively exceptional, so human society from the smallest group to the largest is held together by the active coöperation and good-will of its members. Only because our social world is relatively abnormal does good-will become a venture. In a normal human world it would be not life's greatest risk, but life's greatest asset, for active good-will is the constructive principle of group life.

It will not do, however, merely to say that human social life has become abnormal in order to explain why good-will has become a great venture. Conflict seems so common in our human world, even hostile conflict, that there are not lacking plenty of scientific men who proclaim it as normal in human relations. They fail to see even that it is a dissociating process. Basing themselves upon what they believe to be a scientific theory of organic evolution, they proclaim that life, and so social life, perfects itself through conflict. Social life is accordingly to be understood,

they say, in terms of self-interest and the lust of domination. The same law holds for human groups. They too are controlled by the self-interest of the group and by the desire of the group for power. Human society from the beginning has been an unending struggle of groups for power and possessions. It will continue to be so until the end.

Dispassionate, scientific analysis can find little ground for this cynical, or as some would prefer to say, "hard-headed," view of human life. It is, in fact, commonplace among sociologists that we must start with the group, and with "primary" or face-to-face groups. These original or primary groups are chiefly the family and the neighborhood. They were once the only human groups which existed. As we go back in human history we find these groups continuing to exist, and we have every reason to believe that they antedate even the appearance of man himself. We find these groups, moreover, everywhere peaceful. They are characterized by coöperation, kindness, sympathy, and even affection among their numbers. It must always be remembered that primary groups were the original form of human society, and that still to-day they comprise the bulk of all active human relations. The patterns for behavior in these groups at no stage of their existence bear out the contention of the conflict and self-interest theorists. On the contrary, while conflict is not unknown in these groups, it is always relatively abnormal and is a process of dissociation. It is, in other words, an element which weakens the group life.

Now, it is another commonplace among sociolo-

gists that the principles of group organization are universal. They apply to all human groups from the smallest to the largest. The laws, or principles, of successful living together are not of one sort for one human group and of another sort for other human groups. The great "secondary" groups which are not characterized by face-to-face association have been developing in our human world for the past five thousand years. So far as we can discover these are subject to the same laws of human association as the primary or face-to-face groups. To be sure, secondary groups are not characterized by personal acquaintance, and hence they give little scope to the stimulation of sympathy and other personal attitudes which favor coöperation. Yet coöperation is just as necessary for them as for the primary groups, and active good-will is just as essential among their members. Only it is harder to develop, because their members are not personally acquainted with one another. It is an old saying, and of course one which is scientifically true, that the man we dislike is usually the man whom we do not know. Human society started with face-to-face association; but now it has become a vast complex affair in which there are seemingly mainly impersonal relations, with groups going up into the hundreds of millions. Evidently to cultivate good-will among the members of such vast secondary groups is quite a different problem from the cultivation of good-will in face-to-face groups.

Many other factors have entered in to make good-will difficult between modern groups besides this natural impediment of lack of personal acquaintance.

The earliest families and neighborhoods lived largely isolated from one another. While the pattern for behavior within the primitive family and neighborhood was one of sympathy, kindness, and goodwill, the pattern for behavior toward the strange group grew to be one of suspicion, distrust, and hatred. It is difficult to explain in a brief chapter how this came to be. Perhaps it is sufficient to say that men have always been conscious of their kinship with those in their own groups and have tended, under normal circumstances, to treat them in a sympathetic, kindly, and coöperative way. But the consciousness of kinship did not extend far beyond the primitive group. The man who was not known was often looked upon with suspicion; and with the differentiation of races, customs, and cultures, those who were in strange groups came to be looked upon as so different that they were scarcely considered to be human. This process would never have gone as far as it did, however, if it had not been for the rise of hostile conflict and struggle between human groups. We must now try to see how this came about.

Originally the world was so thinly populated and human groups were so scattered that they scarcely ever came into conflict with one another. Moreover, they had to carry on unceasingly such struggle with the adverse conditions of nature, both animate and inanimate, that they had no time, and but little opportunity, to enter into conflict with other human groups. The condition of primitive human society, in other words, was not essentially different from the condition under which the Eskimos live at the present time.

The twenty-eight thousand Eskimos are scattered along fourteen thousand miles of Arctic coast of North America and Greenland. They average only about two Eskimos to each mile of the Arctic coast. Their villages are seldom larger than from fifty to a hundred individuals. They have to keep up a constant struggle against adverse conditions in order to survive. Hence their little groups are characterized by an intense coöperation, kindliness, and good-will among their members. They almost never fight, and it is said that while a whole village of Eskimos may starve a single Eskimo never does, as long as he stays in his group; for the group will share its food among its members down to the very last bit.

It was really the invention of agriculture which precipitated struggle and war between human groups. Agriculture had two effects which inevitably led to conflict. First, it increased the food supply and so increased the size or population of human groups. Secondly, it increased wealth, and especially wealth in the form of food. The world began to fill up with people, and some human groups began to discover that they could live more easily by appropriating the stored-up food supply of other human groups than by raising it themselves. This was rendered all the more easy because the long separation and differentiation of human groups had made them so strange to one another that their members regarded each other as scarcely human.

Thus war arose in our human world. Conflict and hostility there had been before, but they were chiefly directed toward the animal world below man and only

occasionally toward other human groups. The rise of agriculture made organized plunder possible and profitable. This at once organized all the suspicion and ill-will of human groups toward one another. It organized also the lust for human exploitation. The student of human culture finds at this point a great break in what seems to have been the natural trend of the previous development of human society among the pure hunting and fishing peoples. Now suddenly certain institutions for human exploitation appeared which we have too long regarded as primitive. Among these are organized militarism, despotic government, slavery, polygamy, property for power, and in some cases cannibalism and prostitution. These all resulted from the plunder of human beings and property which war brought. They are not natural to human society.

So far as the archæologist can tell war began in Europe toward the close of the Palæolithic and at the beginning of Neolithic times, or about ten or twelve thousand years ago. Naturally, for a time war flourished and became the chief occupation of successful predatory peoples. It may be said that this has continued down to the present time. However, about twenty-five hundred or two thousand years ago protests against this state of war began to be made by great religious and moral teachers. They began again to teach coöperation and good-will among men. But for the most part their teachings had effect only within groups which were relatively unified and well organized. Such teachings were not allowed, at least

among the European peoples, to interfere noticeably with the war system.

In the meantime, however, the progress of agriculture had made the population of the world much more dense, the relations between all human groups much more complex, and all human relations much more interdependent. The rise of a leisure class, made possible in part through slavery and other forms of exploitation, had immensely increased knowledge, led to numerous inventions, the expansion of trade and commerce, and the discovery of new worlds. The success of predatoriness led to the exaltation of the predatory spirit among nations with the inculcation of a corresponding spirit of self-interest in individuals. In spite, therefore, of the rise of religions of coöperation and good-will, self-interest, the love of power, the lust for domination, have continued to rule our human world down to the present hour. The spirit of conflict and of self-interest has spread even to the primary or face-to-face groups of men. Even family life and neighborhood life have become characterized by dissension and are permeated by disintegrating self-interest. Instead of human beings trying to live together by the exchange of mutual services, by conferring mutual benefits, or by active good-will, many seek to live by exploiting their fellow human beings. Especially do groups or classes try to exploit one another.

But all this violates the fundamental law of normal human association, which, as Novicow has clearly shown, consists in the equal exchange of goods and services; the more intense this exchange of goods and

services is, the higher rises the level of human association. In other words, all that man has achieved above the brutes has come from coöperation with his fellow men. And we have every reason to believe that if this coöperation among men can be widened and intensified; if we can put an end to hostile conflict between individuals, classes, nations, and races, and replace that hostile conflict by harmonious coöperation; we can raise human society and human civilization to levels now undreamed of. Men do not live merely by means of food, nor yet even merely by means of knowledge; they live more by means of coöperation. They need active good-will toward one another quite as much as they need food and knowledge.

Human groups have expanded until all mankind will soon be but one group. If we could discover some way of putting an end to hostile conflict between individuals and groups, and of substituting in its place coöperation based on good-will, we should not need to fear the various bugaboos with which one-sided scientists are prone to threaten us, such as overpopulation, limits of subsistence, limits of human intelligence, etc. Intelligent coöperation could banish all these foes. The one great need of our human world, as the sociologist sees it, is intelligent, active good-will between all of its parts, whether individuals or groups. Mere contemplative good-will, of course, is not sufficient in a world like ours where whole races, nations, and classes remain undeveloped.

If we are to develop the resources in these and in ourselves we need an intelligent, active, mutual goodwill diffused among all men. This can come about only

in two ways: first, through the diffusion of social knowledge throughout human society and the cultivation of an active social imagination; second, through stimulating the kindly, sympathetic emotions which we naturally have through our development in primary groups, but which can be greatly cultivated through religion and ethical ideals, when these become thoroughly socialized.

We have no reason, therefore, to believe that the lack of good-will which we now find in our human world is necessary, or even normal. We have every reason to believe that intolerance, hatred, and ill-will everywhere breed abnormal social conditions among men; and that sympathy, good-will, and coöperation everywhere result in normal social relations.

Hatred cannot be made to cease by hatred. For us, active good-will toward all of our fellow men is the venture above all others which our human world needs to take; for without a larger fund of mutual good-will human society cannot progress and security is impossible.

OVERCOMING EVIL

RUFUS M. JONES

Rufus M. Jones is professor of philosophy in Haverford College. He has edited several journals of the Society of Friends and has published many books, including *Autobiography of George Fox; Social Law in the Spiritual World; Spiritual Reformers in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries; The Remnant; Nature and Authority of Conscience; The Church's Debt to Heretics; A Service of Love in War-Time;* and *The New Quest.* He has travelled widely and addressed students and teachers in many lands. He is president of the board of trustees of Bryn Mawr College, and until recently was chairman of the American Friends Service Committee.

OVERCOMING EVIL

RUFUS M. JONES

PACIFISM means *peace-making*. The pacifist is literally a *peace-maker*. He is not a passive or negative person who proposes to lie back and do nothing in the face of injustice, unrighteousness, and rampant evil. He stands for "the fiery positive." Pacifism is not a theory; it is a way of life. It is something you *are and do*.

I am a good deal disillusioned over the value of propaganda as a method of achieving moral and spiritual ends. It is no doubt immensely successful as a means of advertising commodities or of accomplishing utilitarian purposes. If you say a thing often enough, and if you say it emphatically enough, vast numbers of people will believe it. Practically any theory about life or about society will accumulate a following if vivid writers write it up, and if peppy speakers proclaim it as a panacea for the ills of the world. But theories, like good resolutions, are very thin and abstract until they are put into operation and tried in practice. Hell, we are told, is paved with good intentions and the paths of history are strewn with the débris of abstract theories which in their day made a good noise and sounded fine. The fate of Kip-

ling's *Tomlinson* is the fate of everything constructed out of report and hearsay and guesswork.

"The good souls flocked like homing doves and bade
him clear the path,
And Peter twirled the jangling keys in weariness
and wrath.
'Ye have read, ye have heard, ye have thought,' he
said, 'and the tale is yet to run.
By the worth of the body that once ye had, give an-
swer—what ha' ye done?' "

Paul knew enough about the forces of evil to know that they could be conquered only by greater *forces,* and so he set forth his famous method—"overcome evil with good." There is no other way to overcome it. Something else, something better, must be put in its place. Something strong and positive must put it down, conquer it, and make it cease to be. The evil that concerns us, the evil that really matters, is always embodied; it is incarnate in a person, or in a social institution, and consequently our new way of life, our pacifism, to meet it and overcome it, must be incarnate, too, and must have the dynamic of personal lives in it and behind it.

We shall not get very far merely with phrases like "passive resistance" or "nonresistance." One can neither train a life nor build a world on those or on any other slogans. In the last analysis children are trained and worlds are built by persons who are living concrete and positive lives, whose theories have taken on flesh and blood and have behind them the attractive power of a strong personality. There would be little

use having our government and all the other governments of the world adopt abstract resolutions to the effect that military force shall be outlawed and shall never be resorted to again, if at the same time all the selfish and unjust methods of life and business and social relations were left to work just as they are working now.

War is a fruit which grows and ripens like other fruit. No magic phrase, no written scrap of paper, will stop the ripening of it if the tree which bears it is planted and watered and kept in the sunshine and warm air. The ax must first be laid to the root of the tree. The old way of life must be abolished and a new way of life must be produced and made to flourish. We shall never succeed in stopping war until we have a human society composed of persons who practice a way of life which removes and abolishes the grounds and occasions of war, and which at the same time matures and ripens a spirit of mutual understanding and personal coöperation.

The kind of life which overcomes evil by the new force of *peace-making* finds its best illustration in Francis of Assisi. He is too often thought of as a founder of Friars, a devotee of poverty, as an excessive ascetic, an anæmic mystic who worked himself up to such a pitch of auto-suggestion that he finally produced the *stigmata* of nail prints in his hands and feet. As a matter of fact, the real miracle of Francis' life is of a very different type. Nobody has interpreted this real miracle better than has Laurence Housman in his *Little Plays of St. Francis*. He has caught the marvellous spirit, the touch even, of the *Little*

Flowers of St. Francis, and he has made it real to a modern reader and perhaps some day a theatre will be found that will dare to try its effect on modern playgoers. The great secret is nothing but the way of life which *overcomes* evil with a goodness that is contagious, joyous, thrilling, captivating and triumphant.

He began first of all by expelling all fear out of his life. There was nothing in the universe that he was afraid of. Then, secondly, he had an absorbing passion to carry genuine love into the hearts and lives of men and women of all types and classes and conditions. He had always been terribly afraid of leprosy and had run for his life whenever a leper came near him. He had helped with others who were like-minded to produce that appalling sense, which every leper carried in his soul, of being an outcast and an abhorred being under the curse of God and man. Well, the new turning point of his life came when, instead of running away from the leper, he ran toward him, shared his food with him, and in a sudden abandon of love kissed him, with a perfect recklessness of what might happen to *him* so long as he made this poor leper feel that he was a person and that somebody *cared* for him.

This loss of fear, this sincere human spirit of love, this genuine way of sharing himself and all he had for others, broke down all artificial barriers. It enabled him to conquer the hearts of robbers and turn them into "little brothers." It worked just as well with the rich as it did with the poor. It brought Clara from her aimless, luxurious life of wealth and family pride to

accept the life of an outcast, poor and disinherited, but with the opportunity to give and share and love as Francis was doing. It conquered the heart of the great "infidel" Sultan of Egypt and Syria. I quote from Housman:

"FRANCIS: I would show thee Christ, Soldan. Or if by that name thou know Him not, then by His other name which is Love, wherein also dwell Joy and Peace. This I have come to show.

"SOLDAN: Yea; speak!

"FRANCIS: Oh, hearken, for this is wonder!
Light looked down and beheld Darkness.
'Thither will I go,' said Light.
Peace looked down and beheld War.
'Thither will I go,' said Peace.
Love looked down and beheld Hatred.
'Thither will I go,' said Love.
So Light came and shone.
So came Peace and gave rest.
So came Love and brought Life.
And the Word was made flesh and dwelt among us."

Francis did for the Soldan what no crusading armies ever did—he made this hardened warrier *feel* what his Christianity really meant.

Let one more Franciscan victory suffice. One day Louis IX of France knocked at the door of the little humble brotherhood house and Brother Giles went to the door. Giles recognized his august visitor but em-

braced and kissed him with the same simplicity that he would have shown to a peasant. They knelt together in perfect silence. Then after a period of quiet communion Louis rose from his knees and proceeded on his journey. "Why didn't you say something to him?" the brothers asked, when Giles came back to the room. "I didn't need to say anything," Giles replied, "I read his heart and he read mine." That indicates complete brotherhood, perfect fellowship. There was no chasm between high and low, but both were one in human love and friendship.

The Quaker relief work in the war-harassed countries of Europe was a modern instance of the same method, and it produced the same effect. It seemed to the casual observer to be just relief, charity, philanthropy. But to the givers and receivers it was never that sort of dole. It was a sharing of life and love. It was the interpretation of a spirit, the visible expression of a definite way of life. Those who gave wished to transmit a genuine assurance of sympathy, of fellow feeling, of human friendship for persons who were passing through an unspeakable agony as deep as death, and those who received knew that somebody understood and felt with them and came to their help with no ulterior aim and with no motive but love. It levelled all barriers, it obliterated all enmity of race and of war memory, where that had existed, and it created as if by magic a unity of spirit and a oneness of feeling. It worked among the Roman Catholic peasants of France; it worked with the fathers and mothers of underfed German children; it worked in all ranks of the people of Vienna; it met

the quick response of heart in the refugee sections of Poland; it met a warm and tender rebound of affection from every rank of life in deeply suffering Russia. It created hope, it revived faith, it awakened confidence, it caused light to emerge from darkness, and it gave birth to love and fellowship. The scale of it was limited and the whole operation of it was quiet, simple, without trumpet or advertisement, but it reached the *life* in men and women. It came like a new sun in the sky and seemed to many to be the one evidence of God, the one proof that Christ was really alive and still abroad in the world. It overcame evil by the demonstration of a greater power of life and love.

A doctor who was giving his life to China went to make a study of an island to see if it would do for a leper colony where he could carry on, without danger of spreading contagion, the marvellous modern medical treatment of leprosy. On the way out he passed the perilous haunt of bandits in safety because a fog hid his boat. But on the way back the bandits spied them and boarded their boat. Here they were at the mercy of brigands who were supposed to have no conscience, no heart, no sympathy—supposed to be actuated only by greed and to know only one force, the guns of their pursuers.

Well, this doctor showed them that he had no guns, no weapon of any kind. He told them that he purposely came without defense. He also laid before them his plan of work for the lepers, his desire to save these poor creatures from their suffering, and his hope to make human love build a better world. With

a kind of awe they listened and then left the boat free to go on its way in peace and rowed back to their retreat. Once more the positive way of life, the way of faith, of fearlessness, and of love had overcome. If we are to be effective pacifists we must be vastly more than propagandists. We must demonstrate the power of the kind of life which conquers evil and produces the fruits of peace and good-will.

Under the old system armies invaded countries and conquered them with force. Our method, too, must be one of *invasion*. God invaded Africa through David Livingstone and He has invaded Labrador through Dr. Grenfell. Both these men are types of the overcoming way of life. They conquer men as surely as Alexander or Napoleon did, only their force is different. It is good-will and kindness, it is love and gentleness, it is health and strength, it is light and healing. It invades and conquers, transforms, rebuilds, and inaugurates the new day.

THE NEW WHITE MAN

DEVERE ALLEN

Devere Allen since 1921 has been connected with *The World Tomorrow,* first as managing editor and later as editor. He was a conscientious objector to the War, editing an undergraduate pacifist paper, and later *Young Democracy,* a journal of the first youth movement in the United States. He has contributed to many publications and has spoken before diverse audiences on international, interracial, economic, and political questions. He is a member of the executive committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, a member of the board of directors of the League for Industrial Democracy, a member of the executive committee of the War Resisters' League, and chairman of the executive committee of the League for Independent Political Action.

THE NEW WHITE MAN

DEVERE ALLEN

A HUSHED, rapt audience leans forward to watch in fascination the lips and gestures of an eloquent speaker. It is September 18, 1895.

He is a colored man. He raises his right hand with the fingers spread apart and utters a sentence which arouses his white hearers to intense enthusiasm. From that moment, seven months after the death of Frederick Douglass, this humble Negro becomes in the eyes of the American people the leader of his race.

That man was Booker T. Washington. And what he said was this: "In all things purely social we can be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."

This conception of race relations was never accepted by the leaders of the Negro race in the North, not even in Washington's lifetime. He has been dead fourteen years. Those years have witnessed the greater part of the World War; our participation in it; the return of thousands of colored troops from overseas; the great post-war migration of Negroes to the North; the introduction and perpetual failure of anti-lynching bills in Congress; the organization of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car Porters;

and, in general, a literary and artistic renaissance among our cultured Negro citizens. The emergence, in short, of the vocal, the irresistible, the "new" Negro. The new Negro, whose soul, no less than his forerunner's, to use a phrase from the Negro poet Langston Hughes, "has grown deep like the rivers"; but who more vigorously asserts, as in Countée Cullen's line, "We shall not always plant while others reap." The new Negro, to be sure! The old Negro, emancipated though he was from chattel slavery, has lived in bondage none the less, and only now is he commencing to throw off his yoke.

Not only in this country, however, are new forces gathering among peoples whose skin does not happen to be white. In the emergence of Japan as a world power, in the successful Nationalist movement of China, a ferment is at work which is bound to push open the doors of opportunity for the East. The Orient has long borne the burden of the white man on its back, long lived under a constant menace from the great White Peril.

In Africa, the great slumbrous giant of continents, dark peoples yielded before the white man's invasions and conquests of the last fifty years, and still lie in subjection. Will they so remain forever? It is inconceivable. For the white man's dominance by force, this next quarter century is probably the beginning of the end. We are already on the way to tremendous readjustments.

How shall the white peoples approach this period? What will be their attitude toward the so-called backward countries—the countries which, as some wit has

said, "possess oil wells but no battleships"? Are white imperialism and arrogant race consciousness capable of a change to friendly coöperation? Increasingly whites are certain to encounter a stiffening resistance by self-respecting darker peoples. In any one of a thousand imperialist and racial situations there exist all the materials for bitter, bloody wars. And whether we escape a war of the races, East against the West, followed in time by renewed clashes in Africa and elsewhere, depends primarily upon the white man's state of mind.

The new Negro, the new Chinese, the new oppressed and submerged colored peoples everywhere, are reaching out for higher and higher achievements and more abundant opportunities for self-realization. The world around, almost, "new" is the one word which describes the stirring of thought among those sections of mankind which have hitherto been looked down on by the believers in Anglo-Saxon superiority.

But what of the white American? Despite the legend of the Civil War, he has allowed himself to be sold by his desire for dominance into a spiritual slavery. His back is bent beneath the burden of his own weighty superstitions, the load of his self-created fears. His dreams of the future are haunted by dire demons: loss of supremacy, reduction of economic gain, racial intermarriage. And exactly as the ignorant slaves of the South found their way to some famed dream interpreter, these modern bondmen have besought their scientists, so called, to conjure Nordic strains and cast the spell of the psychological test in order to free their dreams from goblins. Yet

voodooism and medicine men, whether old style or new, can lure for long none but the ignorant and dull. It is because thus far we whites have not yet had *our* spiritual renaissance that we pay any heed to oracles who but bolster up our prejudices. The white man in our time is largely still the *old* white man, holding his hand aloft with the fingers widely spread, and mouthing still the old taboos.

The new white man will soon become articulate. Even now he is trying to find his voice. The new Negro could come first because his burdens, though insufferable, had been laid on his back by other hands. The old white man, however, has lived these many years in thralldom to his own obsessions, and it will take much time to snap the thongs that bind him to his prejudices. Yet one by one they burst. And there will come in time the white man's renaissance, expressing itself perhaps in a new dedication to the art of living, and ushering in the new white man to lead his race from bondage.

The new white man will have to burst the bonds of *ignorance*. He will not allow himself to be deterred by lazy generalities from widening the horizons of human fellowship. He will be aware of Negro achievements and cultural contributions. He will not be subject to delusions about the colored worker. He will know at least a little about the marvellous progress being made by colored Americans in business, the professions, and the arts. He will know so many Negroes personally, if he has the good fortune to deserve their friendship, that the experience of association alone will render him immune from the foolish

phrases of traditionalism. Likewise he will labor through to a deeper comprehension of the olden civilization of China, of the demonstrated capacity of Japanese, of the remarkable adaptability shown in many directions by men of other pigmentation than his. He may be aware of the shortcomings in other races and yet not blind to those in his own.

The new white man will burst the bonds of *superstition*. To the credulous white whose scientific knowledge is not far above the level of the comic motion picture, all colored people "are very superstitious." Of course they are superstitious; but so are whites, and about nothing so much as about other races. The difference lies in the fact that as a whole the black, brown, and yellow peoples are less well educated. What can be said in defense of the better-educated white men, even the highly educated, often, who carry around in their heads superstitions regarding other races which are as unrelated to scientific fact as the "science" of phrenology? Yet it is questionable how far we shall get ahead by appeals to science and by too-learned discussions. This is one field of human contact where the unspoiled fraternization of children belonging to different races is a guide fully as reliable as laboratory studies or dissertations in anthropology.

What of the tales to bulwark white esteem which are passed about behind hands raised to hide the lips —the ugly jests, the myths, insinuations which are to colored people only the vilest of lies, but which to whites, and young whites in particular, are the most insidious of poisons? The new white man will not

hesitate to meet these whispers, no matter how distasteful it may be to drag them into the open. He will scotch them and the basic superstition on which they rest: the belief among whites that whites by the beneficence of nature belong to a higher social, moral, and intellectual caste.

Everyone can recall the days when members of other races than the white race were criticized because they liked to wear gay colors. Would that those old-time critics could be marshalled into a grandstand and compelled to look on for a day at the white women passing up and down Fifth Avenue! One superstition of innate race difference would speedily go into the limbo of ridiculous notions; and others which now obsess the white race may not be much longer in the passing.

The new white man will burst the bonds of *economic dependency*. When our country was new and cheap labor could not be had because land was free to all, slavery was the easy way out for those who had to lean on the exploitation of others for their profit. Indentured labor was another contemporary escape from justice, on a smaller scale. Freedom from chattel slavery brought by no means to all colored people freedom from economic exploitation. Negro labor to-day is "cheap" labor; and many a white-owned industry exhibits the profits that it does simply because it lives in a state of dependency on colored workers. The new white man will not fail to attack this extremely practical aspect of the race question; for without freedom to compete for his bread and butter (since we live as yet in a competitive society) what

can mere physical freedom amount to? In the ranks of organized white labor, which for the most part refuses to admit the colored worker, will some day yet be heard the voice of the new white man, crying out the sound principle of all-inclusive labor solidarity.

Similarly, economic exploitation is at the root of white policy toward the yellow, black, and brown peoples all over the earth. These have been regarded as a means of enrichment pure and simple; any economic gains that have come to them have been incidental to profit-making by white exploiters. Not that the picture is so simple as that of a white marauder stalking the earth and stealing only. In many ways the old white man often tried to make atonement for his swollen financial returns by various welfare projects and by education. In the worst phases of mission work there have always been many to condemn white exploitation fearlessly and whose own effort has been far from a theological exploitation but instead a cooperative, fraternal upbuilding. Yet it is undeniable that without financial gain the white penetration and its incidental benefits would have been left for missionaries exclusively. The old white man's interest in other peoples, on the whole, has been characteristically that of the profit seeker. A great deal of his reluctance to allow free expression of other races' aspirations has been his doubt concerning the result to his pocketbook. The right to be the chief gainer in interracial transactions has seemed to him divinely bestowed and not to be challenged.

The new white man will burst the bonds of *fear.*

For underneath all else that stands between the races is the white man's age-long jealousy of his dominant position. The Ku Klux Klan, the post-war wave of Nordicism, were built up largely on the fear among the white "superiors" that some day, if the "rising tide of color" were not checked, the pale-skinned despot would be jeopardized. It is the same fear, reflected from a different facet, which underlies the intermarriage bugaboo. You can hardly mention interracial social equality, as a rule, without being forced to discuss intermarriage in the same breath. One would think that millions of black, brown, or yellow men and women were breathlessly waiting for a chance to offer as many proposals of marriage to white people. The tragedy of it is that the great bulk of the race intermixture which goes on takes place entirely out of wedlock. As a prominent Negro educator has said about the situation within our own borders, "If the white race were more moral, the Negro race would be darker than it is to-day." Laws against intermarriage do not check unions between the races; but they would diminish slightly the already few legal unions. The net result of such a law is to place the colored woman at the mercy of the white seducer. Immemorially, the world around, the caste system has worked in this tragic manner.

There is only one way to decrease race intermixture and that, paradoxically enough, is the establishment of social equality. For with other races socially on a par with the white race self-respect stands squarely in the way of illicit alliances. There might in truth be a slight increase in legal marriages between the races;

but for a long time the preponderant effect would very likely be a decrease in actual race mixture.

One thing is sure: you cannot disregard custom very extensively in this world of ours, and we may be certain that by the time any considerable racial intermarriage were taking place we should have come along that particular road of social change because there was an extremely widespread approval of it. The mores can be changed; but you can never change them fast.

We have reached that plane of race discussion when in the United States the normal expectation would be for some fearful reader to rise in anger and brush away this argument by one awful question: *"Would you want a Negro to marry your sister?"* The question need not be dodged; but let us follow a more typical situation, and discuss the advisability of a brother wanting to marry a Negro girl. The new white man would probably say that in the first place, unless his opinion is asked, it is none of his business. If his judgment were wanted, he would wish to know one thing, and one thing only: is there love enough between these two so that they can face a world which, on both sides of this arbitrary barrier, will try to tear it to pieces; dare they imperil their children by making them, in their turn, face a social order not ruled by reason, but by passion and prejudice? That would be all; for there is no reliable evidence whatsoever that intermarriage is biologically harmful to that human race which we are ever dividing into portions. You cannot have it both ways. If you fancy that the children of mixed marriages are inferior, how can you turn

about and say in the next breath, as the average white American does when a Negro of mixed blood accomplishes something especially fine, "Oh, that is the white blood in his veins!"?

Whatever may be called for in this juvenile state of the human race, the new white man will be emancipated from the current bugaboos. Looking down the far aisles of coming centuries, he can hardly fail to see increasing interracial oneness. No consequences of race mixture are so filled with possibilities of dangerous explosion as the fears with which the intrenched white exclusionist is so desperately animated.

It must be admitted that colored people themselves are not always devoid of prejudice and class divisions. For example, though it is not generally realized, there were many free Negroes before the Civil War who themselves owned Negro slaves. Economic caste divisions have grown up to some extent inside the Negro race itself in the United States, and within this minority caste group, though it is subject to all the psychological influences of discrimination against it, even color lines have been drawn at times between those of lighter and darker pigmentation. In many a country inhabited by peoples other than whites one kind or another of caste divisionism is maintained. But subjugated races are not likely to be first in abandoning a superior status which serves to sustain their pride while kept down themselves.

In all the welter of misrepresentation, misunderstanding, and conflict which the race question is causing around the world, what is the way toward better

race relations? Is there any easy way? Assuredly, there is none. Is there any way by which old prejudices may be retained and a world of ordered friendship come forth? Is there, indeed, any way at all short of *complete* justice, *complete* equality, *complete* freedom for friendship?

Almost uniformly the great saints and prophets have pointed toward a unity of the races transcending any immediate hope we may dare entertain for our present caste-ridden society. There was once a strange young man of Galilee; and about him is a story told which contains a meaning often obscured in this present time. He lived and did his brief work of teaching in a country where dislike of outlanders was strong and ever present. When asked, "Who is my neighbor?" he selected as the hero of his parable a Samaritan—a citizen of a province hated almost above all others. To tell a story like that in the presence of one hundred per cent. Palestinian Jews would be hardly worse than to retell it to-day, putting in place of the priest who went by on the other side Senator Cole Blease of South Carolina, in the place of the Levite no less a personage than the Imperial Wizard of the Ku Klux Klan, and substituting for the Good Samaritan a synthetic Negro Catholic born in a Jewish district of Soviet Russia.

In a world regimented along racial, national, and religious lines this young teacher thrust the drastic concept of the Father-God and the Brother-Man, all, every person, "of one blood" with all the others. To the audacious radicalism of Jesus, equality was no mere sweeping away of barriers; it was a highly posi-

tive, creative, completely normal atmosphere in which could develop after the normal fashion the insatiate reach of human personalities for others. He, after all, was the Great Emancipator.

Nothing short of such thoroughgoing principles is to-day sufficient. We need, in the phrase of a great-hearted Frenchman, a "passion for the planet." No world of peace is thinkable so long as the dominant white man remains a slave to ignorance, superstition, greed, and fear.

Even the simplest victories over that stultifying bondage have a bearing on the peaceable resolution of world problems. Mere good-will without economic readjustments does not suffice; but expanding influences of genuine freedom in race relations may render possible just changes in economic status. And for the avoidance of interracial conflict on a titanic scale in the remaining years of the Twentieth Century the white man, because of his long dominance, is chiefly responsible.

Only the coming of the new white man can prevent catastrophe. Nothing affects the situation very much unless the new Negro, the new peoples of the new East, and the new white man, can begin now to live a new life more adventurous by far than war and exploitation. When hands are clasped across race lines, the widespread fingers—symbols of caste and separatism—fall naturally together.

No one need be so romantic as to imagine that clasped hands can accomplish all that must be done if the factor of race is to lead toward peace and not

toward war. But from that mood grow the emotional forces which drive men on to conquest over tradition, to the beating of new paths that lead out of encompassing morasses. In that mood the new white man goes forth to fight his heritage of caste.

"RELAXATION" AND RACE CONFLICT

HOWARD THURMAN

Howard Thurman is a member of the faculty of Morehouse College. Formerly he was minister of the Mt. Zion Baptist Church in Oberlin, Ohio. He is a graduate of Rochester Theological Seminary and has also studied in Columbia University and the Oberlin School of Theology. He is widely known as a student preacher and lecturer, having preached frequently at student conferences, as well as at Vassar College, University of Illinois, Ohio State University, etc. He is a Fellow of the National Council for the Teaching of Religion in Institutions of Higher Learning. For two years he was a member of the national council of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

"RELAXATION" AND RACE CONFLICT

HOWARD THURMAN

It is a very simple matter for people who form the dominant group in a society to develop what they call a philosophy of pacifism that makes few, if any, demands upon their ethical obligations to minority groups with which they may be having contacts. Such a philosophy becomes a mere quietus to be put into the hands of the minority to keep them peaceful and controllable. A certain Zulu proverb summarizes the idea: "Full belly child says to empty belly child, Be of good cheer."

The difficulty which a minority group faces is twofold.

First, there is always present the danger which comes from the rather blind imitation of the dominant majority. In its position as a minority it may live vicariously the total life of the group which is contributing so largely to its discomfort. A careful study of the life of minorities usually reveals this imitation of the majority. The latter stampedes the former with prestige and power. Often when the dominant group is heartily hated, the imitation takes the form of compensation. That is, those who ride on top in a minority group may treat those below

them, so to speak, as they themselves are treated by the dominant majority.

I know a man who is treated very contemptuously at the place where he works, and when he comes home he passes the treatment on to the family that is dependent upon him for its existence. This danger is certainly one which is, for example, facing the Negro in American life. It is entirely possible to love people so blindly that one becomes like them in details of conduct, especially those aspects of conduct that are revealed in intimate contacts. On the other hand it is equally possible and perhaps more feasible to hate people so bitterly that one becomes like them. The man who *attends* to evil that he may not fall heir to it becomes like it. As someone pointed out long ago, what gets your attention gets you. This general imitation, whatever may be its cause, tends to cover the whole gamut of experience, from the cut of clothes and small-town economic "imperialism" to religious ceremonials.

The second danger is even more immediate and deadly: a dread despair due to the overwhelming expressions of domination and control which emanate everywhere from a powerful majority. All the current symbols of "civilization" which reach their clammy hands into the most intimate social processes of Negro life bespeak the will of the majority. Everything that he possesses tends to lose its significance if it is not validated by those who are in control. Even if he wants to get a meal in a downtown restaurant in an Eastern city his chances are infinitely better if he enters as a guest of a member of the dominant group.

He must be validated, approved of, sanctioned by those whose validation and approval are meritorious. In many areas this method of evaluation has become a part of *his* method of evaluation.

A sense of helplessness and despair is apt to work its way into the very soul of such a stigmatized minority group. This helplessness expresses itself in many ways. I was going through a section in Atlanta called Beaver's Slide when my attention was attracted by a deep baritone voice singing this refrain:

"Been down so long—
Down don' worry me."

A Negro man whose soul had given up the ghost in the struggle! Or this helplessness may express itself as the motive (this is not always the motive, however), which drives a brilliant Negro holding two degrees from one of the dominant group's best symbols of "education" to become a dining-car waiter—the light has faded from his eyes! At the present time it is increasingly expressing itself in pessimism, bitterness, and tenseness. I shall return to this later in the discussion.

II

I have gone to great length before attempting to state the thesis of my paper. I have been asked to discuss the philosophy of pacifism as it applies to the relationship between Negroes and white people in America. Fundamentally this means as it may be applied to the relationship between a stigmatized mi-

nority and a dominant more or less hostile majority group.

A philosophy of pacifism implies the will to share joyfully the common life and the will to love all—healingly and creatively. It springs out of a sense of the unity, the basic interrelation, and the vast sacredness of all life. It has its roots in a primary *self-estimate,* a self-awareness from which it gets its key to the life around it. Hatred seems to spring out of a warped self-estimate. Perhaps this is in the mind of the spiritual geniuses of the race who have felt that a man *ought* to love his neighbor as he *ought* to love himself.

This conception of pacifism means at least two things for Negroes and white people who must live together in America. First, it means that white people who make up the dominant majority in American life must relax their will to dominate and control the Negro minority. Second, Negroes must develop a minority technique, which I choose to call a technique of relaxation, sufficiently operative in group life to make for vast creativity, with no corresponding loss in self-respect. The meaning of these will become clearer as I discuss each in its turn.

III

At the present time in America the will of the dominant group is tense; it is increasingly concentrated on the domination and control of the minority group, utilizing all of the machinery at its disposal to

that end. Nothing is spared: the press, including the comic sheet and the highbrow journals; the church, including the pulpit, much that goes by the name of charity and many of the *materials* of religious education; and for the most part, the technique and the philosophy of education.

The relaxation of this will to dominate and control would be very far reaching because it would demand an evolutionary, if not revolutionary, shifting of a group mind-set, and the discovery of a new basis for group security. In the mind of the group *the will to dominate* and *the will to live* are *one and the same.* It would be interesting, indeed, to trace the development of this fusion. But that is apart from our purpose. It is out of the depths of this fusion that the Negro is viewed as the "white man's burden," the "black menace," the nucleus of the "rising tide of color." The situation in America is largely shaped by the historical relationship between the two groups.

Slavery would have been very difficult to maintain as a system if there had not been developed a stern, relentless will to dominate and control in minute detail the life of the slave group. For many generations the springs of such a will were fed by education, by religion, and by observation. The security of the group rested in the unchanging quality of this relationship. So important was this fact that the slaves themselves were deliberately trained to fit into the system. My grandmother has often told me how she was taught as a little child just who she was and where she fitted

into the scheme of things on the plantation. Nothing was left to chance—she must be taught that she was a slave and that the will of the mistress must be the desire of her heart. As a nurse in the master's household she saw how careful the training was with reference to the status of the master and his family. The master was the lord of his plantation and held in his destiny the lives of all the members of his colony; his will must never be thwarted and he was responsible only to God. And shall I add, the God of his fashioning? The slave was not an underling, for that implies belonging to the same order, but lower in the scale. The slave was essentially a *body*—of course there were many exceptions to this point of view. The idea that the slave was a body has proved itself to be extraordinarily long-lived. As a small boy I remember being stuck with a pin, and when I reacted to it the little boy who had done it said, "Oh, that doesn't hurt you; you can't feel."

So thoroughgoing was this whole procedure that, far from questioning the ethics of the position, a master-slave ethic evolved which is still to be reckoned with. The sanction for this ethic was not far to seek. I quote here in outline the position as used by Mode in his *Sourcebook for American Church History* (p. 573 ff.):

"Slave-holding does not appear in any catalogue of sins or disciplinable offences given us in the New Testament.

"This fact, which none will call in question, is presumptive proof that neither Christ nor his Apostles regarded slave-holding as a sin or an offence. That

we may give to this presumption its proper weight, we must take account of such facts as the following:

"First. That Catalogues of Sins and Disciplinable Offences, given us in the New Testament are numerous, and in some instances, extended and minute.

"Second. All the books of the New Testament were written in slave-holding states, and were originally addressed to persons and churches in slave-holding states: One of them—the epistle to Philemon—is addressed to a slave-holder. . . .

"Third. The condition of slaves in Judea, in our Lord's day, was no better than it now is in our Southern states, whilst in all other countries it was greatly worse. . . .

"Fourth. Slavery, and the relations which it establishes are frequently spoken of, and yet more frequently referred to by Christ and his Apostles.

"The Apostles Received Slave-Holders into the Christian Church, and Continued them therein, without giving any intimation either at the time of their Reception, or Afterwards, that Slave-Holding was a sin before God, or to be accounted an offence by the Church. Proof: Eph. 6:9; Col. 4:1; I Tim. 6:2; Philem. 2. . . .

"Paul sent back a Fugitive Slave, after the Slave's hopeful Conversion, to his Christian Master again, and assigns his reason for so doing that Master's right to the services of his Slave. Proof: Philem. 10:19.

"The Apostles repeatedly enjoin the relative Duties of Masters and Slaves, and enforce their Injunctions upon both alike, as Christian Men, by Christian Motives; uniformly treating the Evils which they sought to correct as incidental Evils, and not part and parcel of slavery itself. Proof: Eph. 6:5–9; Col.

3 : 22–25; 4 : 1; I Tim. 6 : 1, 2; Titus 2 :9, 10; I Peter 2 : 18, 19."

Now let us put alongside this outline a very impressive statement written by Professor Coe in his *Social Theory of Religious Education:*

"When we who pray to God as father, and call humanity a family and exalt the idea of service, nevertheless take unprotesting comfort in the anti-domestic, unbrotherly, caste-like inequalities of opportunity that prevail in the world, then, however unconscious we may be of compromising our religion, we actually become teachers of an anti-Christian ethic."

On the surface it seems that the relaxation of the majority group's will to dominate and control the minority group is a very negative statement of the philosophy of pacifism as far as it concerns the dominant group. A more careful examination shows that this is not the case. The will to share joyfully the common life and to love all healingly and creatively cannot be the product of the tenseness that is born of fear. When the will to dominate and control is relaxed, then the way is clear for spontaneous self-giving, for sharing all gratuitously. This new spirit finds its direction in *the will to love.* A group so disposed finds its security in a new kind of relationship. The relaxation of the will to control and to dominate becomes something very positive and dynamic.

Nothing can take the place of or atone for this profound change of basic point of view. Anything less

than this on the part of the dominant group is mere patronizing. "And Jesus said unto them, The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them, and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors."

How may this change be brought about? I am sure that I am not competent to answer this question. I am profoundly convinced, however, that the change must be an individual as well as a social one, if we may think of them separately for convenience. There must be individual creative experimentation along with the actual harnessing of social forces to that end. The process must be formal and informal, direct and indirect, studied and spontaneous. The springs which feed the school, the church, and the home must be tapped. This will mean a new philosophy of education, a more adequate philosophy of religion, and a higher quality of religious experience.

IV

In the second place Negroes must develop a minority technique which I choose to call a technique of relaxation sufficiently operative to make for creative living. And this without a corresponding loss in self-respect—perhaps an impossible synthesis.

The supposedly ignorant Negro who has done much of the heavy work of the South has mastered such a technique in some of its aspects. In the midst of a hostile, dominating, controlling white majority he relaxes and oftentimes becomes remarkably creative. When he swears or laughs or sings the gods

tremble. Whatever our judgment may be of the advisability of the attitude, the fact is, such a Negro has transcended his environment and in that degree he is free. It is true that the attitude is often immoral, for sometimes it makes the man bow his knees to what his heart denies. It has given him an exterior defense mechanism which often is not in keeping with his true self. I am of the opinion that it is possible for a member of a minority group to live a relaxed life in the midst of a hostile majority without the apparent or real loss of self-respect and manhood. A faint glimmer of this realization is to be found in the experience of some unlettered Negroes in the South. "In the midst of his thralldom he has created the beautiful on earth; in the midst of his torments he has had so much surplus energy of soul that he has sent it radiating forth into the cold depths of space and warmed them with God."

But what about the educated Negro and those who are in the schools? Ideally stated, it seems to me that the goal of education is to make people at home in the world so that they may live fully and creatively. It aims to put at their disposal a technique of mastery over themselves and over their environment, as far as possible. If the mastery of the environment includes the mastery of persons as well as things, then the way leads straight to a terrific struggle for survival. This makes for tenseness as against relaxation. Often it breeds fear. The members of both groups with the same slant as to education would tend to give each other no quarter.

The philosophy and technique of education which

are the tools of the educated Negro are alike the tools of the educated white man. They are to be used by people who stand in society as keepers of the established order. Their skill is most fully revealed when one stands in society in a position of advantage. (I am referring to philosophy and technique rather than subject matter.) The Negro stands in a position of disadvantage—he is a member of a minority group with a dominant group technique. The net result is discouragement, despair, pessimism, and bitterness. The gulf between him and the great majority of his own group widens. He tends to look upon the lowliest members of his race as the dominant group looks upon them.

Under the circumstances this seems to be inevitable. But an education which tends to throw a member of a minority group out of sympathy with the life and struggles of the greater number of his group to whose fate his fate is also tied is suicidal. I am not here making a plea for a particularized type of education, but I am thinking of placing at the centre of whatever kind of education there may be *a unique concept* which would profoundly influence the whole sphere of education as it had to do with being at home in the world. This concept must be *indigenous;* it must spring out of the life of the minority group itself.

It was pointed out above that in the mind of the dominant group there has been a fusion of the will to live and the will to dominate and control. In the mind of the minority group a similar thing has taken place—there is a fusion of *the will to live* and *the will to hate* the man who makes living such precarious

business. A minority technique which I am calling a technique of relaxation would put the group into a frame of mind that would make it possible to detach itself from the clash of minority and majority sufficiently to interpret the relationship between them in the light of a will to share and a will to love.

This is agonizingly difficult because, for the most part, individual and group experience is against it. It is difficult again because it is not a mere matter of relaxing a will, hard as that is, but it means a whole technique of relaxation running the entire length and breadth of experience. It means that the group itself must be relaxed. This requires a vast faith and an almighty affection. The moment the dominant group relaxes its will to dominate and the minority group relaxes, the way is cleared for summarizing the relationship on a new basis. To this end all social forces operating separately and jointly among both groups must be harnessed.

In my opinion, all our attempts to bring about brotherhood, sympathetic understanding, and goodwill are dashed to pieces against an adamant wall. On the one side it is labelled: The Will to Control and Dominate. On the other it is labelled: The Will to Hate the Man Who Tries to Dominate and Crush Me. When there is relaxation, then the way is clear for the operation of the will to share joyfully in the common life—the will to love healingly and creatively.

PACIFISM AND THE CRIMINAL

ROGER N. BALDWIN

Roger N. Baldwin is director of the American Civil Liberties Union, which he organized as the Civil Liberties Bureau during the War. He served a year in prison for refusal to register for the draft. He has been in the centre of numerous important struggles to maintain freedom of speech, especially in industrial conflicts, and recently spent a year abroad studying civil liberty and repression. He is chairman of the International Committee for Political Prisoners, a trustee of the American Fund for Public Service, and a member of the executive committee of the Fellowship of Reconciliation. Formerly he was a professor of sociology at Washington University and executive officer of the St. Louis Juvenile Court. He is joint author of *Juvenile Courts and Probation* and author of *Liberty Under the Soviets.*

PACIFISM AND THE CRIMINAL

ROGER N. BALDWIN

WHAT should be the attitude of pacifists to the question of prosecuting persons who commit crimes? What should be their attitude to taking part as jurymen in criminal prosecutions? What efforts can they make for the reform of the system of dealing with offenders?

These issues are raised time and again in the lives of those with a pacifist outlook. We are faced now and then with the dilemma of either remaining loyal to the principle of love and good-will and refusing to be parties to punishment, or turning over offenders to the rigors of an archaic system of justice based on vengeance. The fact that the alternatives are so far apart, that so few ways are open to rational and friendly treatment of offenders, puts us in the position of choosing one extreme or the other.

What shall we do with those guilty of offenses against our property or persons—the burglar caught in our home, the thief who runs off with the family car, the youth forging our name to checks? The temptation is always to let the law take its course where the offender has been caught, and then to wash our hands of responsibility—though we must face testifying for the prosecution. But we must be trou-

bled with the consciousness that the law's course inevitably wrecks the lives and characters (such as they are) of its victims. On the other hand, if we turn aside from the law and refuse to prosecute we expose others to the depredations of men without the capacity to live social lives.

In dealing with the personal problems presented by offenses committed against us, not much help can be given by our present system. The best one can do with an offender whom the law has caught, and whose offense involves us, is to see him through in as friendly a fashion as possible. I know of a number of cases of young men caught stealing, whose victims prayerfully followed them through courts and prisons with friendly aid and counsel, and secured jobs for them on their release. In some of the cases that friendship turned the trick and set them on the road to social living. In other cases of youths twisted by the life of the streets and of reform schools cure was hopeless.

To abandon an offender for whom one has a responsibility is to hand him over with certainty to the degradation of our courts and prisons. I venture to say that no man sentenced to an American prison or jail to-day, even the best of them, comes out a better man for his prison experience. Those who do go straight do so because of some strong personal influence, usually from outside prison. Only rarely do prison friendships bring about that new direction of habits and thinking which sets a man on the straight road to social living.

Not only in the relation to an offender who involves

us, but in serving on juries in criminal cases, is our attitude challenged. Shall we accept jury service or shall we make ourselves unacceptable by declaring that we would not in any case vote to convict, because of the futility of mere punishment? For myself, I determined long ago to refuse to be a party to visiting the law's violence on anybody either by prosecuting or by jury service. I have been called for jury duty in criminal courts, and each time I have announced my scruples to the jury commissioner. I have had some heated and amusing arguments with these officials over the impracticality of my stand, but I have never been required to serve.

What can pacifists do to reform this blind and futile old system of dealing with offenders? Good-will and friendship are, of course, the cement of social life everywhere. They are just as true applied to offenders as they are to the rest of us. They are the basis of Kropotkin's argument for dealing with every criminal only by the social control of friends and neighbors. The world is far from any such possibility. But every effort for reducing crime must lie in the direction of decreasing force. Probation, juvenile courts, aids to prisoners upon release, have already accomplished something in that direction, but they are more than offset by the unthinking demands of press, business men, insurance companies, police, and the courts for greater severity to criminals. So difficult is it to wean the public from its ancient prejudices in favor of punishment—the law of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth—that pacifists can put

in their best licks in pushing at every possible point measures against compulsion. That case rests on practical grounds. It rests on ethical grounds. In personal and public relations friendship and good-will stand the test of results just as surely as compulsion and violence always fail to achieve enduringly the results they aim at.

Behind this method of treating offenders lie, of course, the causes which produce them. Our whole social system, based upon inequality and privilege, is largely responsible for the commonest crimes, those against property. Only as that social system is revolutionized will it be possible to strike deep at the major causes of crime. One cannot expect the abolition of crime from a pacifist treatment of offenders alone. Only as a revolutionary outlook upon the cure of its causes is united with the pacifist method can we have well-grounded faith in a world without violence.

In the United States, despite all the agitation for reform of the system of justice, the reformers have made but little real progress. Every reform has been in the direction of decreased force and increased freedom and responsibility for offenders. Chief among them are juvenile courts (a peculiarly American contribution), probation for both children and adults, psychiatric examinations, and organized work to rehabilitate prisoners on release. Inside prisons the significant work of Thomas Mott Osborne toward prison democracy stands out as the chief hope of overcoming the brutalizing effects of prison; but it unhappily has gained no headway against the domination of prison authorities.

The entire reform program in the United States has been set back since the War by the demands of press and business for increased severity against the growing crime rate. The archaic system of criminal justice stands essentially unchanged, with no serious effort to make good citizens out of offenders.

Pacifists can only intensify the work of reformers who share their principle in action whatever their philosophy—more probation, less resort to prison, abolition of capital punishment, more self-government by prisoners, reinstatement of ex-prisoners in normal life against the eternal police persecution.

But without a sweeping reorganization of the whole system of criminal justice these petty reforms mean little. And no such sweeping reorganization is possible without a change in the public attitude to wrongdoers.

And that public attitude is unlikely to change under the present social system based on private property, class privilege, and authority. It will grow only as the radical wings of the labor movement grow, for they alone have the dynamic power to effect great social changes. All its schools—socialist, anarchist, and communist—propose revolutionary concepts of the treatment of crime. The anarchists go furthest in that, as in all else. The anarchist school of thought, for example, demands the abolition of all violence and compulsion in human relations, as well as the abolition of prisons and of punishment—before or after revolution. Kropotkin, in an essay on prisons written after he had himself served a long term in

France for a political offense, says as the summary of his wisdom:

"The first duty of the revolution will be to abolish prisons—those monuments of human hypocrisy and cowardice. Anti-social acts need not be feared in a society of equals, in the midst of a free people, all of whom have acquired a healthy education and the habit of mutually aiding one another. The greater number of these acts will no longer have any *raison d'être*. The others will be nipped in the bud.

"As for those individuals with evil tendencies whom existing society will pass on to us after the revolution, it will be our task to prevent their exercising these tendencies. This is already accomplished quite efficiently by the solidarity of all the members of the community against such aggressors. If we do not succeed in all cases, the only practical corrective still will be fraternal treatment and moral support.

"This is not Utopia. It is already done by isolated individuals and it will become the general practice. And such means will be far more powerful to protect society from anti-social acts than the existing system of punishment, which is an ever-fertile source of new crimes."

In only one country yet have the radical schools had a chance to put theory into practice. In Soviet Russia the Bolsheviks, despite a government even stronger than the Tsar's, in their whole approach to the problem of dealing with crime minimize the law's violence. The theory of the new penology of Soviet Russia rests upon the idea that all offenses are the product of bad social conditions or diseased minds

and can be cured by education and a just organization of society.

I was talking last year to the head of the police department of the whole republic of Ukraine, a man with immense responsibilities. He is not a pacifist; he is a Bolshevik. When I asked him what he proposed to do about meeting the growing crime rate in the Ukraine, he answered: "One thing we will not do is to enlarge the police force. We don't believe that the police can reduce crime. We believe in education and socialism. Some day through them we will abolish the police."

This was the first time I ever heard of a police chief who did not want a bigger force. But that is the official attitude of the Soviet régime—no more police, no more prisons. Whatever new places of confinement are necessary are to be farm colonies where men can learn on the soil to adjust themselves to their fellows in comparative freedom. Throughout the whole Soviet system of dealing with offenders runs the effort to teach men trades—with wages in prison—to give them increasing responsibilities, and to fit them for liberty by greater freedom as their prison term progresses. All well-behaved prisoners are allowed two weeks' vacation a year with pay. All well-behaved peasant prisoners are given three months off without pay to harvest their crops. No sentence runs beyond ten years, and that time is cut by one third or more through work and good conduct. This is true even for first-degree murder. The death penalty has been abolished throughout the whole Soviet Union for all crimes except armed robbery and political offenses—

armed robbery being excepted because of its growth, particularly in districts uprooted by civil war.

The whole spirit of the Soviet penal codes is just what pacifists desire. Even the phraseology has been changed to indicate that punishment is no longer the object of the law. Indeed, the word "punishment" has been taken out of the criminal code. All sentences are "measures of social defense." While that does not change, in fact, the courts' penalties, it indicates an attitude to the offender on which the effort toward his reform is based.

I speak of the example of Soviet Russia because it is the nearest approach in fact to the treatment of one's fellow human beings by the law in the spirit in which a pacifist would conceive that treatment. Russian prisons are not by any means ideal. I visited about a dozen of them, and, while physical conditions are in many places wretched, their new purpose is apparent in the attitude of both prisoners and keepers.

Even in the matter of handling delinquent children Russia has gone beyond the United States with its boasted juvenile courts. Child offenders under fourteen are not sent to court at all, but are handled by a commission under the local school boards, composed of a teacher, a physician, and a layman. No child between fourteen and sixteen can be taken to court unless the commission certifies him as hopeless from an educational and medical standpoint. Of course, in Russia, as elsewhere, institutions for the mentally defective and insane exist, and definitely pathological cases are sent to them, some for permanent custody.

But imagine the furor that would be caused in the

United States if we proposed to do here now, in these days of Baumes laws, what Soviet Russia has already done—namely, to cut all prison sentences to a maximum of ten years, even for murder, and to let prisoners loose in the community for vacations during their terms of imprisonment. And yet I venture to say that just such right-about-face methods would go far toward reducing our crime rate because they would produce more highly social men and women.

The pacifist attitude in the field of reform in the treatment of crime must take cognizance of what is being done in Soviet Russia, despite the fact that it has a government exercising in the political field probably the severest compulsions of any government in the world.

In the years just ahead here in the United States, when no such revolutionary change is possible, we can plug away—not very encouragingly, I fear—on diminishing the violence of "justice" and increasing the opportunities of normal life for offenders.

But however little we may be able to affect the archaic system itself, we can at least refuse to be party to it by prosecuting or rendering jury service. And we can aid with good-will and practical helpfulness the offenders who come our way.

PACIFISM AND CLASS WAR

A. J. MUSTE

A. J. Muste is chairman of the faculty of Brookwood Labor College. He has had experience in labor organization, has studied the labor movement abroad, and has published numerous articles on economic questions. Besides speaking frequently on social and economic problems, he has published several pamphlets on labor tactics. He contributed a chapter on "Factional Fights in the Trade Unions" for the volume *American Labor Dynamics,* and a chapter on "Industry and the Family" for another book, *Family Life Today.* He is chairman of the national council of the Fellowship of Reconciliation.

PACIFISM AND CLASS WAR

A. J. MUSTE

PRACTICALLY all our thinking about pacifism in connection with class war starts out at the wrong point. The question raised is how the oppressed in struggling for freedom and the good life may be dissuaded from employing "the revolutionary method of violence" and won over to "the peaceful process of evolution." Two erroneous assumptions are concealed in the question put that way. The first is that the oppressed, the radicals, are the ones who are creating the disturbance. To the leaders of Jesus' day, Pharisees, Sadducees, Roman governor, it was Jesus who was upsetting the people, turning the world upside down. In the same way, we speak of the Kuomintang "making a revolution" in China to-day, seldom by any chance of the Powers having made the revolution by almost a hundred years of trickery, oppression, and inhumanity. Similarly society may permit an utterly impossible situation to develop in an industry like coal, but the workers who finally in desperation put down tools and fold their arms, they are "the strikers," the cause of the breach of the peace. We need to get our thinking focused right, and to see the rulers of Jewry and Rome, not Jesus, the Powers, not the Chinese Nationalists, selfish employers or a negli-

gent society, not striking workers, as the cause of disturbance in the social order.

A second assumption underlying much of our thinking is that the violence is solely or chiefly committed by the rebels against oppression, and that this violence constitutes the heart of our problem. However, the basic fact is that the economic, social, political order in which we live was built up largely by violence, is now being extended by violence, and is maintained only by violence. A slight knowledge of history, a glimpse at the armies and navies of the Most Christian Powers, at our police and constabulary, at the militaristic fashion in which practically every attempt of workers to organize is greeted, at Nicaragua or China, will suffice to make the point clear to an unbiased mind.

The foremost task, therefore, of the pacifist in connection with class war is to denounce the violence on which the present system is based and all the evil, material and spiritual, this entails for the masses of men throughout the world, and to exhort all rulers in social, political, industrial life, all who occupy places of privilege, all who are the beneficiaries of the present state of things, to relinquish every attempt to hold on to wealth, position, and power by force, to give up the instruments of violence on which they annually spend billions of wealth produced by the sweat and anguish of the toilers. So long as we are not dealing honestly and adequately with this ninety per cent. of our problem there is something ludicrous, and perhaps hypocritical, about our concern over the ten per cent. of violence employed by the rebels

against oppression. Can we win the rulers of earth to peaceful methods?

The psychological basis for the use of nonviolent methods is the simple rule that like produces like, kindness provokes kindness, as surely as injustice produces resentment and evil. It is sometimes forgotten by those whose pacifism is a spurious, namby-pamby thing that if one Biblical statement of this rule is" Do good to them that hate you" (an exhortation presumably intended for the capitalist as well as for the laborer), another statement of the same rule is, "They that sow the wind shall reap the whirlwind." You get from the universe what you give, with interest! What if men build a system on violence and injustice, on not doing good to those who hate them nor even to those who meekly obey and toil for them? And persist in this course through centuries of Christian history? And if then the oppressed raise the chant:

> "Ye who sowed the wind of sorrow,
> Now the whirlwind you must dare,
> As ye face upon the morrow,
> The advancing Proletaire"?

In such a day the pacifist is presumably not absolved from preaching to the rebels that they also shall reap what they sow but assuredly not in such wise as to leave the oppressors safely intrenched in their position, not at the cost of preaching to them in all sternness that "the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

As we are stayed from preaching nonviolence to the under dog unless and until we have dealt adequately with the dog who is chewing him up, so also are all those who would support a country in war against another country stayed from preaching nonviolence in principle to labor or to radical movements. Much could be said on this point, but it is perhaps unnecessary to dwell on it here. Suffice it to observe in passing that to one who has had any intimate connection with labor the flutter occasioned in certain breasts by the occasional violence in connection with strikes seems utterly ridiculous, and will continue to seem so until the possessors of these fluttering breasts have sacrificed a great deal more than they already have in order to banish from the earth the horrible monster of international war.

We are not, to pursue the matter a little further, in a moral position to advocate nonviolent methods to labor while we continue to be beneficiaries of the existing order. They who profit by violence, though it be indirectly, unwillingly, and only in a small measure, will always be under suspicion and rightly so of seeking to protect their profits, of being selfishly motivated, if they address pious exhortations to those who suffer by that violence.

Nor can anyone really with good conscience advocate abstention from violence to the masses of labor in revolt, unless he is himself identified in spirit with labor and helping it with all his might to achieve its rights and to realize its ideals. In a world built on violence one must be a revolutionary before one can be a pacifist: in such a world a nonrevolutionary paci-

fist is a contradiction in terms, a monstrosity. During the war no thorough pacifist in America would have felt justified in exhorting Germany to lay down its arms while saying and doing nothing about America's belligerent activities. We should have recognized instantly the moral absurdity, the implied hypocrisy of such a position. Our duty was to win our own "side" to a "more excellent way." It is a sign of ignorance and lack of realism in our pacifist groups and churches that so many fail to recognize clearly and instantly the same point with regard to the practice of pacifism in social and labor struggles.

Things being as they are, it is fairly certain that if a group of workers goes on strike for better conditions, other methods having failed, they will commit some acts of violence and coercion, some evil passions will be aroused in their breasts. Shall the pacifist who has identified himself with labor's cause therefore seek to dissuade the workers from going on strike? (I am of course confining myself here to a question of principle, leaving out of account questions of the expediency of a strike in given conditions.) My own answer is an emphatic negative, because I am convinced that in these cases the alternative of submission is by far the greater evil. Appearances are deceiving here, and the human heart is deceitful. There is a certain indolence, a wish not to be disturbed, in us which tempts us to think that when things are quiet all is well. Subconsciously we tend to give the preference to "social peace," though it be only apparent, because our lives and possessions seem then secure. Actually, human beings acquiesce too

easily in evil conditions; they rebel far too little and too seldom.

There is nothing noble about a resigned acquiescence in a cramped life or mere submission to superior force. There is as vast a spiritual difference between such submission of the masses and the glad acceptance of pain by the saint as there is between the sodden poverty of the urban or rural slum and the voluntary poverty of St. Francis "that walks with God upon the Umbrian hills." No one who has ever inwardly experienced the spiritual exaltation and the intense brotherhood created by a strike, on the one hand, and the sullen submission of hopeless poverty or the dull contentment or "respectability" of those who are too fat and lazy to struggle for freedom, on the other hand, will hesitate for a moment to choose the former though it involves a measure of violence.

Here it may be well to point out that as a matter of fact the amount of violence on the part of workers on strike is usually grossly exaggerated, and that, on the other hand, practically every great strike furnishes inspiring examples of nonresistance under cruel provocation and victory by "soul force" alone, victory through patient endurance of evil and sacrifice even unto death for spiritual ends. I have witnessed these things repeatedly. More than once I have exhorted masses of strikers to fold their arms, not to strike back, to smile at those who beat them and tramp them under their horses' feet, and their response has been instantaneous, unreserved, exalted. I have also appealed to police heads to call off violence-provoking extra forces and to employers to

discharge labor spies, and have been laughed at for my pains.

Much of what has already been said bears upon the special problem of the communist with his frank espousal of terrorism, his conviction that no great and salutary social change can be accomplished without violence and that workers must therefore be prepared for armed revolt. Our whole focus on this problem also is wrong unless we get it clear that violence inheres first in the system against which the communist revolts, that they who suffer from social revolt in the main reap what by positive evil-doing or indifference they have sown, that practically every great revolution begins peacefully and might proceed so to all appearances but for the development of violent counter-revolution, that the degree of terrorism employed in such an upheaval as the French or the Russian revolution is always directly proportionate to the pressure of foreign attack, that in general the amount of "red" terrorism in human history is a bagatelle compared to the "white" terrorism of reactionaries. The question is pertinent as to whether the "Lord's will" is done by the servant who talks about terrorism and practices very little or by the servant who talks about law and order and practices a vast deal of terrorism.

Most discussions assume that on this point of the use of violence there is a fundamental difference between the conservative and radical wings of the labor movement, and between socialism and communism. There are important differences between these elements, but the contention that they differ *in prin-*

ciple on the use of violence, in the sense the thorough pacifist attaches to these terms, cannot be sustained. Among the unions in the United States many of the more conservative ones practice violence in industrial disputes more extensively than radical unions. Gangsterism in the American labor world is not an invention of the communist unions, though the latter have not refrained from employing it. The socialist parties do not commit themselves in advance to the inevitability of violent revolution, but neither do they promise to refrain from the use of force to defend a socialist order if they deem that necessary. If Ramsay MacDonald, for example, is to be called a pacifist because he favors the League of Nations and disarmament, though he helps to keep the British navy in trim when he is Prime Minister and tells Indian revolutionists he will have the British army shoot them down if they go too far, then it will be difficult to prove that Stalin and Litvinov are not entitled to the same designation.

All this does not mean that the labor movement is not confronted with a serious problem regarding the means to which it will resort to advance its aims. Many times employers, on the one hand, and workers, on the other hand, are approached by the most crude and self-defeating psychological methods. Money is spent on gangsters, for example, that might well net a thousandfold better return if devoted to the education of workers and of the public. Violence begets violence by whomever used. War is a dirty business and entails the use of degrading means, whoever wages it.

The labor movement in New York City not long ago gave a striking illustration of the law upon which the pacifist so often insists that the means one uses inevitably incorporate themselves into his ends and, if evil, defeat him. Some years ago employers in the garment trades resorted to the practice of employing armed gangsters to attack peaceful picketers. It became impossible to send men and women on the picket line to meet such brutal attacks, so the union also resorted to hiring gangsters. Once you started the practice, you had to hire gangsters in every strike, of course. Thus a group of gangsters came to be a permanent part of the union machinery. Next it was easy for officers who had employed the gangsters in strikes to use these same gangsters, who were on the pay roll anyway, in union elections to insure continued tenure to the "machine." The next step in the "descent to Avernus" was for the gangsters on whom the administration depended for its tenure of office to make themselves the administration, the union "machine."

In the meantime, the union gangsters naturally came to a gentleman's agreement with those hired by the employer, so that both sides were paying out large sums of money to gangsters no longer doing any decisive work in strikes or lockouts; both sides had likewise to pay graft to the police so that they would not interfere with their private armies; and the rank and file of union members, having come to look to gangsters to do the real picketing, no longer had the desire, courage, or morale to picket peacefully, appeal to strikebreakers to join them, and so

on. The whole process, working itself out so fatally and from the æsthetic viewpoint so beautifully, had not a little to do with the deterioration undergone by these unions of which the bitter left-right factional strife was rather a symptom than a cause.

Those who can bring themselves to renounce wealth, position, and power accruing from a social system based on violence and putting a premium on acquisitiveness, and to identify themselves in some real fashion with the struggle of the masses toward the light, may help in a measure, more doubtless by life than by words, to devise a more excellent way, a technique of social progress less crude, brutal, costly, and slow than mankind has yet evolved.

PACIFISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE

GEORGE L. COLLINS

George L. Collins is Baptist university pastor at the University of Wisconsin. Until recently he was secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation, working principally in the fields of industrial and interracial relations. He has been a frequent speaker at student conferences and has addressed undergraduates in more than two hundred and fifty colleges. Formerly he was interchurch student pastor at the Colorado School of Mines, and vice president and instructor in the Denver Labor College, as also in the Farmer-Labor Summer School of Colorado and Wyoming. He went overseas with the Fortieth Division, commissioned as a second lieutenant assigned to a machine-gun battalion.

PACIFISM AND SOCIAL INJUSTICE

GEORGE L. COLLINS

CAN pacifism act against injustice? There are ex-pacifists who would answer "No" to this question. One can observe middle-class idealists who have selflessly thrown themselves into the labor struggle and who have been so impressed with the weight of injustice faced by the worker that they have cast aside their former beliefs in nonviolent methods as being impractical and "bourgeois." This is partly because of the difficulty in retaining perspective when in the midst of conflict, and partly through the demand for quick action which more violent methods seem to promise. Then, too, the "intellectual" is generally regarded with a questioning eye by American labor and he is more likely to be considered as a member of the "we group" if he quickly learns to play the game according to the accepted rules, which in industrial conflict may mean the condoning of violence.

It is, of course, quite obvious to the student of labor history that while the worker has indulged in violence on occasion the responsibility for violence lies generally at the doors of the state or the employing class, the two generally being synonymous in practice. But while granting and emphasizing that fact the believer in pacifism must point out what to his view is the failure in the slip, perhaps reluctant,

into violence, of which even labor is sometimes guilty. That failure is seen in some of the unions where gangsterism is at least an occasional phenomenon. The old argument is advanced that one must fight fire with fire. If the bosses use gangsters the workers must be prepared for like activity. Besides, some workers, it is said, are so lacking in a sense of solidarity with their fellows that the only way they can be taught to assume their social obligations is by a beating up. A gangster who was engaged to build up a small and weak union justified his tactics by suggesting that it was sometimes advisable to spank a child. And he might have gone on to say that after the workers had become organized and had secured better working conditions they might be willing to forget the tactics which had been used against them in the organizing days. Of course, a situation where a gangster is the organizer of a union is rare, but it is justified by the belief that the workers are only children in outlook and will respond to fear more readily than to more elevated motives—a point of view held, incidentally, rather widely by employers.

The use of violence, even when the temptation is great, through the frequent lawless acts of special deputies or the police, militates against the success of the workers' struggle for justice. Labor's opponents are able to resort to violence with greater effectiveness because of more experience along that line. Also, the courts have usually been against the workers. Perhaps it may be urged that the temptation for labor is often not that of resorting to gangsterism but of setting up "entertainment committees" which

will look after strikebreakers and wavering members by tactics that are not altogether gentle. But members of such committees sometimes graduate into the ranks of the professional rough-and-ready men. Even when such a development does not take place, individuals who have been "rough" for the union have a hold upon it which it finds hard to shake off. Of course, public opinion, which must usually be cultivated if an industrial struggle is to be won, is speedily alienated if the charge of violence can be fastened upon the labor organization. That is why the effort is at times made to goad the workers into violence, or spies planted within the organization to urge such tactics. These methods failing, such an accusation with the help of the press may be trumped up and generally believed by a gullible public.

After all, perhaps, the worst charge against violence from the standpoint of the worker is that it tends to develop qualities which may be excellent for military men but which are not so helpful for labor organizations. Labor must finally depend on loyalty and mutual helpfulness. As George Lansbury, that labor veteran of England, remarks:

"I cannot conceive a Socialist or Communist State without Socialists and Communists—that is, people who are full of the spirit of brotherhood and love. It is more impossible to imagine a society based on cooperation without the spirit and love of coöperation than it is to imagine a tyrannical autocracy or oligarchy controlling masses of people who hate its power."[1]

[1] *These Things Shall Be,* p. 8.

It may take longer for labor to come to power through pacific methods, but by "selling" its cause to the unorganized worker, to all those who do not profit from the exploitation of labor, and to at least a few of the employing group, it can build more solidly.

Violence does not deserve the standing it at present enjoys in the struggle against injustice, even though it may be immortalized in song and story. The greatly daring who see how the United States of America has not hesitated to use its power to limit the liberty of other countries, especially those to the south of us, might question the Revolutionary War. As far as the freeing of the Negro slaves in the Civil War is concerned, there are many who believe that the war method resulted in slowing down the process of the ultimate emancipation of the Negro, the emancipation which seems to-day to be still in the future. Dr. W. E. B. Du Bois, the well-known Negro writer and editor, was asked one day if he thought the dark peoples would finally seek their freedom from white domination at the point of the sword. He replied that he was not sure of the answer to that question, but on this point he was sure—that if dark people won their freedom by the sword they would then go out and oppress other peoples. Aside from the agreement or disagreement that the reader may be inclined to yield to the above speculations, it seems reasonably certain that if labor descends to violence in its struggle against the holders of economic power, such methods are likely to be used by one faction in a labor organization against another faction, just as the

weapons—machine guns and gas bombs—devised for use against the national enemy are used by the state against its striking workers. Thus the coming of a more coöperative order based on more coöperative people would be further postponed.

What of the strike? Does allegiance to pacifism demand opposition to the use of that weapon? It is all too obvious that the strike, which means the collective withdrawal of efficiency by the workers, the collective folding of arms, does at times involve violence. But that situation, serious as it often becomes, does not mean that the strike is not a pacifist tactic. Unquestionably, certain strikes are not justified, such as jurisdictional strikes, and strikes when attempts at adjustment have not been made; but these are relatively infrequent. There are also what might be called border-line strikes, where it is hard to tell whether they are justified or not. But the justification for the strike as a weapon of the workers remains very strong. The violence which often accompanies it is not inevitable and can be largely eliminated when the community becomes as concerned to protect the worker as at present it is to protect property and profit.

For example, if the community kept the channels open for the full discussion of the issues that provoked the strike the chances of violent outbreaks would be greatly lessened. And if the police were strictly nonpartisan in their business of maintaining order, the community would be much more peaceful. As labor gains in strength violence can be expected to diminish. Violence has been especially the weapon

of the weak—those who were hard pressed. If the workers are strong enough to win in a labor struggle violence is unnecessary, while if they are weak enough to need violence the chances are against their winning anyway. What Gandhi says is probably as true practically as ideally: "I believe in the doctrine of nonviolence as a weapon, not of the weak, but of the strong."

If violence is futile and unnecessary in the industrial struggle what aggressive action may be taken by the pacifist? Perhaps most elementary is the need expressed above of maintaining freedom of expression for the cause of the worker who ordinarily would receive scant consideration by the city newspaper. Some strikes could doubtless be avoided if the issues were clearly put before the public involved. If the workers' case were weak—as conceivably might happen—public opinion would then be intelligently against the strike and there would be less chance that it would occur. On the other hand, if the workers had real grievances to be redressed, as is usually the case, the employers, realizing that the public was informed and was friendly to the viewpoint of labor, might be inclined to yield without a costly conflict. Such prevention of strikes by informing public opinion is a rare enough occurrence, partly through the fault of labor in not realizing the importance of educating the public to the issues and not knowing how to do it, and partly because of the ignorance and lack of organization on the part of sympathizers outside the ranks of labor.

Organized labor, however, is increasingly realizing the importance of the publicity director, and certain unions are farsighted enough to have a department of research. When such unions face a struggle they are immensely better prepared to win the sympathy of the public than those depending upon economic power alone, indispensable as that is. The Amalgamated Clothing Workers are a conspicuous example of a union effectively using research and publicity. They know the economic realities underlying the situation in their industry as well as the employers and often better, and they know how much to ask for.

Going back to the opportunities of the "intellectuals," if they were organized so that before a conflict came to a head in a given community they were holding mass meetings, putting speakers in churches and clubs to cover the whole situation, the strike even though not prevented would perhaps be less bitter and would more often than to-day result in the advancement of the interests of the workers. The places with an approach to an effective technique are rare. In Denver, for example, there have been outstanding ministers and other individuals outside the labor movement who have been close to labor.

It is clear that after a strike has been declared there are ample opportunities for the pacifist to serve in preserving the rights of free speech and free assemblage. The American Civil Liberties Union has done most noteworthy work in this regard. It may not be entirely a coincidence that some of the leaders of

the Union have been pacifists. Time and time again imprisonment has been risked by individuals who were representatives of the Union in their efforts to preserve the elementary rights of the workers. Roger Baldwin and Robert Dunn of the Civil Liberties Union, Norman Thomas of the League for Industrial Democracy, and Frank Palmer of Colorado are several individuals out of a number, who have gone into situations where workers' meetings were banned and have helped recapture for labor those basic rights which it was denied. Whether all who have done such things hold to the pacifist philosophy or not, their activities for free speech were in accord with what might be called pacifist tactics. They were willing to suffer if need be in the nonviolent resistance of encroachments upon the freedom of labor.

Pacifists have no right to speak against the resort to violence by the workers when the latter are backed against the wall by the police and the power of the employer and are not allowed the use of ordinary channels to express their grievances, unless they, the pacifists, have labored to keep those channels open.

In the appeal to public opinion against injustice there is a greater power than is generally realized. The United States Steel Corporation contended that the twelve-hour day was necessary if they were to maintain profitable production, and the steel strike of 1919 did not change their practice, but the publication of the report on the strike by the Interchurch World Movement informed the country of the facts in a way that could not be denied effectively, though the corporation tried to discredit the signers of the

report. Without doubt the fear of another strike in some future time was one factor in moving the company to adopt the eight-hour day, but the Interchurch report was unquestionably the principal explanation.

Even New York City in the Passaic strike of 1926 was stirred by the spectacle of workers suffering and on the whole protesting only by nonviolent resistance. The large sums raised in that struggle would hardly have been forthcoming when there was so little organization behind the strikers if the workers had been less pacific. The employers were finally forced to come down from their position to deal with the workers. It was an instance of the kind to which Professor E. A. Ross alluded when he wrote, "The spectacle of men suffering for a principle and not hitting back is a moving one. It obliges the power holders to condescend to explain, to justify themselves."[2] It showed the power of nonviolent action when there was good publicity.

If pacifism is going to be effective against injustice it cannot content itself with limiting its activities to industrial clashes. It may and must assail injustice in the flank, as it were. This is being done in a small but significant way by such an experiment as the Columbia Conserve Co. of Indianapolis. An important result from this undertaking in the democratic control of production is the demonstration that workers who are not at all above the average can develop the ability to manage productive processes when they have real responsibility thrust upon them. Such experiments in their modification of the wage system are

[2] *Non-Violent Coercion,* by C. M. Case. Introduction.

changing in their little corners the economic arrangement which is fraught with much widespread injustice.

The opportunity for the pacifist in or out of the labor movement to serve through labor education is still largely undiscovered. There are but few centres where labor education is at all worthy of the name. And yet there is a great opportunity through such channels to help labor see its goal and the most adequate means for achieving it. A knowledge of the history of the working class, for example, is enlightening to those who are tempted to swing into the easy but blind-alley way of violence, or for those others who feel that labor is so outmatched that there is little hope of its winning through to a better order.

Outstanding in pacifist strategy, finally, is the organization of a labor party. Though it may make no pacifist claims, yet its method of gaining power through winning general consent to its program of increasing social control by all producers in the interest of all producers is essentially a pacifist technique. Some who regard themselves as farther to the left may feel that such control by a workers' political party could be effectively nullified by those who now rule; but they overestimate the achievements through violent social change, and underestimate the power of ideas increasingly disseminated in the minds of ordinary people.

DOES NONCOÖPERATION WORK?

A. FENNER BROCKWAY

A. Fenner Brockway, M. P., is the former political secretary of the British Independent Labor Party and editor of *The New Leader*. In 1917 he was secretary of the No-Conscription Fellowship and served a term in prison at hard labor, having appeared nine times before police courts or courts-martial for war opposition. He is chairman of the No More War Movement and the War Resisters' International. In 1919 he was joint secretary of the British Committee of the Indian National Congress, and in 1920 joint secretary of the Prison System Enquiry Committee. He was executive of the Labor and Socialist International, 1926–1928; and in 1927 was fraternal delegate to the Indian Trade Union Congress and the Indian National Congress. He is the author of numerous books, including *Non-Coöperation; The Government of India;* and *A New Way with Crime.*

DOES NONCOÖPERATION WORK?

A. FENNER BROCKWAY

LET us be clear about what is meant by noncoöperation. Noncoöperation is resistance to a wrongful authority, not by force, but by refusal to coöperate in its imposition.

Noncoöperation has been practiced for centuries. It was practiced by Jesus when he declined to recognize that the authority of Rome was higher than the authority of God. It was practiced by the early Christians who declined to recognize the rights of the pagan gods, preferring death in the arena. It was practiced by the conscientious objectors, from the time of Maximilian down to the Great War, who faced execution and imprisonment rather than kill their fellows. It was practiced by all the martyrs who accepted torture and burning rather than outrage their principles.

All these are instances of the personal practice of noncoöperation. One cannot apply to them the ordinary estimates of failure or success. They acted as they did, not because they calculated the effect of their conduct, but because they could do no other. Their bodies may have been destroyed but their souls remained untarnished and erect.

While a consideration of consequences did not af-

fect their action, it is worth noting, however, that valuable results to society have followed these personal instances of "noncoöperation." The steadfastness of Jesus has proven the greatest spiritual dynamic in the progress of mankind. The religious martyrs have won the measure of religious liberty which is now enjoyed. The effect of the refusal of conscientious objectors to participate in war is working as a remarkable leaven for peace in Europe today. And beyond these immediate results, this long line of "noncoöperative individuals" has demonstrated beyond contradiction the supremacy of the human spirit over all other considerations—which is, to those who believe in a spiritual future for mankind, the biggest success of all.

Let us turn from this individual practice of noncooperation to its political practice. The distinction is not, in fact, very marked. Noncoöperation has never been practiced as a political method without an almost religious sense of the value of liberty and of the wrongfulness of tyranny animating those who have adopted it.

The woman suffrage movement in Britain prior to the war is an example. The women said: "We are slaves politically. We have no voice in the government of our land. We are asked to obey laws in the making of which we have no share. That is an outrage upon womanhood. We will decline to recognize the authority of man-made legislation." So they refused to pay taxes; they marched in procession to the House of Commons, despite prohibitive regulations, and were imprisoned; they protested in all manner

of ways against their political subjection. Some of the "militant" suffragists, it is true, denied the pacifist principle of noncoöperation by committing certain acts of violence. Most careful observers of the period will agree that by their violence these suffragists put back their cause almost as much as they had advanced it by their sacrifice.

Strikes of workmen against tyrannical or harsh working conditions are to a certain degree another example of noncoöperation—*to a certain degree,* because sometimes they are not the outcome of a sense of subjection or of injustice, but a mere matter of forcing, that is *imposing,* a good bargain. The latter is the antithesis of noncoöperation.

The refusal to participate in war has sometimes developed from personal noncoöperation to political noncoöperation. Indeed many of the conscientious objectors in the Great War were animated by the conviction that it was not merely wrong for them to fight personally, but right for them as an organized body to render a service to the cause of liberty and peace by resisting the imposition of conscription and the conduct of war.

The conscription law which came into operation in England, Scotland, and Wales in 1916 was also legally applicable to Ireland. The British government refrained from applying the law, however, because it feared to invite a revolt in Ireland. This timidity was vigorously denounced in the English militaristic press and the agitation became so strong that in 1917 the government announced that on a certain day the operation of conscription would be

extended to Ireland. Immediately the Irish people outside Ulster indicated their resistance almost to a man. The Bishops joined with the Republicans in calling upon the men to refuse service.

Some discussion took place as to method. Should the resistance be by arms or by passive refusal? It is interesting to record that the Irish sent representatives secretly to England to discuss the matter with the No-Conscription Fellowship—the organization of the English conscientious objectors—and they were so impressed by the effectiveness of the "noncoöperation" method that they returned to Ireland to recommend a similar course of action.

The first step was a one-day demonstration strike. It was amazingly complete. Every factory and shop was closed. Not a vehicle moved in the streets. Even the hotels were left without staffs. When this strike of a whole nation was followed by the intimation that not a man would respond to the calling-up notices, the government realized that the conscription law was dead in Ireland and wisely did not attempt to impose it.

The strike against war is a noteworthy example of noncoöperation. It is a deliberate refusal to obey the commands of authority in committing an intolerable cruelty and crime. It was successfully employed by the workers of Norway and Sweden when war was threatened between their two countries toward the end of the last century. It was successfully threatened by the workers of Great Britain when war with Russia was imminent seven years ago. The example of dockers and railway men in declining to handle

munitions was followed by a declaration on the part of the united trade union movement that they would down-tools if war was declared.

These are all instances of political noncoöperation, but the most impressive examples of all have been those of subject nations struggling for political liberty. Probably the first recorded instance is that of the people of Israel under the leadership of Moses in Egypt. A modern instance is that of the Hungarian people in the Nineteenth Century when they refused to coöperate with Austrian tyranny.

When Austria and Hungary united under one monarchy two hundred years ago, the terms of the treaty laid it down that they should be "free and equal," but the Austrians submerged the Hungarians. Francis Deak then led the Hungarians in a remarkable campaign of "noncoöperation." It took two forms: first, the independent development of Hungarian education, agriculture, and industry, and, secondly, the refusal to recognize the Austrian government in any way.

When the Austrian tax gatherers came the people declined to pay. The Austrian police then seized their goods, but no Hungarian auctioneer would sell them. When an Austrian auctioneer was brought he found that he would have to bring bidders from Austria to buy the goods! The government found before long that it was costing more to distrain the goods than the tax was worth.

The Austrians attempted to billet their soldiers upon the Hungarians; the Hungarians did not resist the decree, but the Austrian soldier, after a little ex-

perience of living in a house where everyone despised him, resisted it very strongly. The Austrian government declared the boycott of Austrian goods illegal. The Hungarians defied the order, with the result that the jails were soon filled.

A policy of conciliation was then attempted. The prisoners were released and partial self-government given. Hungary insisted upon its full claims, whereupon the Emperor Francis Josef decreed compulsory military service. The Hungarians indicated that they would refuse to obey it, and, finally, the Emperor withdrew the conscription law and gave Hungary her constitution.

More recently the Korean revolt against the domination of Japan, and the Irish, Egyptian, and Indian resistance to British imperialism are further instances of "noncoöperation."

How far has noncoöperation succeeded? Let us look at the case of India. The measure of its success will, I believe, illustrate the fundamental strength and weakness of the noncoöperative method.

There has been a Nationalist movement in India for sixty years. Until five years ago its attention was almost completely concentrated upon London. It was a movement of a few educated Indians. They were content to appeal to the British Parliament to grant them, not full home rule, but some amelioration of their unhappy political servility.

Gandhi, five years ago, contributed an entirely new attitude to the Nationalist movement. He said: "Your freedom depends not upon Britain, but upon yourselves. You must not beg liberty, you must win it.

You must bring to the whole of the Indian people a sense of the wrongfulness of their servility. You must lead them to refuse to participate in the alien government which is now imposed upon them by force. At the same time, you must not degrade yourselves or your cause by using the method of force, which is the very evil which the British domination embodies. You must resist by the assertion of liberty in your daily lives, not by deeds of violence."

A number of developments made the time opportune for this message. Self-determination had become an accepted principle during the later stages of the war. The refusal of the British government at the end of the war to withdraw the wartime legislation prohibiting liberty of speech, press, and meeting had aroused intense and widespread indignation. The infamous massacre of the peaceful crowd at Amritsar and the humiliations imposed by the British authorities in the Punjab had outraged every self-respecting Indian. The terms of the Turkish treaty had alienated the Mohammedans. India was ready for a new policy, and by vast majorities the Indian National Congress acclaimed Gandhi's new gospel, though in many cases, particularly among the Mohammedans, its pacifist aspects were accepted more on the ground of expediency than of principle.

The adoption of the new policy necessitated, first, a nation-wide campaign among the masses regarding the significance of national freedom, and, second, the development of that spiritual discipline which would eliminate the danger of violence, and, third, the practical application of noncoöperation. Gandhi led mis-

sionaries of his evangel throughout the villages of India. He was already revered as a saint, and everywhere he went the whole population appeared to respond. The Nationalist movement rapidly came to represent the nation, and by his personal influence, Gandhi succeeded in keeping it from the path of violence.

Gandhi's practical application of the principle of noncoöperation found expression in a comprehensive program. He called upon Indians to resign their positions in government service. He asked the people to refuse all recognition of the personal authority which the British officials claimed. He asked Indian barristers to refuse to practice in the British courts and he appealed to Indians to boycott the courts and settle their quarrels before voluntary Indian courts. He advocated that Indians should withdraw their children from British schools and he urged Indian students to leave the British colleges. Finally, he called upon Indians to refrain from voting for the very limited councils which had been set up under the reform scheme.

While Gandhi was particularly in revolt against the imposition of the British political system, he was in reality in revolt against the imposition upon India of Western civilization in all its aspects. He accordingly called upon the Indian people to revert to the old methods of craftsmanship which were once the glory of India, and specially to spin and weave their own cloth instead of purchasing European materials. Beyond this immediate program Gandhi looked forward to the day when the new spirit of self-reliance

would be so universal in India that it would be possible to carry out complete civil disobedience to British authority, including the refusal to pay all taxes.

Frankly, the application of this program was only partially successful. It obviously depended upon a general acceptance of the Gandhi attitude and a willingness to undergo great sacrifices for it. Such sacrifices were made by many thousands, but on the whole the British government, while inconvenienced, was not seriously threatened. A large part of the support given to the new movement depended upon contact with the personality of Gandhi, and when he was imprisoned and his influence was removed from the counsels of the Nationalist movement other policies made their influence felt.

Many of the ablest Indian leaders, for instance, considered the boycott of the Reform Councils a mistake. They wished to follow the Sinn Fein example of capturing the councils and utilizing them as a platform for the assertion of their principles and as a means of obstructing British rule. This section of the Nationalist movement came to be known as the Swarajist Party, and when Gandhi came out of prison he found that the Nationalist movement as a whole was moving in this direction. At the same time, much of his boycott program had not been generally adopted, and, while Gandhi was still revered as a spiritual leader, his political influence was considerably weakened. Moreover, disputes resulting in violence arose between groups of Hindus and Mohammedans, showing that Gandhi's message of self-reliance and nonviolence had not yet been accepted.

More recently the method of "noncoöperation" achieved a considerable measure of success in a part of the Bombay Presidency, where three hundred thousand peasants declined to pay the increased assessments on their land demanded by the government. The British authorities seized their stocks and cattle, but the resistance was maintained without resort to violence, except in a few minor instances, despite great provocation. Finally, negotiations were opened and agreement reached on a basis which greatly eased the grievances of the peasants.

The Indian National Congress has announced its intention to recommence a "noncoöperation" campaign in 1930, unless the British government extends dominion status to India by then. Gandhi has indicated his readiness to lead the campaign, but in the present temper of the Indian Nationalist Movement —which has departed greatly from the nonviolence philosophy of five years ago—it is extremely doubtful whether the new campaign can be kept on a pacifist basis.

The conclusion from this chapter in Indian history is that the noncoöperative method cannot succeed as a means of resisting alien government unless the principles behind it are personally and passionately accepted by the people as a whole. There can be no doubt that Gandhi's policy would have succeeded if the people of India had really caught the spirit of Gandhi. They had not, and it is much to ask that any people should.

Nevertheless, the noncoöperative movement in India has had remarkable successes. It has led thou-

sands of Indians to rely upon themselves and to understand the meaning of liberty in a new way. It has contributed more than all the efforts of the past fifty years to prepare Indians for self-government. So far as it has failed, it has been due not to anything wrong in the principle of noncoöperation, but to failure to get the people to rise to the height of those principles.

This pacifist method of resistance to tyranny has enormous potentialities, but before it can be completely applied those who are asked to practice it must be educated to an understanding of its significance. The practical policy would seem to be to extend its application with the growth of that understanding. Then a people would progress toward liberty in proportion to their readiness for it, and their country would be saved from the cruelties and hatreds of armed revolt and armed suppression. Above all, when liberty was finally gained, it would be, not a nominal liberty, but a liberty expressing the mind and spirit of the people.

PACIFISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE

KIRBY PAGE

Kirby Page, editor, *The World Tomorrow,* is well known as author and lecturer on a great variety of social, religious, economic, and international questions. He has travelled widely, studying social conditions in almost every quarter of the globe. As a result of his experience as Y. M. C. A. Secretary with the British army in 1916 and with the American troops in 1917, he became a thorough pacifist and refused to support the War. Since 1921 he has spoken hundreds of times before diversified audiences, but especially to college undergraduates and in student conferences. He was pastor of the Ridgewood Church of Christ, New York, from 1918 to 1921. In 1916 and 1917 he travelled in student religious work through America, China, Japan, and Korea. He is a member of the Commission on International Justice and Good-will of the Federal Council of Churches. Besides numerous magazine articles and pamphlets, he has published many books, among which are *Christianity and Economic Problems; War—Its Causes, Consequences, and Cure; Imperialism and Nationalism;* and *Dollars and World Peace.*

PACIFISM AND INTERNATIONAL POLICE

KIRBY PAGE

CYNICISM concerning the ability of international agencies of justice to enforce their decisions constitutes one of the highest barriers to peace. Agreement is obviously more effective than violence as a way to settle disputes between nations. War is undeniably a barbarous and destructive method of handling international controversies. Yet the peoples of the earth continue to squander their resources on armaments and to rely upon armies and navies for security. They are afraid to trust each other and lack confidence in international processes.

Much of the trouble is due to a false analogy. A very familiar argument runs this way: In any society restraint is necessary; force is essential to effective coercion; a permanent body of police is required to administer the use of force against wrongdoers; no such international police force now exists and it seems improbable that one will be created within the near future; therefore, the maintenance and use of national armies and navies are necessary in order to restrain criminal nations. This argument appears so reasonable that it is accepted without question by most people. Let us, however, examine its soundness more carefully.

Two tests should be applied to any use of force. First, is it effective? Second, is it ethical? Can the members of a local community be fairly well protected against criminals by the use of force? Can force be used in such a way as to be ethically justifiable? It seems to me that these questions may be answered in the affirmative. To say that physical force is never defensible is to uphold anarchy. Personally I am convinced that a state of anarchy would produce utterly disastrous results. As long as certain individuals are undeveloped, undisciplined, diseased, or depraved it will be necessary for the other members of society to protect themselves by the forcible restraint of dangerous criminals.

Can this be done in an ethical way? I think so. It is possible to use physical force in such a manner as to protect society and to aid in the restoration of the criminal to right relations with his fellows. By the use of force society may prevent certain crimes from being committed. By forcible separation from society for a period such influences may be brought to bear upon the wrongdoer as to result in his cure or regeneration. Forcible arrest and imprisonment may, therefore, conceivably accomplish the double purpose of protecting society and redeeming the criminal; that is, force may be used in a way that is both effective and ethical.

This is not to say that the present penal system is defensible or that capital punishment is justifiable. Too often our present society is dominated by the idea of revenge—so much punishment for so much crime. All too frequently our prisons are breeding

places for more crime. If society had the will to do it, however, criminals could be temporarily placed in an environment where science, education, and religion could be combined in the effort to cure them of physical ailments, discipline their characters, and instil higher ideals. In the case of dangerous criminals who are incurable, permanent seclusion from society may be required. I am strongly convinced, however, that capital punishment is neither effective nor ethical.

What about organized societies that become dangerous? How can a state be restrained from doing damage to a neighbor? By what means can an interstate agency of justice enforce its decisions? What methods are effective? Which ones are ethical? The experience of the Supreme Court of the United States sheds light on these questions. In the first place, it is important to remember that two kinds of cases come before the Supreme Court: sometimes a judgment of the Court is against an individual or a corporation, sometimes it is against a state. The strategy of the Court differs sharply in the two varieties of cases. A decision against an individual or corporation will be enforced if necessary by calling upon the sheriff or police, whereas in a hundred and forty years the Court has never called for the use of physical force against a state. In the former cases, force may be used effectively and ethically, while in the latter the opposite is true.

Upon what does the Supreme Court rely for the enforcement of its decisions against states? The expressed willingness of the respective states to abide

by its judgments and the power of public opinion, upon these and these alone has the Court relied. One of its decisions was flagrantly disregarded and in several other cases long delays occurred before the judgment was accepted by the respective states. Yet the Court has never sought to use armed force against a state. In 1792 an individual named Chisholm sued the state of Georgia and was awarded a judgment by the Supreme Court. Whereupon the legislature of Georgia not only refused to pay the money due but passed a law declaring that any person attempting to enforce the Court's decision would be "guilty of felony" and would "suffer death by being hanged." What did the Supreme Court do in the face of this insubordination and insult? Those who reason by analogy are likely to say that the law must be enforced at any cost, if necessary by calling upon the Federal government for armed troops. What would have happened if a Federal army had started toward Atlanta? The result would have been war and the destruction of many lives. Under the circumstances the use of physical force would have been neither effective nor ethical. The Supreme Court simply waited. The other twelve states sided with Georgia. The result was the eleventh amendment to the Constitution declaring that the Supreme Court does not have jurisdiction in the case of a suit of an individual against a state. Which was better, to precipitate war or for the Court to be insulted and overruled?

In the case of Virginia against West Virginia there was a long delay before the decision of the Supreme Court was accepted. When West Virginia was formed

into a separate state during the Civil War it agreed to pay part of the Virginia debt. This promise was not carried out. In 1915 the case was brought before the Supreme Court and a judgment awarded against West Virginia. No action was taken by the latter. In 1918 Virginia sought a mandamus to compel payment. While the Supreme Court was considering the matter West Virginia acted. Public opinion had been operating inside and outside of the state. The more conscientious citizens of the state had been endeavoring to persuade their public officials to fulfil the obligations of the commonwealth. Citizens of other states had exerted the pressure of moral condemnation. In time the pressure of public opinion proved to be sufficient.

Let us now consider the international situation. How can a criminal nation be restrained? How can an international body such as the Permanent Court or the League of Nations enforce its decisions? Those who reason by analogy are inclined to say that just as a police force is necessary in a local community so an international police is required in the world at large. This point of view was well expressed by Lyman Abbott:

"The time is coming when all the military forces of the civilized world will be one police force, under one chief of police, with one international legislature to decide what is the will of the nations, with one international court to interpret the official and legal intelligence of the nations, and just enough navy to make the world safe, under a common direction and common control—and no more."

This is, of course, a very extreme point of view. A much more common idea is that the respective nations should place armed forces at the disposal of the World Court or the League of Nations if required for the enforcement of international obligations. This latter attitude found expression in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League. In emergencies, after other means have failed, the Council is authorized to advise or recommend that the members of the League furnish armed forces to be used against a recalcitrant nation. Thus far the League has made no effort to use armed sanctions.

In all probability the League could use armed force effectively against a small power, say Bulgaria or Greece. But in such a case armaments are not required. There are other effective ways of coercing a weak nation. Where a great power is concerned, however, the League dare not use armed force. Any effort to coerce France or Great Britain, for example, with armaments would probably lead to a general war, as the other nations would almost certainly be divided in sentiment. There is a rapidly growing conviction among League members that the armed sanction section of Article 16 cannot safely be used. The prevailing tendency is to look elsewhere than the League for armed security. Wherever the League could use armed force effectively it is not required; wherever it seems to be needed it cannot be used without extreme danger.

Moreover, if the League wages war against a recalcitrant power such action would create serious ethical problems. Innocent people would bear the

brunt of that kind of war as they do in every other war. For every responsible official or citizen of the country being coerced who is captured or killed, there would be scores of innocent victims. War always kills ten or a hundred or a thousand innocent people for every responsibly guilty individual destroyed. Such a method seems to me to be entirely unjustifiable on ethical grounds.

Upon what coercive measures should the League rely for the enforcement of international obligations? Three mighty forces are available: the moral power of public opinion, the diplomatic boycott, financial and economic pressure. The first of these is by all odds the most important. Public opinion, however, will prove impotent in serious crises unless certain preliminary conditions are fulfilled. The nations must first outlaw war and commit themselves to the peace system. They must not only delegalize war as a method of settling international controversies, they must demonstrate their faith in one another and in the processes of peace by drastic reductions in armaments. Before they will be ready to do this, however, an effective peace system must be created. The structure of peace must include: (1) diplomacy, (2) conciliation, (3) arbitration, (4) international courts, (5) regular international conferences to consider economic and political questions, (6) permanent international administrative agencies, such as the League of Nations, the International Labor Office, the Pan American Union, etc., (7) outlawry treaties, (8) disarmament.

Fortunately, this structure of peace is rapidly be-

ing strengthened. It is probably true to say that more progress in this regard has been made in the past decade than during the previous century. We are approaching the time when public opinion will prove to be the most effective factor in securing the observance of international obligations.

The Locarno signatories, for example, "mutually undertake that they will in no case attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other." The only reservations have to do with "the right of legitimate defense" and the provision for collective action against a signatory which violates the pact. Secretary Kellogg and Senator Borah have made it emphatically plain that the Briand-Kellogg treaty in no way deprives the signatories of the right of self-defense or the right to act collectively against a violator of the agreement. That is to say, Locarno goes quite as far toward the outlawry of war as does the Paris Pact, the majority differences being that (1) it is hoped that the latter may become universal and (2) the latter does not *bind* (it merely *permits*) any signatory to act collectively with other signatories against a violator of the treaty, as is the case with Great Britain and Italy in the Locarno pact. Both, however, outlaw war "as an instrument of national policy." Some of the Scandinavian treaties outlaw war without reservation and contain no commitments to collective action against a violator. They go even further than the Pact because they bind the signatories to conciliation and arbitration of all controversies without any exceptions.

When the nations, including the United States,

are prepared to delegalize all war and to use the various devices for the peaceable adjustment of disputes —diplomacy, conciliation, arbitration, judicial decision, international conferences and permanent international agencies of justice—armed force will not be needed, any more than it is required by the Supreme Court. The respective peoples of the world have continued to maintain heavy armaments primarily because they have been afraid not to do so. A psychology of peaceable settlement is now being created. Public opinion against war and in favor of peace is everywhere gaining in influence. Let us illustrate how public opinion would operate in a crisis.

Suppose that the United States violates the Pact and takes aggressive action against another country. In that event, how could the other nations restrain this country? Only by public opinion. Because of our size and strength the effort to coerce us with armaments would almost certainly result in a long and disastrous war. We are so nearly self-sufficing that economic pressure would not be effective. In our case armaments and economic measures would not be needed. Under the conditions specified if it could be clearly demonstrated that we had committed an international crime, there are sufficient honorable and high-minded citizens in this country to compel our government to observe its international obligations. Public opinion inside this country could be greatly reenforced by world-wide condemnation of our outrageous conduct. If, however, any effort were made to use armaments against us, the effect would be to unite the country behind our government, whether it was

right or wrong. Armaments paralyze public opinion. When people cease to rely upon armed force they strengthen the power of public opinion in their own countries and abroad.

If a belligerent government knew in advance that it would be subjected to a diplomatic boycott in the event of a gross breach of its international obligations, such knowledge would act as a deterrent. A diplomatic boycott produces disastrous results. Trade and commerce are seriously affected. Normal intercourse is dislocated. In numerous ways the citizens of the boycotted country are penalized. Moreover, a diplomatic boycott does not have to be universal to be effective. For example, if Italy were ostracized diplomatically by Great Britain, Germany, France and the United States the consequences would be very serious for the citizens of that land.

The diplomatic boycott could also be supplemented in extreme cases by financial and economic pressure. Only two or three nations in the world can long survive economic isolation. Certain economic measures are open to the same ethical objections as apply to war. An economic blockade may develop into the worst kind of war. A complete and universal economic boycott would also be as deadly as war. But certain types of financial and economic measures—the refusal to make loans, the boycott of specified exports and imports, etc.—could be adopted without causing starvation or loss of life.

The difficulties of applying diplomatic and financial sanctions are admittedly very great. In all probability such processes would not be required if the nations

would outlaw war and commit themselves to the processes of peace. During the interim, while peoples are becoming accustomed to depending upon international agencies of justice, it may be necessary to reassure them by providing diplomatic and economic sanctions to be used in extreme cases of international peril. For this reason it seems to me that, while the armed guarantees of Locarno are dangerous, it is better to have the Locarno treaties even with these provisions than not to have had these treaties at all.

What should be the attitude of a pacifist toward the League of Nations? Should he uphold the League as long as the Covenant authorizes the use of armed sanctions? Should an American pacifist advocate the entrance of the United States into the League? My own position is this: since I am not an anarchist, and since, therefore, I believe in government, I am prepared loyally to support the government of this country. This does not mean that I approve of all its practices and institutions or pledge unqualified obedience to any administration that may happen to be in power. As a pacifist I am naturally opposed to the use of the army and navy against other peoples and certainly will not participate directly in any war, certain forms of indirect participation being quite unavoidable. I believe that I can prove my loyalty to the people and ideals of my country more effectively in other ways than by going to war. By the same line of reasoning, I am an ardent believer in the League of Nations as a necessary international agency, although I am utterly opposed to several of its provisions, including the use of armed sanctions. In my opinion the United

States could render a greater contribution to world peace by immediately entering the League, with the understanding that it is not being committed to the use of armed sanctions, than by staying on the outside.

Peaceable sanctions will not prove to be effective unless the nations can learn patience. Immediate results are not always possible. The ultimatum method will continue to have disastrous results. The Supreme Court of the United States could not have survived and gained steadily in prestige and influence unless it had been willing to be insulted and to have its decisions flaunted, rather than to attempt armed coercion of states. International agencies will not always be able to secure immediate or entirely satisfactory results. The peoples of the world must learn to run risks on behalf of peace, as well as in war, and to take the consequences of relying upon the processes of peace, as well as to bear the burdens of waging war.

THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

JOHN NEVIN SAYRE

John Nevin Sayre is secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation and vice chairman of the Committee on Militarism in Education. He is a member of the American Civil Liberties Union and was for ten years a member of its executive committee. For two years he was an instructor at Princeton University. He is an Episcopal clergyman, but resigned from his church at Suffern, N. Y., to help found Brookwood School, later Brookwood Labor College. He has travelled widely in Europe and the Orient as well as Central America. He is president of The World Tomorrow, Inc., and for several years was editor, *The World Tomorrow.*

THE QUEST FOR NATIONAL SECURITY

JOHN NEVIN SAYRE

PACIFISM, first of all, asks people to consider whether national armament can really conduce to security in a civilization which uses the tools of Twentieth Century science? No matter what may be said for defense by armament in the past, we believe that it is an utterly obsolete and extremely dangerous way of attempting to attain security now. In the world in which we live and in the decades immediately ahead it is open to the double objection of (1) mounting cost and (2) diminishing effectiveness for defense.

Within the span of forty years, that is, within the lifetime of one individual such as myself, the United States has increased the annual expenditure for its navy from 21 million to 364 million dollars. The last session of Congress passed appropriations which mean that every time the hands of the clock traverse twenty-four hours the United States spends almost $2,000,000 upkeep for army and navy. A leading article in the New York *Times*, published in March, 1927, was headed, "War—Man's greatest Industry." The writer asserted that "preparation to be ready for war constitutes what is actually the greatest industry in the world."

There is also an increasing human cost not measur-

able in dollars. The machines of war have to be tended by men. The munitions of war have to be manufactured by men, and approach is being made more and more toward the drafting of industry and of whole populations for war service. Once wars were fought by professional armies which constituted but a relatively small part of any people; to-day military strategists plan to conscript the activity of the entire manpower of a nation. A new French law giving power to the state to conscript also the women was passed by the Chamber of Deputies, though not by the Senate. Compulsory military training in time of peace and the invasion of schools and colleges by military departments run by the Department of War are requisitioning study time of youth, and tending to regiment youth's thinking. The post office, the newspapers, the radio, the movies, artists, and men of science are in danger of being drawn in to give their support to the building of war's preparedness machine. All this means an increasing cost to human liberty, to freedom of thought and discussion, to the possibility of social advance. It should be fully weighed in estimating the price to be paid for putting over an "adequate" security program. Armed preparedness is a huge cost in the present, and for the future it is mounting.

Even worse is the fact that increase of expenditure for armament does not in the modern world purchase increase in security. It may do so, possibly, for a score of years, but the policy is subject to a law of diminishing returns and leads straight toward a climax of disaster. Senator Borah in discussing "What is Prepared-

ness?" has called attention to the huge public debts and constantly increasing tax burdens which governments are putting on their peoples throughout the world. "The things with which governments will have to contend in the future," he said, "are the economic distress and political unrest of their own people." A big armament program, he warns, "will be courting trouble. It will widen the breach between the citizen and his government. It will further discourage and exasperate those who already have more than they can bear. It will not be preparedness, for that which accentuates economic distress is unpreparedness."

Now, starting with this situation, consider further the steps toward insecurity which a nation must travel if it trusts its defense to proficiency in arms:

(1) Its equipment for war must be adequate in comparison with the fighting strength of possible enemy nations.

(2) This inclines the stronger nations to armament competition. The margin of security for nation A as against nation B becomes an incentive to nation B, from the point of view of *its* security, to outarm nation A.

(3) Fear enters more and more into the picture; the more effective the armament of one side, the more it is dreaded by the other side. This at first may be a deterrent postponing the clash of war, but meanwhile it tends to speed up armament rivalry, putting great tax burdens and military domination upon the peoples, increasing suspicion between them and

constantly widening the area of a coming war's destruction by drawing into balanced alliances the major nations who fear the ordeal of war without the support of powerful allies.

(4) Modern science by its gift of the submarine, airplane, and chemical warfare adds new terrors; it puts a premium on speed, on striking first, on up-to-the-minute preparedness, on committing dictatorial power to a very small group of men who can act quickly and who can control the huge machine of government from the top.

(5) These statesmen are fallible human beings, living under an intense nervous strain and liable to pride, anger, fear, pressure by selfish interests, and mistakes. Yet a single slip on the part of any one may touch off in explosion the pent-up preparations for war. Says Winston Churchill in describing Europe's armament, "Death stands at attention, obedient, expectant, ready to serve, ready to shear away the peoples *en masse,* ready, if called on, to pulverize, without hope of repair, what is left of civilization. He awaits only the word of command. He awaits it from a frail, bewildered being, long his victim, now—for one occasion only—his Master."

Is this security?

Over against the program of seeking safety by military means, pacifism proposes an entirely opposite way. We hold that its financial and moral cost

will be incomparably less and that the security obtained will be immeasurably greater. Instead of relying for security on power to destroy and the fear which other nations may have of attacking a well-armed nation, pacifist preparedness seeks to build security on a foundation of friendship—both international and domestic. A shining example in American history of the shift of security from a fear basis to a friendship basis is the founding of the colony of Pennsylvania. While New York, New Jersey, and other colonies trusted to gunfire to defend them from Indian attack, William Penn and the Quakers risked the whole security of their wives and children on a preparedness policy of winning the friendship of the Indians.

Pacifist preparedness does not expect to eliminate all human conflict or speedily to remake human nature, but taking the world as it is, and people as they are, it affirms that there is no conflict which cannot be solved better by a peace process than by the war process. Pacifist strategy moves along three coördinate lines: (1) the renunciation of war and armament; (2) the organization of pacifist controls; and (3) continuous effort for social justice.

The Briand-Kellogg multilateral treaties for war renunciation are in line with peace preparedness. It has been seriously weakened by "interpretations" but most pacifists cordially support it. However, pacifists feel that this treaty will not guarantee security until certain additional measures are taken to reinforce it.

For instance, no treaty will break the mastery of fear if the separate nations continue to maintain huge

armaments. To the man in the street the treaty will seem to be but a scrap of paper if nations persist in spending many times as much on war machinery as they do on peace machinery.

If disarmament can be secured by international agreement, well and good; but if some nations are unwilling, pacifists believe that their own nation should disarm anyhow and set the example. And it is more than an example. For even if as example the move be not followed, it takes away in the heart of a possible enemy the fear of aggression by the unarmed nation and it then allows the magnetism of friendship to have full play. The Quakers' security among the Indians rested, not only on the fact that the Friends treated them justly, but also on the fact that these colonists carried no arms. The Indians therefore did not fear them. Story after story in the records proves this point. Besides, as will be shown later, a pacifist nation can organize nonmilitary methods of self-defense, and, trusting to them far more than to the uncertain defense of war, the pacifist nation would be foolish if it held back from stepping forward into daylight because other countries were not yet pursuaded to leave darkness behind.

Secretary Kellogg in so far as he contemplated any resort to war either for self-defense or to punish a violator of the treaty fell short of the pacifist security program. The same is true also of the Locarno treaties and the League of Nations covenant. As long as there are armaments in the background and real fear that some day some nation may use

armed force and that there is then nothing to do but to reply with more armed force—so long will security not be established. A peace system with these reservations may be like a child's house of cards, liable to collapse if one card is pushed over. Pacifists therefore insist that the demon of war cannot be cast out by any demon of the same species under the name of "sanctions" or "self-defense."

Likewise, pacifism rules out armed intervention by one nation in the affairs of another. It is against the use of warships and marines to collect debts or furnish security to life and property. Too often this attempt provokes the very evils for which it is supposed to be a remedy. Armed intervention is vastly different from domestic police for a number of reasons, but especially because it is *foreign* force not controlled by local authority. Resentment is certain to arise against it, it runs counter to nationalism, is the mother of fear and the bar to genuine friendship and coöperation. It does not educate for local democratic self-government, but sets in motion a train of psychological complexes and economic consequences, not generally realized at first, but which are almost certain in the end to lead to more intervention or out-and-out military conquest.

Coming now to the peace armament which pacifists would substitute for the armament of war, it depends on the organizing of social controls which apply peaceful persuasion or in some cases nonviolent coercion. Many of these controls can best be exercised through international agencies, and paci-

fists are therefore continuously active in the social engineering which builds, improves, reconstructs, and multiplies machinery for this purpose.

I have not room to enlarge upon the variety of ways and means by which international agencies could exert other pressures than those of war. But pacifists believe that out-and-out peace controls are available, or that they can be organized, and that the League of Nations, the Locarno treaties, and all other peace agencies will be most secure when they rely not on "armed sanctions for defense," but on peace processes alone.

Let us turn now to the case, so often envisaged by military writers and speakers, of an unarmed and innocent nation attacked by a treaty-breaking foe. We will suppose that it is a clear case of aggression —perhaps an adventure in imperialism—and that for one reason or another the international peace machinery fails to work. Ordinarily, things would not be as clear cut as this, but still it is perfectly fair to ask pacifists what they would do in such an emergency. Our answer is, that in addition to doing all that we possibly can *now* to eliminate the armament curse and construct strong machinery of peace, we think that each nation should work out for itself a peace plan of *nonviolent national defense* which it could put into action by itself in case its land was invaded. The particular methods of nonviolent resistance to be offered would have to be carefully determined in accordance with the size, solidarity, patriotism, material and moral resources of the nation, or group of nations, concerned. Advance prepa-

ration, money, skill, and professional training would be necessary for this defense, as they are for defense by arms.

The idea of peace-defense may seem wildly theoretical to many, but pacifists are able to point to a number of instances where the method has actually been tried, and these cases, while not absolutely conclusive, afford good ground to expect that if a capable people took up the idea of peace-defense in earnest and organized it scientifically and got the churches, newspapers, schools, and other agencies of opinion and education behind it, the peace-defense could be operated with success. The cases which follow are suggestive.

Mahatma Gandhi of India has made the most notable attempt of any leader in our time to swing national consciousness away from violence and over to the practical use of pacifist methods in a struggle for national freedom. Writing to his Indian followers, he has said:

"The secret of success lies therefore in holding every English life and the life of every officer serving the government as sacred as those of our dear ones. . . . I make bold to say that the moment the Englishmen feel that, although they are in India in a hopeless minority, their lives are protected against harm not because of the matchless weapons of destruction which are at their disposal, but because Indians refuse to take the lives even of those whom they may consider to be utterly in the wrong, that moment will see a transformation in the English nature in its relation to India, and that moment will also be the

moment when all the destructive cutlery that is to be had in India will begin to rust."[1]

When every concession is made to the criticisms of Gandhi's program and its obvious weaknesses have been considered, the method still contains strong implications of value for national defense.

Over in China the *boycott* has been used with efficient results against the aggressions of both Japan and Great Britain. It helped bring about the withdrawal of Japan's domineering Twenty-one Demands and within the last two years it has effected a striking reversal in Great Britain's attitude toward the "unequal" treaties. Although a fleet of British warships rides in the harbor of the treaty ports and patrols the waters of the Yangtze, yet in reality their day is done. The boycott of Chinese merchants against British goods has struck such blows at British trade as warships cannot repair or recover. Only if the Chinese should themselves be tempted to resort to violence, as the communist group did at Nanking, would foreign warships and soldiers now be given power to loose wide destruction. Let the Chinese, however, achieve national unity, let them rally their masses in determined but pacifist opposition to any aggressive Power, and who will say that China cannot before very long be master on her own soil?

Or if we look in western Europe, we shall find in Germany, disarmed after Versailles, two remarkable instances of the defensive force, against military invasion, of the *nonviolent strike*. In March, 1920,

[1] *Young India*, p. 171.

some thousands of soldiers who had been secretly armed entered the city of Berlin under the leadership of a Dr. Kapp, who attempted, like Mussolini, to seize power. An eyewitness writes:

"On a particular Friday night, quite unknown to anybody, a few thousand troops marched into Berlin and took possession of the city. During Saturday and Sunday a general strike was organized by the workers of Berlin, and it was the most complete general strike that has ever taken place in any part of the world. By Sunday evening that strike was in perfect order, and on Monday morning there was not a single service running, gas and electricity were cut off, water was allowed to run, but it was impossible to have any cooked food, and so on, for a period of four or five days. . . . The result was that by the following Thursday evening the whole action of the Kapp *putsch* fell to pieces, and terms were made. I stood on that Thursday evening in the Leipzigerstrasse at the foot of Wilhelmstrasse, and I watched a few thousand troops, according to the terms of the agreement, march out of the city, defeated by a defenseless mass of people who had operated a very successful general strike."[2]

In a less thorough way, but over a wider area, German workers downed their tools when in 1923 the French army with tanks and machine guns invaded the Ruhr. As everyone knows, the French after a year or two found it impracticable to overcome this resistance and hold on to the district. The

[2]Wilfred Wellock: "The General Strike and War," in *No More War,* June, 1927.

Dawes plan was set up and the French forces withdrew. It was a costly experience both for them and for the Germans. The German defense was open to serious criticism at a number of points and yet the central fact stands out that on the whole the German nonviolent resistance succeeded. One wonders what would have happened if similar tactics, instead of war, had been employed by the Belgians, and then by the French, when the Kaiser's army crossed the frontier in 1914.

Propaganda was one of the great discoveries of the war; mostly it consisted of lies, but a propaganda of truth could be an influential force and a peace weapon in the hands of a country suffering under invasion. The attacked nation refusing to commit violence but using truth propaganda with other means of pacifist resistance would do its best to win world public opinion to its side, and also such liberal opinion as might be found within the aggressor nation. And even if the invading enemy should be able to seize cables, radio, telegraph, newspaper offices, and other channels of communication, a determined people would probably find ways of eluding the censorship and getting out their news. The Belgians managed to do it, and Sandino from a corner of Nicaragua was live front-page stuff in the capitals of Europe and all over the American continent.

Of course, a truth propaganda unprotected by violence calls for more courage and sacrifice from those undertaking it than does the usual war propaganda of lies. But, correspondingly, it is a force of spiritual constructiveness. In South Africa it was employed by

Gandhi with outstanding success. He called it "Truth-force," also "Love-force" and "Soul-force." He found that it was most powerful when backed by voluntary suffering. He says,

"I discovered in the earliest stages that pursuit of Truth did not admit of violence being inflicted on one's opponent but that he must be weaned from error by patience and sympathy. For what appears to be Truth to one may appear to be error to the other. And patience means self-suffering. So the doctrine came to mean vindication of Truth, not by infliction of suffering on the opponent, but on one's self."

Facing the actualities of race prejudice and economic exploitation in South Africa, Gandhi got this doctrine over to some forty thousand indentured Indians, and by his method, persisted in for eight years, they won their fight. When asked if suffering and going on suffering did not require extraordinary self-control, Gandhi replied, "No extraordinary self-control is required. Every mother suffers."

It is on that capacity of common men and women to suffer for a cause that pacifism greatly relies. Hitherto war and the service of arms have exploited this power of suffering to the utmost, but is not the hour at hand when pacifist service of a just cause will evoke it still more effectively? The appeal of pacifism is very similar to that which Christianity in the First Century made to the oppressed and idealist in the empire ruled by Rome. Jesus' teachings of forgiveness, of absorbing evil by love, of the might of Truth, of super-racial and super-national loyalty to

the human brotherhood, and of getting free from fear by flinging one's life into a cause sustained by God—these correspond to mighty forces of life; they are the munitions of pacifism with which it proposes to wage defense against the powers of violence and evil.

Finally, genuine pacifism will not neglect the causes of strife. Believing that no nation liveth to itself and that its security and welfare is more or less bound up with that of others, pacifist preparedness seeks a solution by agreement on such problems as population outlet, securing to every nation access to the sea and to necessary raw materials, markets, etc. Or if within a nation two per cent. of the people own or control sixty to seventy per cent. of all the wealth, or if there is brutal treatment of religious minorities or much race discrimination, it may not be sufficient for national security simply to preach pacifist methods. That should be done, but it will be unrealistic and not convincing to the aggrieved groups unless at the same time pacifists are clearly striving to change the fundamental injustice of these situations. True pacifism is not passivism or any leaving of injustice alone. Its aim is not peace as an end, but the using of peace as a method; it is high-powered activity for change and yet also conservative of order. As a way of advancing social justice, pacifism makes its greatest contribution to security for the nation.

PACIFISM AND PATRIOTISM

H. C. ENGELBRECHT

H. C. Engelbrecht is history editor of *Social Science Abstracts*. Formerly he was assistant editor of *The World Tomorrow*, and has been attached to the Committee on Militarism in Education, to the staff of the research department of the Federal Council of Churches, and to *The Nation*. He has been instructor in the Junior College at Bronxville, N. Y., and instructor in history in the University of Chicago. He has studied social conditions in Europe and has published frequent articles on social problems.

PACIFISM AND PATRIOTISM

H. C. ENGELBRECHT

A RIOTING New York mob attacked the house of a prominent abolitionist in 1834. It gained an entry and in fierce glee began its work of destruction. Everything movable was thrown out of the windows, drenched in oil, and got ready for a huge bonfire, whose flames somehow were to purge the city of the stain of antislavery agitation. One of the gangsters tore a picture from the wall and was about to commit it to the cleansing fires when he discovered that it was a portrait of George Washington. He hugged it to his breast and shouted dramatically: "It's Washington! For God's sake don't burn Washington!" His cry was immediately echoed in the street: "For God's sake don't burn Washington!" Very tenderly the painting was taken down the stairs and a group of bullies installed it on the veranda of the neighboring house and placed it under careful guard. From his exalted position the Father of the Country looked down on the frenzy of the patriotic vandals.

This little incident illustrates the problem of patriotism. It is an astonishing, often most irrational power, attracting strange pilgrims to its shrine. Its spokesmen proclaim weird doctrines. And what deeds

are done in its name! Enormous reserves of oil are stolen by millionaire thieves and a "faithless public servant"—in the name of patriotism. Blacklists, including the best element of the country, are spread—in the name of patriotism. A mayor puts his name on the front page of newspapers on two continents by organizing a "society for hating the British"—in the name of patriotism. Men are insulted on the street for not removing their hats when a military parade passes with the flag—in the name of patriotism. Women kneel and kiss the Liberty Bell—in the name of patriotism. Children every morning are put through a solemn ritual including a pledge of loyalty and a salute to the flag—in the name of patriotism. There is a journal, fortunately obscure, called *The Patriot,* which sees as its highest duty the vicious denunciation of the Jews. And there is the super-patriotic Ku Klux Klan. Autos are raced over treacherous beaches at death-defying speed to bring back records held abroad—in the name of patriotism. Millions of men are torn from their homes and labors and sent out to fight to the death with other millions whom they do not even know—in the name of patriotism.

Is it any wonder that many cannot speak the word "patriotism" without a sneer? Old Sam Johnson's vigorous judgment that "patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel," despite its uncounted repetition, does not seem to stale. Schopenhauer's statement that "patriotism is the passion of fools and the most foolish of passions" will also find a ready echo. The word "patriotism" has fallen from its high estate. It is used so often as a synonym of narrow-mindedness,

exclusiveness, fanaticism, selfishness, and bottomless ignorance that intelligent people who sincerely love their country hesitate to apply it to themselves, while cynics employ it as a term of scorn. Whether or not a pacifist may be a patriot depends entirely on what patriotism is.

The pacifist can never be a purely emotional patriot. Flag-waving, parading, cheering, throwing tons of ticker tape on a "hero," Fourth-of-Julying, are not enough. This sort of thing generally lives side by side with profound ignorance and bigotry. It makes saints of Washington and Lincoln and attributes an almost magic significance to being born in a log cabin or rising from the lowly estate of newsboy. It ascribes the greatness of the country to soldiers and bankers. It revels in fierce hatreds, changing the object of detestation readily under the barrage of newspaper propaganda. Every good American used to hate the British, then he turned on the Germans, then on the Russians; meanwhile others have specialized in despising the French or the Japanese or the Southern Europeans.

The pacifist, furthermore, cannot join in any immoral patriotism. Stephen Decatur's "My country, right or wrong!" is probably the most immoral sentence in the language. It makes the state a god, promulgating not only law, but ethics. The pacifist would insist that the state is not outside of the moral categories, but that it is bound by them. Its treaties are not scraps of paper to be torn up at will. Its promises to subject peoples or to colonies must be kept. The liberties of smaller nations dare not be destroyed or

their rights invaded whenever the stronger powers find it to their advantage.

Above all, though, the pacifist is not a military patriot. Perhaps this is the heart of the problem. For a great multitude militarism and patriotism are synonymous. The argument is very simple. The country must see to its security. This is possible only by military force. Hence, the true patriot is also a militarist. This argument of necessity is generally adorned with a catalogue of the virtues fostered by war. We have not yet forgotten the last war and how the great slaughter was justified and glorified by the leaders in all countries. When the inhuman submarine was bitterly attacked, one preacher declared:

"Submarines are certainly loveless and un-Christian. They are as unrighteous as Mammon. But we use them exactly as Jesus also told us to use Mammon. That is the wonderful thing, that in all these matters we have the words of Jesus on our side."

Again, when the peoples, horrified by the slaughter, were seeking peace, another preacher declared:

"I cannot abide the whining and yammering over the agony and misery of war. War is not a misfortune, but a great good fortune. God be praised that the war came. . . . And God be praised that we have as yet no peace. . . . War is the great knife by which God is operating as a mighty surgeon on this people and cutting away the poisonous boils which have been infecting us. God be praised that we have as yet no peace!"

With all this justification of war and its religious exaltation the pacifist disagrees most strongly. Did military and naval preparedness, never so highly developed as in 1914, make for peace and insure security? The pacifist does not believe that the savage killings, poisoning, maiming, crippling of millions in each country can ever be justified. Even if war really brought permanent settlement of vexing problems—which it does not—it is a procedure utterly unworthy of a reasonable human being. Few men owed as much to war as did Napoleon, yet that vain little soldier was compelled to admit:

"War is an anachronism. Some day victories will be won without cannons and bayonets. . . . Do you know what I marvel at most in the world? The impotence of force in organization. There are only two powers in the world, the mind and the sword. In the long run the sword is always defeated by the mind."

So the pacifist will have nothing of military patriotism. In this point he will exercise the right of conscience, the right of personal conviction, and dissent. The government may jail him or even worse, but it cannot compel him to violate his conscience and help slaughter in war. For that reason the pacifist is also opposed to all military and naval preparedness. Armies and navies, reserve officers' training corps, citizens' military training camps, are all part of the war system, which the pacifist wishes to see abolished.

Yet it seems to me that the pacifist may well be a patriot. Much depends here on definition. The pacifist's patriotism must be intelligent and realistic. He

tries to discover the really important institutions, movements, and problems in the country and to work with these. Saluting the flag does not feed a single hungry person or care for a neglected child. Singing the national hymn does not clarify a single national problem or advance anyone's intelligence. The pacifist is realistic about the things that really matter. He thinks of the schools and the teachers of the country as a thousand times more important than all armies and navies. A single good library is more valuable to him than all arsenals and armories. Real homes, rearing healthy and intelligent children, stand high above military training. The various social agencies bravely struggling against disease, poverty, the slums, unemployment, and insecurity are worth a hundred times more than a whole horde of politicians. The peace movement produces greater heroes than all wars. With such intelligent and vigorous patriotism the pacifist may well be identified.

Similarly, he may sponsor a critical patriotism. Romantic patriotism never tires of proclaiming its love of country, but seldom troubles to be specific. It includes everything from the rock-ribbed coast of Maine to the sun-kissed valleys of California. But does it refer to the climate, or the people, or the form of government, or the working of the courts and the police? The pacifist is not so indiscriminate a lover. He will find many things to admire in American history, but he also knows of the dark pages. There are excellent features in American government, but in parts it is antiquated and vicious. The American courts have made admirable decisions, but their rec-

ord for atrocious pronouncements is cruel and long. The United States has for long been a beacon of liberty to the world, but to the Philippines, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua it has rather been a destroyer of freedom. The police of the country are in some respects an admirable institution, but at present they are also the greatest menace to civil liberties. The pacifist sees the good and knows the wrong of his country. He is no blind worshipper. As much as he will praise and advance the good, he will denounce and oppose the evil.

Finally, the pacifist will foster a humanitarian patriotism. A certain narrow type of patriotism lives on hatred of other nations, national pride, snobbishness, and exclusiveness. It invented national honor, a most touchy thing, which cried out to be avenged at any and all occasions. It made calculations as to how superior its own way of life, its language, manners, and customs, how much more valuable its own nationals, how many foreigners could be "licked" by one American. All this pettiness was hailed as a very high order of patriotism.

The pacifist, on the contrary, knows that a great and important part of the world lies outside of his national fences. He knows also that the people of that other world are neither inferior nor vicious. He sees no reason for despising or hating them. For him there is a great human fellowship in which French and Germans, American and Russians, join hands, in which racial snobbery does not call on pseudo-scientists to prove the superiority of the Nordic, in which color is no bar to friendship. In this great human

family every nation has something to contribute, every individual has the right to his way of life. Similarly, every nation has something to learn and every individual his duties. Mutual suspicions, ridicule, hatred, and contempt must give way to understanding, friendliness, and coöperation.

The pacifist, then, is not a man without a country. Patriotism is a good word and there is no reason to cast it off, even if it has been scummed over with much that the pacifist rejects. As the world grows ever smaller and the interdependence of its parts greater and more perceptible, the connotations of the word "patriotism" will steadily enlarge. Still it seems to me that the pacifist will always be able to say: The world is my home and my country is my field of activity.

WAR RESISTANCE AS WAR PREVENTION

DEVERE ALLEN

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EVERYBODY wants peace. Nearly everybody knows how to get it. The Bok Prize drew 22,165 peace plans which complied with all rules of the contest, not to mention thousands which did not. With so many available approaches to the abolition of war, it seems strange that wars have occurred during the last century on an average of once every two years, and are still a constant threat in most parts of the world.

By a somewhat arbitrary classification the usual schemes for the prevention of war may be arranged in three categories.

One is the legalistic approach, an approach primarily dependent on governments. In this category fall the Outlawry of War, the League of Nations, the World Court, arbitration, conciliation, the codification of international law. The creation of new peace machinery is essentially the central theme of such proposals.

Another approach is psychological, an effort to change the traditional attitudes of nations toward each other. In this group belong the enterprises that involve direct relations among the peoples of various countries—work for international understanding,

education, the spread of Esperanto, friendship dolls, travel, international conferences, and so on.

A third approach is the economic, an attempt to eliminate the causes of war—imperialism, high tariffs, private exploitation of raw materials, unregulated export of surplus capital, industrial autocracy, the profit system, and what not.

Few people other than fanatics would argue that any one of these approaches to peace is alone sufficient for the banishment of such a hanger-on as Mars. Most thoughtful students would agree at once that the only sound tactics involve a marshalling of all these forces in a steady attack, phalanx by phalanx. A smaller number would recognize the need of creating a new code of international conduct, the building up of new methods of social change—the beginnings of a new social order.

Every international crisis, however, forces into a position of extreme noncoöperation those who hold unwaveringly to a way of life in accord with their conception of the new order. When war comes these are the ones who are labelled "conscientious objectors," a phrase of which many are proud, but which in itself, as someone has said, is one of the worst names that ever hanged a dog. In the sight of a patriotic citizen eagerly hoisting a beloved flag to signalize the undertaking of a desperate crusade, the objector, however conscientious, seems antisocial and intolerably egocentric. Such a position unavoidably evokes antagonism.

It is not strange, therefore, that even in the peace movement itself only a minority are able to see any-

thing in this manifestation of pacifism that is of practical value. Many are able to concede the right of conscience without admitting that the conscientious objector has any social utility save as a living testimony to a vacuous ideal. It may be, so they say, that a few conscientious objectors in every period have a function in carrying on the brave hope and roseate vision essential to prophecy; it may be that these radicals deserve respect; but as for us . . .

The pacifist in war-time, on the other hand, sees a vindication of his fears concerning the methods on which the majority have counted. He sees that the legalistic method, while necessary, is inadequate; for under stress laws are broken, institutions collapse. He finds proof that what he has insisted is true: that the public mind is fickle and that friendships, even of the most homogeneous populations, are speedily consumed in the blazing heat of nationalist propaganda. And he has already become convinced, if he is anything of a realist, that while the causes of war must be ceaselessly attacked they can never be removed completely, for all life is change and new causes of conflict spring from the soil in which the dead ones have been buried.

Pacifism, essentially, is a method of social change, of social development. Its dynamic power is goodwill. War is, of course, pacifism's greatest contradiction.

Always, for centuries, there have been those who refused to accede to war's demands; who have determined that violence, bloodshed, and hatred shall not be aided by their hands; who admit of no need impell-

ing enough to warrant them in laying aside for an inferior method the uncompromising way in which their trust remains unshaken.

As I have pointed out in my Introduction to this book, Lao-Tse, father of Taoism and a contemporary of Confucius, counselled not violence and war but selfless nonassertion. Buddha taught the way of nonviolence and renunciation, or harmlessness. The strong emphasis of Jesus on pacific ways of life became to his followers for the better part of two centuries a binding principle of nonparticipation in the war system.

Through the Middle Ages, when King Podiebrad in Bohemia, King Henry IV in France, and others were concocting leagues of nations to hold back the Turk, and popes and rulers were employing arbitration in certain cases while authorizing war in others, always a "remnant" carried on its witness to the validity of nonviolent resistance.

Numerous oddities have characterized these sects, from Taoism, which in its asceticism little valued culture, to many of them in the present day. It was a member of one nonresistant sect who, during the World War, refused to "bear arms," but cheerfully accepted a post in the heavy artillery; and another whose unwillingness to wear the uniform rested chiefly in his contention that it had buttons, and buttons (though these were made of metal!) were traditionally made of bone and thus were products of animal slaughter. But those whose difference from the mass was marked regarding war have been at no time the sole repository of eccentric customs. And let no one

idly, without investigation, dismiss these pioneers as uniformly devoid of intellectual clarity. Their gift to the world has been a precious one, their light has shown the way for many a modern.

The "testimony" of such sects against war, however, whether in peace-time or more stressful periods, has been almost without exception a personal or group expression of a faith and an ideal. Refusal to sanction war has uniformly been stated as a devotion to a better way. Almost never has it taken the immediately practical form of nonviolent social pressure to gain a definite objective, not even to prevent or stop a war.

As a matter of fact, history shows a paradox: those of the most thorough view who hold to a literal nonresistance, who oppose all individual use of force under any circumstances—these, in their eagerness to be kind and loving to their war-bent fellow countrymen, have often been the first to compromise.

Lao-Tse, it is highly probable, sanctioned "defensive" war. The apostasy of the war-blessing Christian Church as a whole is all but the very story of organized Christianity. In every war of any size there have been many Friends who distinguished themselves as "fighting Quakers," and while dismissals occurred in earlier days because of such a departure from principle, in the last war only a few such expulsions, if indeed any at all, took place. More Friends in England went into combat units than served as extreme objectors; while in this country there was probably not one Quaker who refused the alternative service which is credited by such widely read textbook historians as Mace, even if wrongly, with hav-

ing aided in the prosecution of the war. Garrison, as intimated in my Introduction, when the Civil War was on cautioned his friend Oliver Johnson to say nothing to embarrass the government in the war. He so subordinated his nonresistance loyalties to abolitionist zeal that he consented to deliver an oration after the war at Fort Sumter in celebration of military victory —thereby, incidentally, doing no good for the future of the black man in the sullen South. Even Mahatma Gandhi recruited for the British army during the World War, and declares that he would vote for military training under a Nationalist government in India if the majority wanted it!

When 11,000 British pacifists and 4,000 in the United States who refused to fight regardless of consequences in the last war joined with many in other warring countries, a movement was started which since the War has developed differently from earlier pacifism both in quantity and quality. A great impetus was given to conscientious objection but "conscientious objection" also began to yield to "war resistance," and the change of terms is not without significance. The old flame of conscience and idealism still flared brightly and gave light, but like an acetylene torch it was used to cut through the iron mail of militarism.

The War Resisters' International, a body with affiliated sections in twenty-one countries, knit together increasing numbers of kindred spirits even though laboring under tremendous handicaps. In its ranks are those who for religious convictions disavow all war, and those whose pacifism is devoid of

religious professions; those who repudiate all use of force and those who entirely repudiate war while believing that the use of individual force in certain situations constitutes no analogy to warfare. In the United States the war resistance movement is represented by such groups as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, the Women's Peace Union, the Women's Peace Society, and the War Resisters' League.

Among hundreds of thousands outside the ranks of the War Resisters' International, however, the spirit of sturdy war resistance has grown into deep conviction. Increasingly, war resisters cease to think and talk of their viewpoint as personal "testimony" merely, and examine into the practical effect of mass resistance on war-breeding governments.

They have become acutely aware of recent developments in modern warfare and in modern civilization. Every day it becomes more clearly apparent that a modern war cannot be waged successfully if it is opposed at home by any appreciable minority not susceptible to threat or intimidation. Complicated as are the forces of manufacturing, transportation and communication, and the distribution of products nowadays, a condition approximating complete national unity is essential to war. Hence the increasing use by war governments of propaganda coupled with ruthless suppression of dissent.

But suppose dissenters are fairly numerous, strongly determined, fearless as only those can be who see in their attitude the presage of a new ethic? The military men who rave at so-called "slackers'

oaths" are right; never has anything arisen so capable of hampering the traditional exercise of their ancient trade. Critics who speculate over the possibility of war resistance ever converting a whole population need not worry quite so much; no such wholesale conversion is needed to stop a war.

Mr. Arthur Ponsonby succeeded in securing over 130,000 signatures to a Peace Letter to the British Prime Minister, explicitly refusing to produce munitions or bear arms in another international conflict. In Germany nearly 250,000 signed a similar frank repudiation of war service. Even discounting a percentage of these signatures as hastily given and perhaps not entirely dependable should war pressure come, no longer can anyone say that the concept of massed nonviolent war resistance is something alien to Occidental psychology. Nor can anyone reasonably deny that the presence of so daring, so determined, and so articulate a group of war resisters, indicating as it does the existence of many thousands more as yet unknown, constitutes an increasingly formidable threat to a future war policy. Remember, too, that probably in another war few groups in any population will be exempt from conscription, and that in the future women war resisters or men above combat age will count more heavily.

But is this not sheer anarchy? What will happen to the country if minority groups thus seek to impose their will and prevent a war deemed necessary? The answer is manifold. It cannot be presented in brief compass. Chiefly, it boils down to this. A war is seldom desired by a majority in any country; most if not

all wars are produced by the stupid blundering or the dangerous diplomacy of small groups of officials acting in the interests of other small groups, usually economic. Not yet has democracy in its true sense functioned, for war-making governments do not take their people into their confidence. A group of resisters exercising obstructive power is the lingering popular conscience which has at length been shouted down or terrified into silence. Society cannot afford to suppress its dissenters, even if there is risk involved in tolerance; for by the prophecy of those willing to pay a price for their convictions states make their most profound social gains. Almost all advances the human race has thus far made have been due to the defiant rebellion of minorities. A minority is not always right; yet whatever is right has to come through a minority. The whole evolution of morality, socially considered, has proceeded in such a fashion. The question of the relation of the pacifist to his government and his fellow citizens is discussed in some detail by the chapter which follows this.

There is another reasonable objection: can any individual or group honestly determine in advance of the facts what should rightly be a war-time attitude? Is such a viewpoint scientific? Should rational moderns be bound by such a dogma? To these queries it is possible to reply forthrightly. They are based on an unrealistic conception of modern war. Once a war is imminent, there are no real facts accessible; every cable becomes a carrier of falsehood, every telegraph wire a channel of pollution, every wind of gossip a pestilence of perversion. The only time when a ra-

tional being can determine scientifically his attitude to war is now. As for dogma, what social person lives who has not dogmatically assumed that he will never while sane commit cold-blooded murder? Yet when a socialized form of murder is at stake, a colossal system capable of reducing our present civilization to slime and ashes, men pause academically and in a pettiness only permitted by their false sense of security and remoteness from battle haggle over a question of merely partial or unfaltering faithfulness to peace.

Yet is it not an antisocial stand, this war resistance, disregardful of the ones who need protection? A fair question. But what person looking across the map of Europe, where "protection" by violence has been the rule, can say that armaments and war have protected anybody? That of all fallacies has the least solid sustenance in fact. And as far as failure to aid one's country is concerned, let no one forget that war resistance is a movement almost world wide. Any war to-day between large countries would have to reckon with war resistance behind both battle lines. The war resisters of the world do not recognize the vertical divisions which separate man from man; they see only the horizontal frontier where humanity struggles in all nations to fling the oppressive mailed fist from its bowed and bloody shoulders.

Suppose all this is true. Is war resistance anything but negative? One may as well declare health negative, "negative" as a physician pronounces the result of a test when he can find no pathological condition. Negative? Consider some effects of war resistance.

It strikes directly at man-power, the indispensable

element of warfare in all ages. Not yet do Robots stalk over no-man's land under the flare of radio-directed star shells; and when that day arrives, if ever, a human brain will be back of every last mechanical device. Military experts quarrel over cavalry; naval experts debate the place of battleships; but all agree that flesh and bone are the *sine qua non* of war.

It cuts to the root of a fatal popular state of mind, the reliance on war as a last resort. Let people believe in war as a final reluctant weapon and they are ready for any propaganda which assures them that everything else has failed. A conviction firmly held by a considerable minority that nothing other than peaceful means of settlement will be tolerated can go far to stimulate the inventive genius of diplomats.

It can aid in the conquest of international fears. If great demonstrations of military preparedness (such as the now defunct Mobilization Day) can instil fear into the minds of other peoples, certainly a demonstration of pacifist conviction can do something to alleviate fear and afford a sounder basis for the growth of good-will. The presence of that 130,000 in England, small in influence as they still may be, is a reassuring evidence to every other country that no British government can start a war without encountering stubborn opposition from British subjects. The fact that Britain's labor movement stopped the threatened war on Russia in 1920 and has recently adopted a strong war-resistance resolution certainly lessens fear to some extent of a future war launched by a shameless ministry. Britain has been selected as an illustration because she is a great power and be-

cause in England war resistance has reached its most vigorous peak; but what is true of England would be equally true of any other power.

It can push governments toward peace. The history of war is an evolution which has sloughed off many a once appealing *casus belli* for which governments could no longer obtain popular support. Religious wars, for example, have become all but nonexistent, partly for economic reasons, to be sure, but also because the old dreads have been somewhat reduced. War resistance removes every *casus belli* from tolerance and lends a new insistence to demands for peaceful settlement.

It supplies a moral and dramatic equivalent for war. Struggle, color, sacrifice, danger, heroism—all these elements must be present in any cause that is to command the allegiance of youth at its finest. There is in war resistance no emotion of the killer, but it demands men and women, not cowards, and at no time is a war resister free from danger. Like the fireman at his post, the war resister stands poised for action and, most probably, for costly action. In countries where there is no peace-time conscription it often takes a war to expose a war resister to perils more serious than economic insecurity and the contumely of patrioteers. But in many countries young men by scores are to-day serving out sentences of brutal severity.

The war resister may work devotedly—as most of them do—for all kinds of peace projects, whether economic, legalistic, or psychological. But for the perfection of such instrumentalities to the point of effective

action the world must wait many years. Recognizing that war resistance is not a panacea, that the other approaches to a warless world are also necessary, and that war resistance may also fail as yet, still the war resister need not wait. He can quietly set to work just as the bacteriologist prepares far ahead of an epidemic his potent antitoxins.

Of those who long for the creation of a peaceable world order, for a dynamic society of nonviolent growth, the war resister asks a simple question. If your faith is in a Court, do not overlook, he says, the vast power in the court of conscience. If your hope is in the removal of war's causes, do not forget one major cause of war, namely, the willingness of people at the behest of government to kill for country. If you aim at a peaceward development of the League of Nations, do not neglect the league of War Resisters, which needs the coöperation of all pacifists. And if your trust is in the outlawry of war, you will find what time may reveal as your most faithful allies among those who have already risen to say in no uncertain tones, "As for us, we have already outlawed war from this time on."

PACIFISM AND THE STATE

BRUCE CURRY

Bruce Curry is associate professor of practical theology in Union Theological Seminary. He has published numerous articles, especially in periodicals for students, among whom he has spent substantially one third of his time for the past ten years, in the United States, Canada, England, and the Continent. He is the author of *Jesus and His Cause* and *Facing Student Problems.*

PACIFISM AND THE STATE

BRUCE CURRY

In the minds of many citizens the final blow to the pacifist position is that it involves disloyalty to the state. It seems clear to them that the pacifist abandons his country in the hour of her greatest need. In peace-time thousands are urged by their own better instincts toward the pacifist position of nonkilling, of nonviolence, of overcoming evil in peaceful ways; but they are deterred from joining the ranks of pacifism by the seeming treason to the state which would be theirs if war, in spite of all, should be declared.

Has the pacifist any real answer to this dilemma? In case of war are not "loyal citizens" and "pacifist" contradictory terms? And if so what must be the attitude of the state, even in times of peace, toward those who are declared pacifists?

Let us make clear the position of the state, as illustrated in our own country and held by the majority of citizens; then let us ask the pacifist to answer if he can.

Ancient and fundamental concepts of the duty of citizens to fight for their country are part of our heritage. How contemporary is the ring of the fol-

lowing sentiments which Plato in the *Crito* ascribes to Socrates:[1]

"Do you imagine that a state can subsist and not be overthrown, in which the decisions of law have no power, but are set aside and trampled by individuals? —and if she [our country] lead us to wounds or death in battle, thither we follow as is right—he must do what his city and his country order him; or he must change their view of what is just,—if he does not like us when he has become of age and has seen the ways of the city and made our acquaintance, he may go where he pleases and take his goods with him. . . . But he who still remains, has entered into an implied contract that he will do as we command him. We give him the alternative of obeying or convincing us—that is what we offer, and he does neither."

Straight down through the centuries came this viewpoint, enshrining itself securely in the ideals of modern states. So an Englishman puts it thus:[2]

"Such a man [conscientious objector] comes in conflict, not with an Act of Parliament passed to-day or yesterday, but with a moral law of patriotism which has been established for ages, has been the protection of human liberty, and is the necessary condition of human progress. . . . When England and the British Empire are engaged in a life and death struggle on behalf of national freedom and independence, the

[1] *Dialogues of Plato,* B. Jowett Translation. Vol. II, pp. 151–153. Oxford University Press.

[2] Professor A. V. Dicey, in *The Nineteenth Century and After,* for February, 1918.

crotchets, the scruples, the tenderness of the individual conscience must yield to the necessity of preserving the life and liberty of England."

A typical American embodiment of this ideal may be found in the tenth article of the Declaration of Rights, in the Constitution of the State of Massachusetts:

"Each individual of the society has a right to be protected by it in the enjoyment of his life, liberty, and property according to standing laws. He is obliged, consequently, to contribute his share to the expense of such protection; to give his personal service, or an equivalent, when necessary."

It has become almost axiomatic, therefore, that obedience to constitutional government, even when one does not wholly approve its measures, is a necessity for the life of the nation and a duty for everyone who loves his country. In times when no national crisis impends he may seek to change the ideals and, correspondingly, the laws of his government. But under war-time dangers he must "do his bit," i.e., whatever his government asks. How reasonable, how fair, how necessary, how supported by common sense and backed by natural emotions!

It follows that extreme pacifists must be unreasonable, antisocial, emotionally stunted, ingrates and parasites, not to say traitors. They seem to accept security of their homes, property, and lives, purchased at the cost of life by those who serve in the armies and navies, without a qualm of that "con-

science" about which they prate so much. Thus the public opinion of our country comes to be summarized in the question often put, "What would be our fate as a nation if the majority of our citizens were pacifists?"

With this inherited and accepted viewpoint, we must not be surprised at the withering flame of passion which centres upon pacifists and conscientious objectors in the roiling days of war. Soon after we had entered the World War citizens of Pasadena mobbed a pacifist meeting, saying they would have no peace meetings there if they had to take the law into their own hands. And a certain Captain Phelps of the California Loyal League said to a pacifist in the court room, "I will kill you the first opportunity I get outside." For those who were drafted and who refused any form of military service, Theodore Roosevelt demanded treatment as criminals and imprisonment at hard labor, or at least internment with alien enemies and permanent deportation from the country as soon as possible. An outstanding minister is reported to have said, "I'd hang every one who lifts his voice against America's entering the war";[3] and the eminent James W. Gerard, ex-Ambassador to Germany, advised feeding every pacifist raw meat. The drastic treatment, even torture, meted out to conscientious objectors in army camps went unchallenged by most American citizens.

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[3]Those who have become pacifists since the World War need to be warned what they may expect in case of another war. Let them read *The Conscientious Objector in America,* by Norman Thomas, and the following pamphlets which can be secured from the Civil

Again, the modern democratic state, instead of exacting universal and uncompromising obedience from every citizen, has strained a point to make place for individual liberty, freedom of conscience, the right to adhere to religious beliefs, even when these run counter to the state's natural claims and weaken its security. It was natural that such provision should be made by the framers of the American Constitution, many of the forefathers having sought these shores in quest of religious or political liberty, and having suffered all manner of hardships that freedom of conscience might be preserved. And, lest the general spirit of the Constitution might be inadequate, the First Amendment was added to make specific the right of religious freedom.

In line with these principles the state has always tolerated and respected the views of pacifist religious sects, such as the Society of Friends and the Mennonites. In the World War the Selective Service Regulations (Section 79, Rule XIV) allowed such objectors to war to be registered for noncombatant service only. And such service was liberally interpreted, tempered to most sensitive consciences, even to the point of allowing a man to go home and work on his own farm. Finally the law was stretched, by executive orders from the Commander-in-Chief, to include not only members of such recognized religious sects, but all objectors adjudged "sincere," sectarian and nonsectarian.

Liberties Union, 100 Fifth Avenue, New York: *The Case of the Christian Pacifists at Los Angeles; Your Amish Mennonite; War-Time Prosecutions and Mob Violence; Amnesty for Political Prisoners.*

Many moderate pacifists found themselves able to comply with the demands of so moderate a state. To be sure, they did not escape the scorn and opprobrium of the "one hundred per cent. Americans," but we must distinguish between the attitude of the state in the person of its sober officials, and that of the populace inflamed by passion and fear; just as we must distinguish between the conciliatory orders for treatment of conscientious objectors in war camps, issued by the Adjutant General,[4] and the barbarous treatment sometimes accorded the objectors by their fellows, and even by the officers in charge.[5] President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker were quick to condemn the mob spirit and the unlawful attacks upon pacifists, even suggesting that those engaging in such outbreaks were themselves the foes of constitutional rights, of democratic government, of our national ideals and aims.

There remain the extreme pacifists, who, on various grounds which we shall later examine, refuse all obedience to military orders, however mild. Here the issue becomes tensely drawn. The state stands ready to allow freedom of conscience *within reasonable limits,* nay, to limits which seem to many even unreasonably generous. But beyond these limits the state feels it cannot go, at peril of its very existence. It could not tolerate, for example, the plea of conscience made by a citizen for burning his neighbor's house or murdering a fellow citizen, or promoting

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[4]Given in Appendix VII of Major W. G. Kellogg's *The Conscientious Objector.* Boni and Liveright.

[5]Some of whom were disciplined for flagrant disregard of orders.

insurrection. And it seems only a step from these to the greater loss of life and disruption of the state which the extreme pacifist would bring or allow to come upon his country in the event of war. Hence the state looks upon all such as criminals, or potential criminals, to be watched and to be restrained by force if necessary. From the standpoint of the state, the conscience, never infallible, has led these minority individuals into an egregious blunder so deadly that it can be given no quarter.

While in our country the state has never based its position upon religious sanctions, large Christian elements within it have not been slow to buttress the accepted viewpoint by appeals to Scripture and even to the teaching of Jesus, showing the duty of citizens to obey the sovereign commands of the state. The favorite texts used are:

"Render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's" (Mark 12:17).

"I came not to send peace, but a sword" (Matt. 10:34).

"Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers. For there is no power but of God: the powers that be are ordained of God. Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God—wherefore ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience' sake" (Romans 13).

"Submit yourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake" (I Peter 2:13).

The pacifist who bases his own position on Christian teaching must be prepared to take into account these injunctions.

The answer of the pacifist to the claims of the state will depend upon how deep-dyed his pacifism is—how radical his program and method. For working purposes we may distinguish three degrees: (1) The near-pacifist who deplores war, hopes for peace, even works for it in certain ways, but meanwhile supports the machinery of war. (2) The active pacifist who works to abolish war and refuses to bear arms, but who, in event of war, would help his country in some form of noncombatant service. (3) The extreme pacifist who will not support the state in any war measures whatever, refuses in this matter to take any orders from the state, and practices noncoöperation.

To the first group really belong about nine tenths of our people, though they might not now relish being credited with any approximation to pacifism. Let ex-Secretary of War Newton D. Baker be their spokesman: "I am a pacifist; I am a pacifist in my hope; I am a pacifist in my prayers; I am a pacifist in my belief that God made man for better things than that civilization should always be under the blight of this increasingly deadly destruction which war leaves us. And I am a pacifist in believing that the real contribution to that sentiment lies in adequate, sane preparedness on the part of any free people to defend its liberties."[6]

To the second group belongs a large proportion, possibly a majority, of those who openly call them-

[6]From his address on "Pacifism" delivered before the national convention of the Reserve Officers' Association, and published in full in the *Field Artillery Journal* March and April, 1925.

selves pacifists, including many members of pacifist religious sects, such as the Friends or Quakers.

It will now be clear that between these first two groups and the ideals of the present state there is no real quarrel; for they conform fully or relatively to the requirements of the government as outlined above. Hence the state asks them for no defense of their position, but for guarantees of sincerity. Two things must be pointed out, however, in connection with the second group, the active, noncombatant pacifists. First, while the state holds no charge against them at present, there would be a different story if the majority of our citizens should take that position, rendering impossible the raising of combatant forces for war. The state will hope that the tribe will not increase, and will look with disfavor upon its efforts to spread its doctrine. Second, however tolerant the attitude of the state, the public in general misses no occasion to heap upon these avowed pacifists all calumny and abuse, making no distinction between them and the extremists, branding them all in a lump as slackers and traitors.

For pacifism's real defense against the claims of the state, we must now turn to the position of the extreme, noncoöperating pacifist. If he can make his case at all, it will more than hold for all other paler degrees of pacifism.

The extreme pacifist begins with the following fundamental assumptions: (1) The government is not the state; it is only the fallible rulers or officials, representing only partially the public that makes up

the state. Without the "consent of the governed" there can be no claim to authority in a democratic state. (2) The state is not society; it is *one* of the institutions created by society for its service; hence it has no absolute claim on the individual. (3) The state is not a God, above the moral law; it must be judged by the moral law.[7]

It follows that one's highest loyalty is not to the government, not to the state, but to society, or to humanity, or to the moral law within, or to God. If loyalty to the state conflicts with a higher loyalty there can be no hesitation in holding true to the latter. When the state asks support of war, it is asking one to be traitor to these higher interests, for war with all its methods is their deadly foe.

The position is fairly stated in the following extracts from George W. Martin's "Liberty and Sovereignty" in *The Atlantic Monthly*, July, 1926:

"Whatever the necessities of governmental theory, no man, in actual fact, surrenders his whole being to the state.

"Man has a sense of right and wrong. If the state —or its instruments—goes too consistently against that sense, he is stimulated, first to antagonism, and then to resistance. The state is for him sovereign only when his conscience is not stirred against its performance, and whatever brings the conscience of man into opposition to the state must, for the state, be sacred ground—not only by reason of man's duty to himself, but also because of his duty to the state. For

[7]On these points see John Dewey: *The Public and Its Problems*, pp. 25–36. Henry Holt and Co., 1927; and N. Thomas, *The Christian Patriot*, pp. 34–45. W. H. Jenkins, Philadelphia.

in a democracy every citizen must share the responsibility for the development of the government and the compelling of it to do right and to discharge properly its function of so ordering society as to afford the citizens the best possible opportunity to live the good life. He cannot discharge this duty by blind obedience without examination of the aims and methods of the state; to do so is to fail not only in his duty to himself—for to postulate infallibility for the fiats of the state is to relieve ourselves from any requirement of thought whatever—but also in his duty to the state; because any government which is sure that none of the citizens will ever resist tyranny by force is certain to drift into despotism, and so be in danger. . . .

"Man must go by his own moral certainties; and if he believes that the captain of the ship is unawares steering for the rocks, he must not obey him. The real safeguard of morals is found, not in the statute book, but in the readiness of man to give battle to tyranny, ambition, and selfishness in whatever guise these come. . . .

"If, by definition, a law is a statute enacted by the government, then to disobey that statute is obviously unlawful, and there is no *legal* justification for such disobedience. The courts are concerned with nothing beyond this. But the whole duty of the citizen cannot be compassed with such a formula, unless infallibility on all questions be conceded to the second-rate lawyers who sit in our legislatures; and such a doctrine, if carried to its ultimate logical conclusion, would preclude the repeal of enactments or the amendment of constitutions.

"While the citizen has no right to act with indifference to the well-being of the social whole, never-

theless both his duty to himself and his duty to society may exact resistance to attempted decrees of the sovereign. His very oath to support the Constitution may require that he oppose an attempt to enforce part of it; for such an attempt, if ill-advised, may result in bringing the whole structure of the government crashing down in a welter of debauchery or violence which will jeopardize the continuance of the very fundamental principles on which the organic law is founded."

From this viewpoint it becomes clear how even the extreme pacifist may consider himself more loyal to this country than most of the blind supporters who clamor for his blood, or the super-patriots who consign him to the blacklist in peace-time and to the prison cell in time of war.

The Christian extremist will go on to take up the challenge of Scripture texts, including the teachings and spirit of Jesus in relation to civil government. He will profess himself ready to "render to Cæsar the things that are Cæsar's and unto God the things that are God's," but will add with Norman Thomas, "and surely the conscience is God's." He will point out that Jesus' statement about "not peace but a sword" has no reference to national affairs. He will assert that war is a denial of Jesus' whole philosophy; that, like Jesus, he stands ready to die for his country, but not by the method of making others die. He will take his cue from the apostolic stand, "We ought to obey God rather than man." He will take Paul's injunction concerning obedience to the powers that be as referring only to cases where one's conscience

is not violated, reminding us that Paul himself, according to tradition, suffered death at the hands of the state rather than comply with the state's demand which ran counter to his convictions. For the Kingdom of God he will reserve a higher loyalty than for any earthly country, certain that in so doing he will be leading his own state toward that blessed goal. With Hocking, he will conceive of the function of religion as being that of inducing men "to recognize their abiding city as elsewhere, and, serving God supremely, in whom are the issues of the future as well as the past, compel the state to lose its present life, if need be, that it may save it in the service of a better order."[8]

Some of us who make this extreme refusal to defend our country by the war method go a step farther. We believe that *one wins the right to take this stand only by "enlisting" heart and soul in another method which we believe is a more adequate defense.* Taught by the experience of the nations in the World War and since, to despair at best of anything but temporary security through war; convinced that even that security is purchased at too high a cost to our national ideals of justice, humanity, and liberty; we not only repudiate it ourselves, but warn our state against it as a broken reed, upon which she may lean only at the peril of her existence.

We give ourselves in service to the state, for her more genuine and permanent security, by a method in which we have far greater confidence, a method

[8]W. E. Hocking: *Man and the State,* p. 443. Yale University Press, 1926.

much truer to the genius of our democracy, better suited to the ideals to which our country was committed from her birth—the method of creating friendship, understanding, and good-will among the nations; the method of removing the causes of war through adjudicating differences, making openly arranged concessions to the rights of others, withdrawing gestures of unfair discrimination, greedy exploitation, or cutthroat competition toward our national neighbors.

This method has been translated into terms of very definite programs involving the commitment of the individual's energy, time, thought, and money. We excuse ourselves with nothing short of putting our life blood into some branch of this service. We offer this new sort of "service record" to our state in lieu of the military service she has been accustomed to require.[9]

We repudiate the name "pacifist" if it is to connote passivity or disloyalty toward the interests of our country. Our interest is talking and practicing that which we and all loyal citizens can do for the cause of peace and security for our state and for all governments. If war should come in spite of our efforts, and it should be charged that our methods had not worked, had not achieved defense and security, we should reply, "Neither has the military method of the past; we abide by our faith in the greater efficacy

[9]The details of such service lie outside the scope of this treatment. Send for a leaflet entitled *What You Can Do in Regard to War and International Relations* and follow the leads there suggested. Published by the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Bible House, New York City.

of our method which assuredly will work, if and when the state and the nation as a whole give themselves to it with half of the zeal now expended on promoting preparedness of the military sort."

Is it not the plain civic duty of all those who would work for a warless world, from near-pacifists to extreme objectors, to forsake outworn methods which have failed the state, to reject any attitudes of recalcitrance alone, and to give themselves unreservedly to the new attitudes and the new methods which wait to create enduring peace?

Is it not the duty of the enlightened state so to arrange its affairs that this conflict of conscience with national requirements may be removed? Are not the times ripe for such a readjustment? Shall our country advance or retreat from the start already made in this direction?

Upon the answer to these questions depends the issue, whether the clash between pacifism and the state shall be removed, or whether, with the number of pacifists increasing, and the state remaining obdurately militaristic, we shall be plunged into greater weakness, bitterness, and disruption.

NATIONALISM AND THE NEW AGE

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

Rabindranath Tagore is one of the world's great literary and cultural leaders. In 1901 he founded a school at Santiniketan, Bolpur, Bengal, which has become a revered international institution. He has visited Europe several times, as well as China, Japan, and the United States. In addition to the verse and articles he regularly contributes to a large number of journals, he is a composer and has written and set to music over three thousand songs. In 1913 he received the Nobel Prize for Literature. He has published about thirty works of poetry, and many novels, plays, and other books, among them *Gitanjali; Hungry Stones; Nationalism; Creative Unity;* and *Fireflies.*

NATIONALISM AND THE NEW AGE

RABINDRANATH TAGORE

THE human races will never again be able to go back to their citadels of high-walled exclusiveness. They have been exposed to each other physically and intellectually. The shells which so long gave them full security within their individual inclosures have been broken, and by no artificial process can they be mended again. So we have to accept this fact, even though we have not yet fully adapted our minds to this changed environment of publicity, even though through it we may have to run all the risks entailed by their wider expansion of life's freedom.

The creature which lives its life in a dark cave finds its safety in the very narrowness of its environment, and the economical providence of nature curtails and tones down its sensibilities to such limited necessity. But if those cavewalls are removed by some cataclysm, then either it must accept the doom of extinction or carry on satisfactory negotiations with its wider surroundings.

A large part of our tradition is our code of adjustment which deals with the circumstances special to ourselves. These traditions, no doubt, variegate with color the different racial personalities—a coloring

which has its poetry, and also certain protective qualities suitable to each environment. We may come to have a strong love for our colorful race specialty, but if it gives us fitness only for a very narrow world, then at the slightest variation in our circumstances we have to pay for this love with our life itself. In the animal world there are numerous instances of complete race suicide overtaking those who fondly clung to some advantage which later on became a hindrance in an altered dispensation. In fact, the superiority of man is proved by his adaptability to extreme surprises of chance—neither the torrid nor the frigid zone of his destiny holding for him insuperable obstacles.

There are certain mental peculiarities, falling more under pathology than psychology, which have no universal significance. Such peculiarities are inoffensive so long as they keep to their own boundaries, but when carried outside these they either hurt those who possess them, or the others who are confronted by them, or perhaps ultimately both. So, directly they come out of the environment of their origin they have to be judged by some universal standard of behavior, by the moral standard which has the universal character of truth. An abnormal appetite for acquisition may be appreciated by a man's wife and other dear ones; but when it is brought out in its dealings with his neighbors the standard of conduct which is exclusively that of his own family circle will no longer serve.

What I want to make clear is the fact that since, as in the present age, the human races have come out of

their traditional reservation-fence into mutual contact, the reliance on a universal ethical standard is the only means which can save humanity from disruption into barbarism or death. The late war, which involved a vast number of peoples in its carnage and whose economic and moral consequence is even now troubling the atmosphere of a great part of the world, is merely an indication that in the hurry of the scientific progress of the West, which has made the human world physically almost one country, the cultivation of the ethical ideals needful for this condition has been overlooked.

It has come as a great surprise on the races of man —this sudden change from a life of comparative seclusion to that of mutual proximity—and will test to the full their moral adaptability. The peculiar qualities which gave special advantage to some of them in former days, in order to save those very people, have to give place to others of an opposite kind.

It is difficult for us to realize this, because the sunset clouds of the past, under their golden flourishes and blood-red magnificence, conceal the approaching doom; and people are still speaking in a language which hardly takes count of the impending night. When we in Asia talk about readjustment in response to the world situation to-day, we forget that it should be directed to a future of new ideals and not to the mere shifting about of the methods of a past which is already declared bankrupt. Therefore, our dreams also bristle with the image of raised swords, darken with the vision of poison gas, and glisten with gold

streaks that are but the harbingers of death-dealing thunder clouds.

Of course I know, from the point of view of prudence and practical politics, that a sudden and complete change may not be possible, or may even be considered dangerous, and so the weapons of the past have yet to be used till they slip out of our hands by the very absurdity of their anachronism. And is not their weight already proving too heavy, turning the living skin of man into an impervious sheath and his whole constitution into an iron safe? Is it not for the people the rigor of death itself—this progressive stiffening of their muscles and hardening of their hearts?

In man, whose existence is not merely biological, the process of death first begins in the spiritual system and then it creeps into the other departments of his life. This has been the case with all the great civilizations that flourished for a period and died when their spirit decayed. The continual dwindling in the proportion of food for our moral and spiritual nature has not troubled the political leaders of the present age, not even the scientific philosophers, who are busy analyzing the component parts of *what is*, and think it old-fashioned to bring into view a synthetic vision of *what should be*. The vastness of the race problem with which we are faced to-day will either compel us to train ourselves to moral fitness in the place of merely external efficiency, or the complications arising out of it will fetter all our movements and drag us to our doom.

When our necessity becomes urgently insistent,

when the resources that have sustained us so long become exhausted, then our spirit puts forth all its force to discover some other source of sustenance, deeper and more permanent. This leads us from the exterior to the interior of our storehouse. When muscle does not fully serve us we come to awaken intellect to ask for its help, and are then surprised to find that it has a greater supply of strength for us than our physical power. When our intellectual gifts grow perverse and only help to render our suicide gorgeous and exhaustive, our soul must seek an alliance with some power which is still deeper and still further away from the rude stupidity of muscle.

In the present age the human races have come close together. Their differences in language, tradition, and degree of strength are so apparent as to be a commonplace. Our first meeting has only recognized these differences, and in the place of geographical barriers has thereupon set up the barriers of mutual misunderstanding. Even the religious ministers, sent by the West to the East, whose profession it is to preach brotherly love, have in their sectarian pride and prudence emphasized and exaggerated these differences more than any other body of men. They have produced the psychology which makes it comfortably easy for the military and the mercantile powers of their community to carry on their mission of depredation in alien countries helplessly open to their inroads.

The consciousness of difference has poisoned our literature, our history and philosophy, the education of our children, and has even invaded the frontier line of science where it touches sociology. The cultivation

of intense race egotism is the one thing that has found its fullest scope at this meeting of men. In no period of human history has there been such an epidemic of moral perversity, such a universal churning up of jealousy, greed, hatred, and mutual suspicion. Every people, weak or strong, is constantly indulging in a violent dream of rendering itself thoroughly hurtful to others. In this galloping competition of hurtfulness on the slope of a bottomless pit, no nation dares to stop or slow down. A scarlet fever with a raging temperature has attacked the entire body of mankind, and the political machine has taken the place of creative personality in all departments of life.

It is well known that when greed has for its object material gain it can have no end. It is like the chasing of the horizon by a lunatic. To go on in a competition of multiplying millions is a steeplechase of insensate futility that has obstacles but no goal. It has for its parallel the fight with material weapons, weapons which must perpetually be multiplied, opening up new vistas of destruction and evoking new forms of insanity in the forging of frightfulness. Thus seems to have commenced the last fatal adventure of drunken Passion riding on an intellect of prodigious power.

When the condition of the world is so desperate it will not in the least help if we in the East also join in this stampede toward a general annihilation. We must discover our salvation in some other power that has its basis upon sanity, and this power is moral. On its positive side it will work in the direction of unity, cultivating the spirit of sympathy and coöperation. On its negative side it will actively resist the

aggression of evil by the moral weapon of complete ostracism, just as we exercise it in its physical form in the case of a fatal disease which is contagious. It will translate fight from its present depth of brutality to the moral altitude which belongs to the human spirit. Through it, society will get rid of fighting as a definite profession.

The division between those who waste their life in cultivating the art of killing and those who labor to sustain them must be removed, and the full flow of humanity through our social organism must not be obstructed. That is to say, fight and reconciliation, acceptance and rejection, which taken together are the constant and natural features of life, must not be separated into technical departments, but, through moral tradition and training, be allowed to function over the whole of society. The development of intellectual and moral sympathy for his fellow being, the spirit of service and sacrifice, and the dauntless attitude of rejection toward evil of all kinds in the face of danger and death, must form the principal part of education for everyone.

Material force has its power in the physical blows it can inflict and therefore emulation goes on endlessly augmenting the means of dealing such blows. It can only come to a natural stop when man asserts the dignity of his spirit and says: "I am not afraid." In our weakness we maintain a material power which dominates us; the power which is spiritual dwells in our strength, in our fearlessness, fortitude and spirit of sacrifice.

To-day, more than ever before in our history, the

aid of this spiritual power is needed, and therefore I believe its resources will surely be discovered in the hidden depth of our being. Pioneers will come who will take up this adventure and suffer, and through suffering will open out a path to a higher elevation of life in which lies our safety.

Let me, in reference to this, give an instance from the history of Ancient India.

There was a noble period in the early days of India when, to a band of dreamers, agriculture appeared as a great idea and not merely a useful fact. The heroic personality of Ramachandra, who espoused its cause, was sung in popular ballads, which in a later age forgot their original message and were crystallized into an epic merely extolling some domestic virtues of its hero. However, it is quite evident from the legendary relics still embedded in the story that a new age ushered in by the spread of agriculture came as a divine voice to those who could hear. It lifted up the primeval screen of the wilderness, brought the distant near, and broke down all barricades. Men who formed separate and antagonistic groups in their sheltered seclusions were called upon to form a united people.

In the Vedic verses we find constant mention of conflicts between the original inhabitants of the land and the colonists. There we find the expression of a spirit that was of mutual distrust and a fight in which was sought either wholesale slavery or extermination for the opponents, in the spirit of animals who live in the narrow segregation imposed upon them by their limited imagination and imperfect sympathy. This spirit would have continued in all its ferocious

vigor of savagery had men failed to find the opportunity for the discovery that man's highest truth is in the union of coöperation and love.

The progress of agriculture was the first external step which led to such a discovery. It not only made a settled life possible for a large number of men living in close proximity, but it claimed for its very purpose a life of peaceful coöperation. The mere fact of such a sudden change of condition from a nomadic barbarism to an agricultural civilization would not have benefited man if he had not developed therewith, for the guidance of his conduct, some inner principle of truth. We can realize from the reading of this epic the birth of idealism among a section of the Indian colonists of those days, before whose mind's eye was opened a vision of emancipation rich with the responsibility of a higher life. The Ramayana represents in its ideal the change of the people's aspiration from the path of conquest to that of reconciliation.

In the present time, as I have said, the human world has been overtaken by another vast change similar to that which had occurred in the epic age of India. So long, men have been cultivating, almost with a religious fervor, that mentality which is the product of racial isolation; poets sang, in a loud pitch of bragging, of the exploits of their popular fighters; money-makers neither felt pity nor shame in the unscrupulous dexterity of their pocket-picking; and diplomats scattered lies in order to reap concessions from the devastated future of their victims. All of a sudden we have awakened to the consciousness that

the walls which separated the different races have given way, and we find ourselves standing face to face.

This is a great fact of epic significance. Man, suckled at the wolf's breast, sheltered in the brute's den, brought up in the prowling habit of depredation, suddenly discovers that he is Man, and that his true power lies in yielding up his brute power for the freedom of spirit. There are a few great countries—China is among them, and also Japan—that have found their civilization from the soil of nature, the mother who taught them the lesson of life, the music of which, flowing in the blood of their children, revealed itself in a vast symphony of human relationship. They have loved her rivers and hills; they have fed their eyes upon the blue of her sky and the tender green of her corn shoots; they have enjoyed the dance of the invisible rhythm in all the forms and colors with which she surrounds them; they have known that the subtle intricacies of human existence find their perfect unity in the harmony of interdependence, never in the vigorous exercise of elbows in the midst of a mutually pushing multitude, clamoring for a solitary peak of self-determination; they have never indulged in the arrogant assertion of independence which only belongs to the barren rocks and to the desert wastes gray with the pallor of death.

This spirit of interdependence is the spirit of meekness in life which gives it the unseen and inexhaustible strength to inherit the earth that we find in the green grass whose banners of conquest are humble

and yet ever victorious. Therefore, I bring to utterance the cry of the new age which is waiting to close the blood-stained pages of its past and to hear the epic that will voice its hope in a great song.

All the same, I am afraid you will find it difficult to put faith in a poet's dream. I can guess how disappointed you must feel at not reading anything from me of a practical nature. There is a proverb in Sanskrit that you must not expect fruits from a sugar cane. As a poet I can only have my vision. It may not be as useful as, say, your fishing rod, but it may produce the same effect as the spring breeze. Very often it is of more importance merely to attract your eyes toward the path rather than encumber your back with a ladder. That ladder appears so substantially practical that in the joy of its possession we often forget to inquire if there is any height to be scaled.

I wish to remind you that this new age has brought a new King and only those who have the imagination to see the New Comer and the loyal sympathy to receive him in a proper manner will find his own true place. So long, we have been serving our tribal idol. We have not yet awakened to the fact that the tribe has become a shadow, that its temple has come down to the dust and that the idol lies shattered. It will be a piece of wasteful folly to imagine that we can still propitiate it with the blood of human victims and with the food plundered from the famished.

The God of Humanity has arrived at the gates of the ruined temple of the tribe. Though he has not yet

found his altar, I ask the simple men of faith, wherever they may be in the world, to bring their offering of sacrifice to him and to believe that it is far better to be wise and worshipful than to be clever and supercilious; I ask them to claim their right of Man to be friends of men, and not their right of particular proud race who boast of their fatal quality of being the rulers of men. We should know for certain that rulers will no longer be tolerated in the new world, as it basks in the open sunlight of mind and breathes life's free air.

In the geological age of the infant earth the demons of physical force had their sway. The angry fire, the devouring floods, the fury of storms, continually kicked the earth into frightful distortions. These Titans have at last given way to the reign of life. If there had been spectators in those days who were clever and practical they would have wagered their last penny on these and would have waxed hilariously witty at the expense of the helpless living speck taking its stand in the arena of the wrestling giants. Only a dreamer could have declared on that day with an unwavering conviction that those demons were doomed because of their very exaggeration, because of those formidable qualities which, in the parlance of modern schoolboy science, are termed Nordic.

I ask you, once again, let us—the dreamers of the East and the West—keep our faith firm in Life that creates and not in the Machine that constructs, in the power that hides its force and blossoms in beauty, and not in the power that bares its arms and chuckles

at its capacity to make itself obnoxious. Let us know that the Machine is good when it helps, not so when it exploits life; that science is great when it destroys evil, but not when the twain enter into unholy alliance.

Before I conclude I ask your leave to say that I believe in the individuals in the West; for on no account can I afford to lose my faith in Man. They also dream, they love, they intensely feel pain and shame at the unholy rites of demon worship that tax the whole world for their supply of bleeding hearts. They cherish in their minds the creative faith which by its magic secretly fashions the images of a perfect expectation in the midst of the boisterous dissipations of unbelief. In the life of these individuals will be wedded East and West; their lamps of sacrifice will burn through the stormy night along the great pilgrim tract of the future, when the names of the statesmen who tighten their noose round the necks of foreign races will be derided, and the triumphal tower of skulls in memory of the war lords will have crumbled into dust.

SHIFTING THE NATIONAL MIND-SET

GEORGE A. COE

George A. Coe until recently was professor of religious education in Teachers College, Columbia University. Formerly he was a professor at Union Theological Seminary, and at Northwestern University. He has been president of the Religious Education Association of America, and is a member of various philosophical, psychological, and scientific bodies. He is chairman of the Committee on Militarism in Education. He has been a frequent contributor to philosophical and religious periodicals, and is the author of numerous books, including *A Social Theory of Religious Education; Law and Freedom in the School;* and *The Motives of Men.*

SHIFTING THE NATIONAL MIND-SET

GEORGE A. COE

WAR is, of course, a state of mind. This means not merely the mental processes that accompany and immediately precede hostilities, but also the entire set of readinesses that determine, in advance of acute friction, how a nation shall conduct itself with relation to friction-producing causes. Habits of thought and sentiment, which I shall here call the national mind-set, may and do make war while there is yet peace. They make it, not by hating other nations, not by desiring war, but by adjusting the whole mental mechanism so that, in certain situations, war-favoring reactions will occur as a matter of course. War seems to break upon us like an electric storm or an earthquake; it seems to happen *to* us. But in reality it happens *in* us, as a long, interconnected series of events, the last of which—the call to arms and the actual fighting—merely carries out the nature of the series.

By changing the earlier members of this series in such a way as to establish a contrary mind-set, we could prevent war altogether, we could make it as obsolete as cannibalism. Suppose that all the children of the country were to be so trained and instructed that, a generation hence, the American mind should have a deep revulsion against the inhumanity of war,

an intelligent realization of the futility of it, and at least a rudimentary understanding of the causes of international strains and of the ways in which people who do not desire war are nevertheless made to fight —if this kind of psychical preparedness were built up in our people for even one generation, we should be well on the road toward final emancipation. Looked at theoretically, this is entirely within our powers. If the educators of to-day were given a commission thus to shift the mental mind-set of the whole nation, and if they were granted a free hand, they could "turn the trick."

But these two "ifs" are the crux of a most difficult problem. The adults of this generation, who control the education of the young, are not yet convinced that lasting peace is practicable. There is still a general belief that armies and navies are a natural and necessary part of national life, and the people as a whole are still ready to be exploited by the special interests that act through war-provoking statesmen. How, then, can we educate effectively for peace?

We have to deal here with a vicious circle. The mind-set toward war propagates itself from generation to generation, not by objective evidence that this is the only possible mind-set for a nation, but by naïvely assuming its own finality. Peace is made impracticable precisely by the careless belief that it is impracticable. Hence, in our schools, though we sincerely profess peaceful sentiments, we never bring ourselves quite to the point of producing in the young any mind-set that possibly could bring war to an end. The state as it is teaches patriotism toward the state

as it is, though the state that now is has a mind-set toward war.

Under the influence of the Great War, in spite of the demonstration that it gave us of the futility of such conflicts, our schools are to-day under pressure to teach a more militant nationalism than ever. To teach it, for example, under the guise of history. Demands are made openly (as well as otherwise) that the events and the personages of our past shall be uniformly treated so as to glorify our country. Honest schoolmen have actually to struggle for the right to be truthful in the presence of young citizens. One need not expatiate upon the amazing and humiliating folly of our fellow citizens who so little understand the real glory of the United States as to be unwilling to teach to children the unvarnished truth of our past. Our problem is, Can education break this vicious circle, and if so, how? The case, I opine, is by no means hopeless even in public education, but besides the public schools we have other powerful educational instruments that might conceivably be brought into play.

First of all, it is not to be supposed that the American people can be permanently committed to the distortion of history, or to the evasion of history, in the public schools. Dogmatic nationalists cannot usurp the function, nor destroy the influence of the historian. It would be wise strategy for those who want the truth about war to be known to give active support to schoolmen who are struggling to have actual history rather than pseudo-history taught. Further, through pulpit, platform, and press, particular points

in our history might well be spread before the people with a view, on the one hand, to inoculating the public against pseudo-history in the schools, and, on the other, to spreading intelligence concerning the nature and the causes of war and the nature and the causes of peace.

This is not—note it well—a proposal to substitute a dogmatic pacifistic history for a dogmatic militaristic one, but to root out dogmatism as far as our fallible minds can do it. We shall get the deeper moral reactions, not by prescribing these reactions to children, not by doing their thinking for them or for the larger public, but by exhibiting the relevant data in their naked objectivity, and in their relations of cause and effect. War thrives upon misunderstanding, half truth, prejudice. The cause of peace is naturally affiliated with the objectivity of the scientific and historic spirit. Possibly there is some significance in the fact that efforts to prescribe what shall be taught as history spring up coincidently with efforts to prescribe what shall not be taught as natural science. Our appeal from both must be to facts, to respect for truth, and to the reasonable and necessary authority of the expert. We should therefore seek and expect the support of scientific men in general for historical objectivity in the schools.

A second practicable step is to develop a discriminating patriotism in place of the patriotic ritualism that now prevails. It is true that many teachers endeavor to make patriotism intelligent, in a sense. They do it by recounting our national virtues, constitutional and other, so that our country is made to

appear as the paragon of homelands. I shall not contradict this ranking of my country if I say that, however admirable America is, this method of teaching does not produce discriminating patriotism—the kind that is ready to make needed improvements. Add to this sort of teaching the salute to the flag, and what is the result? The main result is readiness to rise, follow, and fight whenever any administration sounds the tocsin of alarm. Thus it is that the public schools make the people pawns for almost any strong national leader who has an international game to play. This is the way to grow "cannon fodder"; it is not the way to grow citizens of a democracy.

If we must have a ritual of patriotism—and much can be said in favor of it—let us make it the expression of attitudes discriminatingly taken. Let us salute the flag for specific reasons, such as the use made of the Boxer indemnity fund, the unfortified Canadian boundary, and (not least) the tasks of world helpfulness and world peace that are still ahead of us. And let us add to the salute, at least for pupils who have learned the truth about international unrighteousness (our own included), a clause of consecration against all exploitation of the weak, and against all national selfishness and greed.

But can we get even mild changes like these into our schools? The key to the answer is the schoolman. Are our teachers, principals, superintendents, normal schools, and teachers' colleges to regard the educator as a creator of social policies, or as merely a hired servant to execute the policies of the *status quo?* Is education to aim merely at efficiency in running our

present social machinery, or is it, in addition, to attend to the defects in our social relations, and to assist in finding and applying appropriate remedies? The most prominent trend of the moment is toward efficiency in the narrower, the short-sighted, sense. But the trend is not unanimous, and there is no reason to doubt that many a schoolman would gladly free himself from its mechanizing influence. Why should not the schoolman stand forth in his community as a leader of social thinking, convincing the parents, if need be, that the more creative type of education is what their children need? Such a community leader could mobilize latent good-will, and latent capacity for broad outlooks; he could rally the people to the support of science, of history, and of the higher patriotism.

But we are not entirely dependent upon public education. The private schools and colleges, if they but will, can profoundly influence the movement for permanent peace, and—what is more important—the churches, if they will, can cast the deciding vote through the millions of children whom they reach. There is an enormous amount of moral power, largely latent, in the churches; they have, too, the advantage of a tradition, a professed loyalty, that squarely contradicts the whole war philosophy. It will be far easier to get definite and practical education for peace into the church schools than into the schools of the state—easier to secure objectivity as to the facts, easier to meet the conditions of strong motivation. What, then, are the main points in a policy for such church education?

First, let the churches reassert that the state is not a final moral authority for the citizen. This is an ancient doctrine, but it has fallen into disuse among Protestants. It is high time to recover the old position, and to teach children freely to judge, from their religious standpoint, the policies and the acts of their own government. A super-political conscience must be developed in and through church schools.

Second, the customary sentimental generalities about war and peace should be superseded. They are not sufficient; neither is merely emotional opposition to war. Let the church school marshal facts, and teach them with a thoroughness that will point the way for the public schools. A thoroughly realistic approach to facts is the surest way to open the springs of strong and enduring motivation.

Third, let religious leaders study to become expert in the analysis of moral issues in current events and discussions, and let them lead the people in such analysis. This is different from assuming to tell people which is the right side in the debate concerning the League or the World Court and similar matters. What is needed, rather, is deeper moral appreciation. Many a well-meaning man is judging public questions narrowly, unethically, for lack of experience in making ethical distinctions. Such men need—all of us need—constant stimulus to look for the broadly human interest within problems of law and administration. The churches can do an extraordinary service by training the young to disentangle the threads in public issues, and to feel the cause of every man, woman, and child concerned in them.

Fourth, let the churches encourage the ripening of motives into definite decisions. We shall not get through with this business of war, perhaps, until large numbers of persons here and there go individually over the divide that separates them for good and all from war-making in all its stages. This attitude has made its appearance already, and it is likely to spread. Not under emotional contagion, but in the sacred solemnity of cool thinking upon concrete situations, with a full realization of the costs, let our young citizens be brought face to face with this privilege of citizenship. How meaningful would faith, and consecration, and fellowship then become!

Even if the public schools and the church schools should continue their present policy of blowing hot and blowing cold, awakened parents need not do so. It is their privilege to declare the truth as they see it openly to their neighbors, and to bring up their children to the habit of the open eye. From such families will come at least a few prophets of peace who, even if their own generation stone them, will from their graves lead the forces of good-will to victory.

PLANTING PEACE AMONG THE CHILDREN

SARAH N. CLEGHORN

Sarah N. Cleghorn is well known as a contributor of articles and verse to *The Atlantic Monthly, Scribner's,* and other periodicals. For several years she has been on the faculty of Manumit School at Pawling, N. Y. She has written numerous articles on social questions for *The World Tomorrow,* of which she is a contributing editor. She is the author of *Portraits and Protests,* a book of poems.

PLANTING PEACE AMONG THE CHILDREN

SARAH N. CLEGHORN

I HAVE had a singular experience in trying to write this paper. My natural inclination was to attempt to describe the kind of social spirit which I think tends to raise in the hearts of children the growth of peace. I was strongly inclined to go as far as I could into the philosophy of life that seems to me most congenial to such a spirit. In short, I wanted to write about the kind of people we shall have to be, if we try to live with children and show them what peace is like.

But I believed that what was wanted from me was a group of concrete suggestions—actual methods which may be adopted by teachers and parents and which will lead toward what we all desire. I had in mind a set of such ideas, most of them ideas I have tried for several years, as a teacher and housemate of children, to practice. Accordingly I wrote such a paper, and I have tried to persuade myself ever since that it was meritorious. But the more I tried to imagine it in print, the clearer it became that it wouldn't be half as useful, actually useful, as the kind of paper will be (I hope) which I have all along wanted to write.

Should anybody who reads this feel any curiosity

as to what my concrete suggestions were, let me list the five of them here without further comment.

I. Frequent utopian discussions in schools and at home dinner tables, especially in relation to history and business.

II. Friendly communications from our children to the children of whatever race, class, or nation is temporarily the object of prejudice or suspicion.

III. A stout and stubborn refusal to tolerate the infliction of punishment on children or adults—especially marks of disgrace.

IV. Consideration for all animal pain, not only for animals of the protected and favored classes, but also of those outcast animals, commonly tormented for scientific research or for sport, as guinea pigs, angle-worms, and fish, or for food, as lobsters "broiled alive," or for fur, or extermination as "vermin," involving the hellish steel trap, etc., etc.

V. Provision in schools and homes of children's sanctuaries both of time and place, where children of these Western lands may indulge, as Eastern children habitually may do, in stillness and meditation.

I think these proposals are all very good. But now I am going to write about the roots of the tree that can bear such fruits. I am going to attempt a portrait of the disposition and attitude in us from which our children cannot help drawing in the habit of universal courtesy and confidence—such a portrait of it as Blake used to make of the faces and heads he saw in his visions; for to me this vision is also clear.

I see it quite clearly in action in the persons of a number of friends and acquaintances of my own, at

different times. It seems first of all to consist in a peculiar accessibility. Some people are very accessible to those who interrupt them; with extraordinary flexibility they accommodate themselves to the most frequent invasions of their plans and time. These interruptions they treat as welcome surprises, great opportunities for the very object they have in hand, —namely, relaxing and beautifying life and filling it with amenity. Some people are peculiarly accessible to strangers; even their photographs show those who have never seen them how easy they are to come at. When a stranger speaks to them they do more than return a civil and obliging answer; they somehow kindle. The electrons in their consciousness of self fly out of the old orbits and form a new chemical arrangement, in which the personality of the new acquaintance has been recognized, has been somehow received, accommodated. He passes on in the flesh, but his impact remains a part of the environment of the person who has welcomed him.

If persons possessed of this accessibility respond thus to casual strangers, how much more so to those comers who bear signs of misfortune, and make an emergency appeal. The lost puppy, the deformed or humiliated man, the subject race, the forlorn hope, are not merely received and accommodated, they are gone out after, they are drawn in with loving urgency, to the lights and the fire. The sight of need charges these persons with additional power. Their current of response exceeds itself. No one needs to work upon their feelings, for their feelings are not subject to growing stiff and dry.

Persons with this spirit are open to a peculiarly delicate need in others; I mean their need for freedom. For this reason children are especially at home with them, even when, as puzzled observers remark, "they pay no attention" to them. It is so, too, with the bashful and repressed. Though these persons approach others boldly, they approach softly; they seem able to recognize in others the same flower-like capacity for being bruised that we are each aware of in ourselves. They give air, they give room, to the guests of their hearts. They leave doors and windows open. The wildnesses, the fiercenesses, the sorenesses of the spirits who mingle with them are left unhandled; the bloom, too, of secret bliss they do not rub and crowd against.

There seems to be need, in mortal life, for a superabundance of spiritual force to weather certain storms which sweep along and overpower our bodies and our brains. This spirit of which I am trying to draw the portrait is provided with such superabundance of vitality. When the moral tornadoes sweep over them, they bend and rise again.

"They let the legions thunder past."

Something sustains them, a sense perhaps of the essential weakness and impermanence of the storm itself. To those whose continuing passion it is to show loving-kindness, the most unkind encounter will give sometimes only a more piquant opportunity. I have myself less than the average amount of this courage and endurance, but it seems plentiful in the world, more plentiful than one would dare to hope

from casual observation. Like the prisoners in Beaumont and Fletcher's play, many persons whom I know in the flesh, and have thus known, are able to reply to the threat:

> " 'Why, slaves, 'tis in my power to hang ye!'
> 'Very likely.
> 'Tis in our powers, then, to be hanged, and scorn it!' "

In short, the strength of this spirit consists in large part of extremely agile responsiveness to what is not at all obvious. All analysis of it comes back to the fundamental fact that its sense of self is not the usual strait-jacket, but a loose, elastic garment flowing away from its life on all sides. This loosened, libertarian form of self-consciousness is something people don't seem to be born with.

On the contrary, it seems to be attained by many sorts of personalities, through many sorts of experience and discipline; of which religious contemplation is only one, and not necessarily the best. Many people have the power of coming out of the skin-tight metal container most of us live in when awake, under the magnetism of lovely aspects of nature. For this reason, they feel a passionate pleasure in being alone in woods or by waters. Walt Whitman felt this to an intense degree. From time to time we read in a magazine some account of a sudden, startling experience of feeling, the life of a tree, or a wave, as it were from the inside of the tree's own life. Such an article, appearing a few years ago in *The Atlantic Monthly*, aroused a great deal of inquiry and corroboration.

Æ in his *Candle of Vision* refers often to this experience. The poetry of De La Mare and of Marguerite Wilkinson is full of it. Some people feel it in music, which, they say, "carries them out of themselves," gives them the sense of transport, of ecstasy. Many people have dreams which, though unremembered in form, leave such a glow and radiance behind. Perhaps those in whom I have been oftenest observing the action of this spirit are only those who have managed to follow where such intimations led them, and out of a tenuous and fragmentary apprehension have come at length into a mood, more or less continuous, of being almost as intensely aware of other lives as they are of their own. They feel in their very bodies how

"Momentous to himself as I to me
Hath each man been that ever woman bore."

But how? Who knows how such a spirit can be cultivated? Is there a sure and certain method for acquiring it? I have already indicated that I think so, that for every man I believe there is such a means; only I think it may never be exactly the same for any two of us. It must be somehow by exploring within, yet being more than ever active without; by using time and money and wits more and more completely "for the relief and benefit of the estate of man" (and beast), and yet by insisting all the time on reposing in our own hearts on the sense of infinite leisure; by somehow combining intensity of sympathy and sweating endeavor, day in and day out, to replace unhappiness by happiness, with the serene conviction under

all sympathy and struggle, that happiness, bright, earthly, and heavenly happiness, is the manifest destiny of all on earth.

Such a spirit, once we feel it growing in us, need take no special thought to translate itself into language children can understand. Children, like ourselves, assimilate a great deal that they can't consciously understand, and perhaps assimilate it all the better for that reason; and the moral, that is to say, the social, difference between two children, one of whom hears his parents habitually refer to their fellow mortals as "poor fish," "cheap skates," "riff-raff," "common, ordinary people," and one who habitually hears courtesy and fellow feeling in the language of his elders, will probably not be understood by any of the parties concerned, but only felt, felt in every encounter they make from youth to age, felt to the marrow of the bones.

This is not as good a portrait as Blake used to make of the heads and faces he saw in his visions. I am afraid it is all I am capable of putting on paper now. The inwardness of this life and character, however, is limned where we can all find it. We do know where to find the way to peace. All the international solutions are within the hearts of every woman and man who has to live among children. A mystic mole in the depths of us knows where, if we will let it burrow along the paths of its own deep instinct. No one alive is at any time without the buried impulse, the paradoxical power

"How from self the self itself to free."

PACIFISM IN PERSONAL RELATIONS

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES

John Haynes Holmes is minister of the Community Church in New York City. Formerly he was a Unitarian minister; from 1908 to 1911 he was president of the Unitarian Fellowship for Social Justice, and from 1908 to 1919 was vice president of the Middle States Unitarian Conference. He was president of the Free Religious Association from 1914 to 1919. He has been a member of the board of directors of the American Civil Liberties Union since its beginning in 1917, and has been active in a multitude of humanitarian causes. He is editor of *Unity*. Besides frequent articles, he has published a number of books, including *The Revolutionary Function of the Modern Church; Marriage and Divorce; New Wars for Old; Is Violence the Way Out?;* and *Patriotism Is Not Enough.*

PACIFISM IN PERSONAL RELATIONS

JOHN HAYNES HOLMES

IT IS an easy and pleasant task to discuss pacifism in personal relations. For it is precisely in these relations that pacifism has won its victory—a victory so complete and final that it is difficult now to conceive that it was ever in doubt.

In international relations force still rules the world, and the program of pacifism is regarded by practical men as a foolish and on occasion dangerous dream of amiable because weak fanatics. In economic relations the jungle law prevails between competing capitalists and between similarly competing capitalists and laborers, and constant strife, both horizontal and vertical, reveals with lurid glare "the good old plan" that

> "They should take who have the power
> And they should keep who can."

In social relations we have our prisons, our police, our constabulary, our whole vast system of repression, punishment, and death imposed upon the weak by the sheer physical power of the strong; and any proposal that there may be another and better way of keeping order in society is scorned as inexcusable

levity when not denounced as mild insanity. Yet the very men who accept force and violence as the divinely ordered method of controlling and directing human affairs are most of them exemplifying in their personal relations the program of pure pacifism! In this most intimate, delicate, and difficult of all phases of human contact, which once was ruled, like other relations between human beings, by the dominance of physical power, these men are dispensing with force and violence altogether. They have found this better way of which we have spoken—a way itself so simple, beautiful, and effective, that it has been forgotten that there was ever any other.

Yesterday, in our relations as individuals, we were all of us brutes whose reliance was "tooth and claw," just as we are still such brutes in our relations as members of the social order; to-day, in these personal relations, however, we are most of us men who have discovered reason and good-will. In that one field of experience, in other words, wherein we are able to exert direct personal control over events, we have established life on an out-and-out pacifist basis. And this achievement, so hardly won, and now so quietly and happily accepted, is the prophecy of the coming victory of pacifism in those more remote international, industrial, and social fields which men have yet to reclaim from the jungle to civilization.

The most primitive and intimate of all personal relations is the sex relation between man and woman. So far as we can make out, one of the earliest forms of marriage was "marriage by capture." The man went out and seized by force the woman with whom

he had chosen to consort. The helpmate thus seized by force must of course be held by force; and thus for ages the basis of the marital relation was accepted without question as the superior physical strength of the male. Long after "marriage by capture" had been succeeded by "marriage by purchase," and still later by other more civilized methods of acquisition, the laws and customs of society sustained the husband in the forceful possession of the wife. If defeated in war, for example, his wife became a part of the booty of the conqueror, to be held by him in perpetuity as wife or concubine. Euripides's "Trojan Women" shows how obediently, if tragically, this convention was accepted by women as well as men.

In the ordinary relations of daily life the rule of the husband over the wife ran all the way from the ancient power of life and death to the modern power of rebuke and chastisement. As late as the early decades of the Nineteenth Century in England, the right of a husband to beat his wife was duly established in the statute laws of the kingdom. The growing humanity of the times imposed a limit, to be sure, upon the pain and injury which could be inflicted—the rod of his anger must not be thicker than the man's thumb! But the right itself to beat into submission was incontestable. How could it be otherwise? For a man must keep order in his household; he must hold his wife fast to the stern duties of "bed and board." And how can this be done save by the rule of force? As well expect a slave to labor without the overseer's lash, as the wife to serve without the husband's fist or stick.

But all this is now a part of the barbarism of the past. No longer is marriage established and maintained upon the basis of the physical power of the male. There is compulsion still, but it is the compulsion of love and not of force. If a man is to win a woman to-day he must stir her compassion for his need and her admiration for his virtue. If a man is to hold a woman he must bind her to him by the compelling power of pure affection. The faithful wife now stands by her husband not because she fears his strength, but because she adores his devotion. She loves him, that is all! And "love is enough." Thus slowly through the ages has the marital relation been lifted from the low plane of physical force to the high plane of "soul force," to use Gandhi's great phrase. If husband and wife hold together to-day it is because they are "kindly affectioned one toward another, tender hearted, forgiving one another." Marriage, in other words, to the exact degree of its real success, is a purely pacifist institution.

What is true of the relation of husband and wife is true as well of the relation of parent and child. For centuries it was believed, and among multitudes of men is still believed, that children must be disciplined by force. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" is an adage not of one language but of many. In ancient times the father had frequently the power to slay his child on an occasion of extremity. This barbaric right has been tempered in our time to various forms of corporal punishment. But at the bottom of the latter as of the former is the conviction that a natively incorrigible boy or girl must be controlled,

and that control must be compassed by the threat or use of force. The superior physical power of the adult is the guarantee of order in the household. How otherwise can a child be disciplined to that capacity of self-control and self-direction which is the essence of character?

But corporal punishment, the use of force in the handling of a child, is in our time utterly discredited. In no enlightened household is the hand of the father or mother even so much as lifted against their offspring. Whipping, slapping, shutting in closets, denial of food, all penalties successfully visited upon children because the parents have the physical power to enforce their will, are now seen to be, like all use of violence, an indulgence of the primitive within us, and thus a breakdown of the very character which we would create in the child. They are above all, like all use of violence again, a resort of desperation on the part of those who know no better way.

But this better way exists—and has been found and is now being practiced in many homes. To understand a child, to respect a child, to love a child—this is all that is necessary to control a child. Nay, this very word "control" is inaccurate, a survival of the old and horrid days of physical compulsion! We do not "control" children any more; rather do we liberate them into a favorable environment created and sustained by the wisdom of enlightened minds and the peace of loving hearts. Our task as parents is to discipline, not our children but ourselves, and thus to make a world in which they may grow like flowers in the sun.

The same truth holds of the school as well as of the home. As recently as the time when I was a schoolboy, in public schools (in Massachusetts) rated among the first in the land, the relation between teacher and pupil was based fundamentally upon the principle of corporal punishment. No memory of my childhood is more vivid than that of the long "rattan," as it was called, which stood in the corner by the teacher's desk; and no experience of my childhood was more shocking than that of seeing this "rattan" descending viciously, stroke after stroke, upon the extended palms of my weeping and frightened playmates. This was the way the schools were run as recently as forty years ago. How else could children be controlled, and the authority of the teacher maintained? But we do not speak of "control" any more. The modern teacher does not use or even desire authority. Whereas the school yesterday was a place feared and hated by the

> ". . . whining schoolboy, with his satchel
> And shining morning face, creeping like snail
> Unwillingly to school,"

just because it was a place of authority and punishment and force, the school to-day is a place enjoyed and loved, and sought with eagerness and haste, because it is a place of comradeship and happy play and busy peace.

In this most difficult of all relationships, the relation between adult and child in the home, in the schoolroom and on the playfield, the use of force as

the sanction of authority is swiftly going. Soon in all homes and schools, as in all enlightened homes and schools at this moment, it will be gone, and in its place will rule the law of pacifism.

In our wider personal relations, as between man and man, the same truth holds. In earlier days the individual citizen went armed upon the street by day, and hid himself away at night in a home which was at once a fort and an arsenal. The sword or stave was as much a part of the personal equipment of a man three centuries ago as the fountain pen or match box is a part of the equipment of the modern man. Security of property and person demanded, according to the practice of the time, that force be ready for instant and effective use.

But we have a different practice to-day. The old convention still endures, rather foolishly, in the case of certain men who carry revolvers on their persons or keep them handy in their bedrooms. But most men to-day are emancipated from this personal bondage to the rule and armament of force. My own experience, I imagine, is typical of millions of men and women in our time. I was brought up in a household wherein firearms were taboo. I never saw a pistol or a gun except in places altogether removed from my immediate experience. For many years my father was regularly away from home for periods varying from one to three weeks, or even a month. This left my mother and the three younger children alone, to guard our property and protect our lives as best we could. But we never had firearms, most of the time not even a dog, to resist a possible intruder. Now the custom of

the family has descended to me. My home is as defenseless against attack as a paper box. Neither bolts nor bars, pistols nor swords, have any place in my household economy. As for myself, I have travelled far, been in dark places in strange cities at unseemly hours, hiked 'cross country as a stranger in a strange land, but have never carried so much as a stick to defend myself from molestation.

And this is a commonplace of experience to-day, is it not? The armed man is disappearing from contemporary life. The armored home is as antiquated as a mediæval castle. We no longer live together as citizens on the basis of force. Slowly but surely, through centuries of evolution in social contacts, we have been learning to substitute for force the intangible but substantial virtues of trust, good-will, and fair play one with another; until the weapons which were yesterday regarded as necessary to security are now actually regarded as a menace to security and, in a city like New York, for example, are prohibited by law. So far have we gone in shifting the daily routine of life to a pacifist basis that I am to-day, as a citizen of New York, actually guilty of a crime under the laws of the state if I have a revolver on my person or in my home.

But, it may be argued, this change in social custom does not mean that force has disappeared as the sanction of order and security in personal relations. It simply means that force has changed its form, or rather its place. Weapons are carried just as much to-day as they ever were, only they have been transferred from the possession of the single citizen as a

law unto himself to the possession of official police as the representative of the citizen. We do not undertake to-day to arm ourselves for defense at home and abroad for the obvious reason that there are armed men on every street corner charged professionally with this task. What we cannot do now, policemen will do for us with precisely the same weapons that our fathers used in the good old days of private arms. Behind the defenseless citizen, in other words, there stands the whole vast machinery of the police. Society exists to-day, as it has always existed, on the basis of force. Not so conspicuous as it used to be, this force is now infinitely more effective, since it is no longer distributed among myriad amateurs, but concentrated in the hands of professionals trained, like soldiers, to the job of shooting and killing.

To such plea of avoidance there are two answers. First, the police system is nothing new or unique in our time. Rome was superbly policed in the classic days of her imperial power. Yet her citizens felt it as necessary to be armed as to be decently clothed and shaved. In the Middle Ages there were wide areas where law of the king or the duke was imposed upon the people with a rigor unmatched in most areas of social life to-day. Yet every burgher went armed, and every traveller on the highways had his armed retainers. *Per contra,* in certain cities, not altogether unknown in our time, the police power has disintegrated under the corrosive influence of political and commercial corruption, and insecurity, so far as public control is concerned, has become rife throughout the community. But there has been no general arming

of the populace, and few individual householders have felt it necessary to turn their domiciles into citadels. Such collapse of the police power, it may be said incidentally, is coincident with veritable orgies of violence upon the part of the uniformed officers of law. In Chicago, for example, which is as near to a condition of primitive anarchy as any city in this country, the police are frequently armed with rifles as well as revolvers, and patrol the streets in armored automobiles equipped, like tanks on a battlefront, with machine guns. In London, on the other hand, long famous for the orderliness of its streets and the security of its homes, the police have no weapons at all. As a matter of fact, there is little causal relation between the phenomena of an unarmed citizenry and an armed police. So far have we gone in the direction of pure pacifism in our civic life that we are actually in sight of disarming the state as well as the individual in the routine associations of our daily affairs.

A second answer to our opponent's plea is found in the fact that men in all ages have explored and travelled through areas of the world which were unorganized socially, or were inhabited by savage tribes, and yet have found arms unnecessary. Most men, to be sure, have relied in such regions upon physical force for their security. They have met the spear with the sword, the arrow with the bullet. But others have gone unarmed and unafraid, on the simple basis of manly confidence in men, and have not had their trust betrayed. In the absence, in other words, of all force, save that wielded menacingly by the strange barbarians among whom they have moved, these gallant

adventurers have not only survived, but have enjoyed a security and happiness unknown to those who have come breathing bloodshed and slaughter. The Quakers have given us the supreme examples of this pacifist achievement in modern times. William Penn, in his Pennsylvania experience, answered conclusively and forever the claim that there is no ultimate security in our contacts with our fellow men, especially those of inferior culture, except in the control and exercise of superior physical force. Arms are necessary only when "hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, envyings, murders, and such like" are present in the heart. Displace these sentiments with "love, joy, peace, long-suffering, gentleness, goodness, faith, meekness, temperance"—and weapons of wood and steel may safely be put away. "Walk in the spirit," said Paul, "and ye shall not fulfil the lusts of the flesh."

No, there is more, far more, in this matter of pacifism in our civic contacts as individuals than the mere transfer of arms from the citizen to the state. There is something deeper here in our peaceful relationships as citizens than reliance upon force remote and organized. What we really have to-day is not a new police but a new psychology, a new inward mental habit projecting itself outwardly in the form of a new social convention. To-day we trust our neighbors, instead of distrusting them. We take it for granted that the great mass of our fellow men in our community, even in our nation, are friendly, and establish our individual conduct upon this basis. Consciously or unconsciously we breathe the air of fel-

lowship, and therewith find the whole temper of our lives transformed. The use of force as the sanction of personal life is disappearing. Already, in this our time, has pacifism become the law of men if not of nations.

Thus is pacifism coming into its own in our personal relations. This rule and discipline of action, so feverishly denounced, is nothing new or strange. Least of all is it anything quixotic, fanatical, mad. On the contrary, it is to-day the basis of the life we live in all the most intimate and difficult relationships of our human experience. The very men who clamor for ever greater armies and navies as the sole condition of national survival, and who rage at every suggestion of preparedness for peace instead of for war, are themselves the living witnesses, in their personal relations with their wives, their children, and their fellow citizens, of the practicability and beauty of that law of love which some of us would now extend to all the world. Pacifism has been proved. Wherever applied, it has stood trial. Like the discovered cure of a disease, it needs only to be extended from individual test cases in the laboratory to all cases in the world at large, to bring universal healing unto men.

For human nature, in things spiritual as in things material, is everywhere the same. Two men in contact present largely the same psychological problem as two million men in contact, just as two cells in contact present largely the same biological problem as two million cells in contact. Indeed, these personal relations of which we have been speaking are at bottom social relations. Every contact between indi-

viduals transforms itself at once into a social institution. The love of husband and wife creates the home. The care of parent for child creates the school. The life of neighbor with neighbor creates the community; the life of citizen with citizen creates the state. Our pacifism, therefore, is already prevailing, not only in individual experience but in social experience. Here are great institutions, formed by the relationships of individuals in daily contacts, dominated and glorified by the rule of peace. In the home, the school, the community, the nation, physical force has gone, and "soul force" is come. What has been done and is being done on this smaller scale can also be done on a vastly larger scale. The same gravitation that binds two dust grains in the soil binds as well two planets in the sky. So the same love that binds two brothers in the home may bind as well two nations on far-sundered continents. The law of life is one. Its fulfilment anywhere is the promise, prophecy, and pledge of its fulfilment everywhere.

CAN PACIFISM GROW?

GOODWIN WATSON

Goodwin Watson is associate professor of education at Teachers College, Columbia University, and author of many books, among which are: *The Measurement of Fair-Mindedness; Case Studies for Teachers of Religion; Experimentation and Measurement in Religious Education; Sketches In and Out of School;* and *Orient and Occident, an Opinion Study.* He is well known as a research director of the National Young Men's Christian Association, and as a public speaker.

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MANY an otherwise attractive utopia has remained a vision because it could find no adequate root in the soil of human nature. Every proposal for social change involves eventually a readjustment of human responses so far reaching that the mind tires in contemplation. Even so trifling a matter as the substitution of an easy metrical system for a complex inch-pint-pound system runs into learning so difficult that the portion of human nature which wants the change promises to be relatively ineffective in overcoming that other portion of human nature which has gotten set in its ways. The prohibition of the sale of alcoholic liquor has vividly demonstrated an ever widening circle of unpredictable reactions. No change stands by itself. No habit may be learned or unlearned in complete isolation. No organism in its change leaves others unaffected. Surely when motives so involved as those bound up with conflict are at stake, the best of intelligence will fail at many points to comprehend all the consequences of any change.

It is not strange, therefore, that wise men should differ so thoroughly in envisioning the altered human person proposed by the pacifist. Some have seen him as an impossible, airy creature, deprived of the very

stuff of his being, a freak which no biology would ever tolerate. Others have seen in the citizen of a warless world the inevitable flower of human growth through the long centuries.

For the most part, the strife of tongues seems to miss the crucial questions. There is, for example, much to-do about original nature. Now the at-bottom original, fundamental human nature is universal. It is common to all men of all centuries, all cities, and perhaps to the higher animals. The very existence of pacifists and militarists in the world is evidence enough that the warlike is not surely included within, nor excluded from, human nature. Some generations have been born, weaned, schooled, loved, utilized, reproduced, and eliminated with no outcropping of any war enterprise. Others have known little else. The Spartans might live for their battles while neighboring Athenians sought other prizes. Some tribes have existed for unknown generations with no participation in the curious and cruel rites known as warfare.

Not only facts but theories, too, agree. No scientifically acceptable theory of human nature offers any inevitable outcome toward war-making or peacemaking. It is a comfort to find this agreement in an area of psychological theorizing where the uncontested spots are few. One may hold with the reflexologists that man is born with little except a few simple hook-ups. On this theory the baby grows angry only when hands and feet are restrained. By some never-inquired-into chain of conditionings the baby presently learns to become angry when a bottle is

removed, or when the attending mother fails to appear on demand. Bit by bit the learnings accumulate, like connections on a metropolitan telephone exchange, until the situations which set him off may be a "When you call me that, smile!" word, or a few lines written in a letter. The responses meanwhile are re-re-re-reconditioned, so the story goes, until instead of the original yowl there appears a movement toward a handy club, or a gun, or, in other settings, toward the telephone and the lawyer's number. It is vain to try to list all the specific situations which might arouse someone in some civilization between North and South poles, between Tarzan and the Superman! A broken pole, a track in the dust, a face turned away, a noise in the night, a tarnished bead, a changed note, a newspaper article, a far-away oil deal. It is equally hopeless to begin the catalogue of responses—gritted teeth, deceptive smiles, letters, dark plots, coöperation, courtesy, protection of others. Each has its appropriate occurrence. What one shall do, how one shall do it, when one shall feel occasion to respond at all, all learned, learned, learned, says the reflexologist. Human nature becomes that which its bit-by-bit builders let it become.

At another extreme in theory are found the hormic theories of McDougall, Warren, Woodworth, and others. Human nature appears to be made up of pattern drives represented by words like "pugnacity," "fighting," "combativeness," "mastery," "acquisitiveness," and "self-assertion." Yet in the same lists appear "parental instinct," "tenderness," "sympathy," "coöperation," "gregariousness," and "love."

What determines when one shall function, when another? That is usually left unanswered. One loves in situations which call forth loving, fights when situations arouse fighting, noses around when situations provoke curiosity. Helpless as this leaves the scientist in predicting human responses, it is a necessary vagueness. The situations in which this core of feeling and action gets going must be many and varied to accord with the facts. Some will grow angry at a story which amuses others, embarrasses others, and profoundly bores others. Some will let their so-called fighting instinct operate with tooth and nail, others in quiet, pale-faced demands, others in bull-necked vocalizings, others in retaliation, others in self-improvement. "Gregariousness" for some may mean a League of Nations, for others the four hundred and fifty-eight clubs and societies of "Middletown." And here the separate streams of thought about original nature join. Whatever man is born with, whether ridiculously simple reflexes or scientifically incomprehensible urges, the fact remains that at age twenty-one the specific stimuli to which he reacts and the specific manner of his reacting have been formed not by his original nature but by the educative setting in which he has developed.

It is easy, also, to exaggerate the fixity and permanence of these learnings. Recent studies of adult learnings have emphasized a familiar experience. Old dogs do learn new tricks. A man to whom the name of Smith means nothing at all on Wednesday may hate Smith violently or admire him earnestly on Thursday. Never a war has come but many men past forty

have quickly learned to regret words of admiration for some nation and words of disparagement for another. New tools create new skills and new demands. Nothing known is more adjustable than specific human natures. It is almost impossible to catch them stable long enough to get a picture. Each person is ever becoming. Each reaction leaves the organism, perhaps in every part, different from what it was before. Changing human nature, in the sense of shifting its responses, is one of the easiest things in the world to do. To be sure of the exact nature of the change is one of the most difficult.

Perhaps the real predicament will appear when the task of pacifism is described with more precision. The pacifist is to respond to a situation such as "Mexican injures my countryman" with a pattern of responses something like that which he uses when he becomes aware of the situation "Chicago burglar injures my countryman." He is expected to respond to the need for funds to support international government with the same acceptance he gives to county taxes. He is no more to think of shooting a German than of shooting a rival bond salesman. In a world in which everyone did these things the new responses would be no more difficult to inculcate than the rather unquestioning acceptance of policemen and legislatures. Not schools particularly, but the conversation of parents and playmates, the assumptions of the story and scenario writers, the speeches and news and holiday ceremonies build up these habits of responding. Given one generation of pacifist life and the production of future generations with that same type of attitude

becomes as simple as breathing. To produce a war would require the kind of miracle which doesn't happen.

It is precisely the lack of such an educative environment that makes impossible at present the development of many pacifists. On the other hand, such a taken-for-granted pacific régime must be manned by the very type it would create. The social order must produce the new sort of citizen. The new sort of citizen is needed to produce the social order which can produce him. "So round about and round about and round about we go!"

How about the existing pacifists? Why have they broken with the standards of their milieu? What produced them? Largely factors which are specific and which are likely to operate on only a limited portion of the population. Some of them rebelled against an orthodox home and orthodox theology and got rebellion against orthodox patriotism and orthodox economics mixed in for good measure. Some have tasted the wine of crusading, many by the conqueror technique, a few by the martyr technique, and this cause represents an opportunity to carry on. If it weren't pacifism for some, it might be vegetarianism, antivivisectionism, or eugenics, or behaviorism, or child-centred education. Some are in the parade because admired friends are. Some join more readily because of the thrill of setting a world right. It adds to bigness and releases the cramp of interiority.

All of these emotional factors are peculiarly personal. The pioneers in any enterprise are social sports. Their numbers are very limited. They may be

the heralds of a new civilization but the civilization will not be made by more of the same circumstances which produced the forerunners. If pacifists multiply it will be because the social situation so rubs many individuals as to knock off militarist corners, and to favor a pacifist type of living.

The intellectual exposition and evaluation of pacifism, alone, while it has its value for the few, is likewise hopeless as a basis for widespread change in people. Doubtless the revulsion readily associated with war in modern life and the clear logic of the pacifist position must be admitted as influential. Yet in the mixed motives of men, respectable reasons are seldom predominant causes. There are many who have a physiological, nervous, intellectual, and emotional reaction against war, war scenes, and war incidents, who are nevertheless far from pacifism. There is no clear evidence that all of the logicians and all learned students of society are making pacifist responses. Logic may dress the congressional debate, but it seldom has brought about the attitudes of the debaters. Hence the question is not, fundamentally, the correctness of the pacifist position. It is a great but necessary assumption that the intellectual integrity of a scheme has little bearing upon its social acceptability. Anyone can point to absurdities in our fashions of dress, of income distribution, of immigrant selection, of choosing mates, and of worshipping the Lord, but he would best not set his heart on seeing his sounder schemes put into operation. When people change habits they need more than a good reason for doing so. They need circumstances which make the old re-

sponse uncomfortable, the new one gratifying. Such a change in situation will shift foods, clothing, or opinions. And the gist of the matter is that this annoyance over the effects of the conventional war responses has so far been very limited. Factors peculiarly personal have rearranged the scale of values for a few people, but the traditional culture of the masses bids fair to continue to prove no more unsatisfactory to them than any proposed shift toward pacifist behaviors.

This, then, is the course of the argument. The growth of pacifism is not determined or opposed by unchangeable instincts. The growth of pacifism, on the basis of the forces that produced the pioneer pacifists, is sure to be limited. The intellectual arguments are not quite, but almost, irrelevant. If pacifism is to grow, it will be because it becomes, for the masses, a more satisfying form of behavior.

Two hints for the guidance of such an educational process emerge from a review of the way in which people learn new behaviors. The first is that new behavior is learned specifically. The second is that new behavior is most readily learned if it relates itself directly to the major drives of human nature.

Behavior is usually learned specifically. Pacifism is often general and abstract. Before it is in form for learning it will have to be analyzed into a multitude of concrete ways of living. This may seem belittling to a cause which waxes impressive on generalizations. Love and good-will and freedom and peace are magnificent words. But they are deceptive words. They give the erroneous impression that they carry, in

themselves, the behaviors they are supposed to describe. Religious groups have been particularly prone to feel that the acceptance of the Golden Rule solved social problems. As well expect, suggests one writer, that acceptance of the multiplication table will build turbines. It is the discovery of proper applications that is hard.

Experimental investigations of character reveal an amazing lack of integration. Children who cheat in spelling may or may not cheat in athletic contests. Persons afraid of mice may be brave before burglars. Children obedient at school may be incorrigible in the gang. Adults may none of them be without sin, but may all reach for stones. A man may browbeat his son, grant every whim of his daughter, treat his wife as an equal, cringe before the doorman of his apartment house, lunch in jovial good-fellowship with his worst business rival, despise Mexicans, admire Mussolini, vote for a senator who is a strong advocate of world peace, and go himself to a Citizens' Training Camp. Just which of these responses are desirable, which undesirable, from the pacifist point of view? If pledge signing is all that is involved the task is much easier. But how far will pledges alone carry the pacifist program?

Just what other responses should be expected from a typical Iowa farmer aged forty, a Ziegfeld chorine aged twenty-two, a wealthy dowager, and a college professor of history? What are the current undesirable words and acts? What would the desirable ones be? To answer such questions as these is the first task of efficient pacifist propaganda.

The greater task is the relating of these specific behaviors to the strongest human desires. If, for example, any community could be so organized that the person who speaks of the next war loses caste as does the person who offends public taste, then one specific pacifist behavior would be related to the strong human trend toward avoiding scorn. What other trends might be called upon? Probably the major trends can be simply stated. Human beings tend to move from situations which are physically painful toward situations which are comfortable, full of pleasant feelings. Human beings tend to move from situations in which they are looked down upon toward situations in which they are looked up to. Human beings tend to move from situations which leave them thwarted and defeated toward situations giving them success and mastery. Human beings tend to move from situations in which they feel lonely and unwanted toward situations in which they are loved and appreciated. Human beings tend to move from situations which are monotonous and tiresome toward situations which are new and thrilling. Human beings tend to move from situations involving uncertainty and danger toward situations in which they are at home, feel themselves secure and safe. The list might be extended, but these trends will be among the strongest.

This, then, constitutes the crucial test of pacifism's progress. Will the specific pacifist behaviors seem to the ordinary man to assist in any such trends? Will he find pacifist behaviors relieving in any measure his physical discomfort or adding to his sense of well-

being? Will he find pacifist behaviors getting him recognition and approval? Will he feel that he has failed if the pacifist program doesn't operate, and find himself successful at getting done something he wants done, if he does? Will he find himself more deeply beloved as a pacifist? Will he find the pacifist response adding novelty, zest, and new experience to his living? Will he feel more securely at home in the situations connected with his pacifist responses than in the situations which fit with his traditional responses?

If the answer to these questions is now predominantly, "Yes," then pacifism can grow. The opportunity calls for something more dynamic than a survey. If the answer can be made to be predominantly, "Yes," then pacifism can grow!

The highest human quality in human nature is the ability to learn. The wayfaring man, though a fool, can learn to connect liver with health, certain badges with approval, correspondence schools with success, candy and flowers with being loved, movies with novelty, insurance with security. None of these are inborn or inevitable connections. Just as these and countless other elements of growth have been incorporated into human behavior, so the pacifist enthusiasm can be nurtured. Let the very real connection between peace and well-being, war and suffering, be emphasized until few can fail to associate them. Let agencies of public communication, newspapers, school texts, movies, articles, books, and speeches, so far as they can be controlled, speak their word of recognition for the servants of peace. Let the creative planning of small

groups throughout the world focus on the ideal of peace until any threat to its maintenance becomes a threat to hopes, schemes, and aspirations with which personality has been identified. Let the common aim bind men together in a fellowship so rare and distinctive that no thought of pacifism can exist without the beautiful glow of comradeship to enhance its appeal. Whenever men seek to preserve the best of the life in which they have found security, or to devise new steps toward the quickening or enriching of experience, let them be ever aware that neither stability nor zest is consonant with participation in modern warfare. Let the new order speak of its age-old peace and its haunting possibilities of new standards of life.

Pacifism will grow, then, not by chance nor by divine right nor by intellectual worth nor by zeal, alone. Pacifism will grow in so far as those who foster it are efficient social engineers, able to build above the wish, the deed.

LIFE'S BREAD AND WINE

E. MERRILL ROOT

E. Merrill Root is associate professor of English in Earlham College. He was a conscientious objector in the War and went overseas with the Friends' Reconstruction Unit in France, aiding in building projects for refugees. He is widely known as a lecturer and as a poet. For some time he was one of the editors of *The Measure*, and has contributed articles and verse to a large number of magazines. He is author of a book of poems, *Lost Eden*.

LIFE'S BREAD AND WINE

E. MERRILL ROOT

WHY do men after a period of peace accept and even welcome war? Many of them would admit that war makes the world indeed a "city of dreadful night," a place of "builded desolation and passionate despair." Their reason agrees with the realist; but some obscure inner necessity makes them believe that their actual interests are contrary to their factual interests. And though they may be wrong in what they choose, they are right in what they want.

The man in the street (even the man in Wall Street) accepts war not so much because he is a fool as because his life is foolish. He wants adventure and poetry; he has a quaint passion for dragons; he feels a divine despair for unicorns; he longs for magic casements opening on the foam. And then the realistic pacifist offers him the unimpeachable platitude that fiery dragons will set fire to hen-coops; proves with pomp and circumstance that unicorns (being creatures of the moon, who do not understand "Gee!" and "Haw!") will not plough a cabbage field; or says that the foam of perilous seas in faëry lands forlorn will give him a sore throat!

That is why the realistic pacifist is at once so unanswerable and so futile. Almost all men will admit that

war is irrational; but that is the very reason they feel an obscure inner impulse toward it. If war is irrational, so much the better; anything to escape the rationality of every day! You may warn convicts that they will be chased and shot; but they often prefer excitement (even with mutilation) to safe and sane gang labor. You may keep a boy in the house without pictures, books, toys, or a dog; tell him to be perfectly quiet; and assure him that he will kindle red ruin if he plays with the matches; but he usually prefers red ruin (even complicated with roast boy) to safe and sane dullness. Man does not live by bread alone, but—as the symbol of the sacrament tells us—by bread and wine. Bread (or prose) is necessary; wine (or poetry) is just as necessary. Men sometimes turn to war because they have only half rations of the bread; but they often accept war with a desperate joy because they have had *no* rations of the wine.

The real objection to war, of course, is not that it is irrational, but that it is so rational as to be mechanical. It is not a magic casement: it is a barred cell. It is not a unicorn visiting the glimpses of the moon: it is a well-drilled army mule. It is not a conflict with dragons: it is a contest between spectacled high priests of science as to which can first invent the most obliterating gas. Such is the answer of words. But the answer of deeds must be to provide the unicorn, the dragons, the magic casement opening on the foam.

The great wrong of our civilization is its dullness—the dullness of the day-by-day. The great hope of our civilization is the possible romance of the day-by-day. What we need is a world where men can truly

enjoy the lilies of the field and the many mansions.

Consider industry. The spirit of man asks for fairyland and is given a factory. We all know the mill: that oblong of red brick, shaking like a dinosaur with appendicitis. Who would not rather go to war (at least until he found that lice, mud, gas, and Big Berthas were just as bad) than to spend his life in a mill? Motor through a mill village: the houses are as alike as Fords or muffins. From such a place a manhole into hell would seem a magic casement . . . a tank would seem a unicorn! Or think of Caliban in the coal mine—

"Nothing but blackness above,
And nothing that moves but the cars—
God, if you wish for our love,
Fling us a handful of stars!"

One could scarcely blame Caliban if he took star shells for stars. Or, even worse, think of the clerk in the department store—tending soap or chiffon as anxiously as ants tend their white larvæ. Industry is dull: that is its worst crime. It gives little bread—but it gives no wine. Instead of the lilies of the field fairer than Solomon in all his glory, it gives us the bobbins of the factory, duller than Babbit and all his real estate. It is not a merry-go-round, but a dreary-go-round. It it as hopeless as the *Looking Glass* jingle about seven maids with seven mops trying, day after day, to sweep all the sand into the sea. A world of stenographers, five-and-ten clerks, shoe salesmen, coal miners, advertising agents, and bobbin boys without

leisure or poetry, *must* react from the dullness of their lives by indulging in professional baseball, vice crusades, Coney Island, cocaine, *The Saturday Evening Post,* the movies, the Ku Klux Klan, Billy Sunday, and war—all of which one may call sowing the wild oats of poetry.

The trouble with the industrial civilization "whereunder crawling cooped we live and die" is that it makes existence so dull that we swallow life like a cold pancake. Now one should never swallow life like a cold pancake: one should take life either as a fairy tale or as a nightmare. And, not being able to delude itself into thinking modern life a fairy tale, the spirit of man often prefers even the nightmare of war to the cold pancake of the day-by-day.

Or consider education. Plato said that education should be a "turning of the eye of the soul toward light." *Our* education turns the eye of the body toward law offices and Cadillacs—or toward tractors and manure. Education should be a magic casement opening on the foam of that shore where Sir Isaac Newton walked, picking up a shell here, a pebble there, while he listened to the "mighty waters rolling evermore." It should be a unicorn, carrying us into ultimate lands of poetry where words ring like smitten harp strings or glow with all the gorgeous glamour of witches' oils. It should make our mind a magic land, over which float Shelley's clouds driven by the wild west wind: a land where Keats's nightingale sings: a land beside which sound the mournful and memorable seas of Conrad: a land into whose sky

Hardy rises like a bleak, august mountain hooded with stormy clouds. It should be liberal like the Dervish in the Eastern tale—who gave the Prince an ointment which, rubbed upon his eyes, made him see all the hidden treasure and riches of the earth. It should fascinate the mind with "the fairy tale of science and the long result of time."

Education should be "liberal" in the most audacious sense of that disfigured term, for it must liberate; it should create not coin but character. And what *does* it do? It scarcely exists. Instead of education we get paraphernalia: million-dollar dormitories, halls which are too often dormitories in the Latin sense, laboratories—and stadiums. And *inside* we get the tedium of a life that is too feeble to carry the weight of its shell—an Ariel and Hamlet incased in the carapace of a mollusk as big as a dinosaur! We find huge enrollments, monstrous classes, overtasked professors lecturing dully, literalistic and factual mangling of literature by cogwheels that claim to be men, degrees that are mere recommendations for jobs or certificates of social prestige. Education is a dull department store where you buy science by the yard (or inch), Shelley-chops by the pound, or history by the (very much watered) quart. And in order to make it even more mechanical, you have the drill master sending all the Robots through the motions of military training. The whole affair is a factory for the manufacture of intellectual pemmican, of spiritual dried beef—superintended by foremen who are Ph.D.'s, concerning whom Walter Hendricks has said the final word:

"I think there should be two of me:
A living soul, a Ph.D."

Finally, as a wild and pathetic and hopeless reaction against all this, you find fraternities, athletics, "college spirit," and the hideous hilarities of the "old grads"—in short, you get, once more, the wild oats of poetry!

And when, in addition, the family often seems an institution for clipping the wings of young eagles; and when religion seems a worship of Property, the Father—Respectability, the Son—and Conformity, the unholy Spirit—who can wonder that daring and imaginative youth follows any will-o'-the-wisp or balefire that happens to cross the horizon? Alan Seeger thinks war romantic much as a Gopher Prairie yokel who has never known anything better might gape at a Chautauqua lecturer or a circus calliope. The shop or office is dull, the school is dull, the home is dull, religion is dull: civilization is endurable only to cigar-store Indians. And so all that is vital in the human spirit feels an obscure inner necessity for anything—even for war—which will redeem it from dullness: just as Swinburne, during the mid-Victorian boredom, wildly (and foolishly), prayed for a harlot to "come down and redeem us from Virtue."

Moreover, we must add to this dullness our contemporary literature of diagnosis—medicinal realism which devotes itself (often solemnly) to the antiseptic task of making the dullness of things as evident as possible, but seldom goes beyond and shows us the Superman and the Arrows of Longing—from

Mencken on the heights to Masters in the gulf—till we get a world where the human mind, knowing it is an inhabitant of a very mean city—seeing, in the words of James Branch Cabell, "the mile-post rather than the goal"—despairs and accepts war, cynically as a fatality, or æsthetically as a spectacle.

We hear much of the unrest, the extravagances, of Youth. But with industry (to workman or to capitalist) as dull as an existence devoted to sifting ashes, and with education as dull as a symposium of fossils, how can spirited and daring youth be anything but restless and extravagant? As Thoreau said, our only concern should be because we are not extravagant *enough!* The only answer to the appealing pseudo-extravagance of war is to show that it is not extravagant, but merely the dull final result of working out our dull contemporary equation; and to provide the true extravagance.

What can we do?

"Only that day dawns to which we are awake." The first requisite is to know that we are dissatisfied —and the second is to know at least the direction whence satisfaction must come. Our slow, creative task is to add the wine of poetry to the bread (what there is of it) of prose. Are we employers? Then we must make our business as human and interesting as we can under the present system; and also do all that we can to change that system. Are we workmen? Then we should strive (for our own sakes) to put as much as we can into our work—whether repairing Fords or selling fish; and also use our energies and brains to foster a different social order. Are we pro-

fessors? Then we should not be "scholars"—clocks (as Nietzsche says) that give out a steady, dependable ticking—so long as you remember to wind them up: rather we should be dynamos of the spirit: rather we should show our students the wonder and spectacle of life as drama—from electron and protozoön up through Einstein and Shaw to those "beings who are now latent in our thoughts and hidden in our loins . . . (who) shall stand upon the earth as on a footstool, and shall laugh and reach out their hands amid the stars." Are we students? Then we should discover the inner springs of romance, and be able—

> "To see a world in a grain of sand,
> And a Heaven in a wild-flower;
> Hold infinity in the palm of your hand
> And eternity in an hour."

And in the family, in religion, we should insist upon daring, experiment, adventure, till—even in the day-by-day—we hear all the horns of elfland loudly blowing. If we hear the horns of elfland we shall not listen for the bugles to blow battle.

We must, in short, provide the æsthetic equivalent of war. We must make art and philosophy magic casements opening on the foam of perilous seas in faëry lands that are *not* forlorn. We must make science a unicorn to carry us nearer to the heart's desire. We must challenge youth with the real dragons: disease, militarism, ignorance, capitalism, war, the dullness of the mob. Let us sign our letters (and our lives), "Yours for magic casements!"

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